Empirical Moral Psychology Research Articles

Critiquing Empirical Moral Psychology

Thought experimental methods play a central role in empirical moral psychology. Against the increasingly common interpretation of recent experimental data, I argue that such methods cannot demonstrate that moral intuitions are produced by reflexive computations that are implicit, fast, and largely automatic. I demonstrate, in contrast, that evaluating thought experiments occurs at a near-glacial pace relative to the speed at which reflexive information processing occurs in a human brain. So, these methods allow for more reflective and deliberative processing than has commonly been assumed. However, these methods may still provide insight into some human strategies for navigating unfamiliar moral dilemmas.

A Review of Kristján Kristjánsson, 2006. Justice and Desert-Based Emotions. Aldershot: Ashgate

moral principles) and even nominally ascribe to them but he could never have a sense of justice in situ. To use some pseudo-scientific language of my own, for Hoffman, it is an empathic disposition that ‘‘turns you on’’ and ‘‘tunes you in’’ to human suffering as something to be pained about. It structures and informs one’s perception of other people’s aversive experiences in a way that is characteristic of morality as it is commonly understood—that is, as placing demands on us to suspend hypothetical first-person action incentives in the name of others’ (deserved) weal and woe. William Damon and ‘‘Positive Justice’’ Reasoning Of the three theories of justice internalisation Kristjansson tackles, his response to Damon’s (1975) stage-theory of ‘‘positive justice’’ reasoning is by far the clearest illustration of his neo-Millian notion of theoretical ethics in dialogue with empirical moral psychology. Damon’s theory presents a descriptive account of how children’s thinking about fair sharing progresses over the course of childhood, from about age 4 to age 10. Its novelty resides in showing that an appreciation for familiar principles of fair distribution of the kind that appear in Sher’s (1987) list of desert-base categories—strict equality, equity (to each according to need), self-interest (to each according to what he wants), merit (to each according to ability, effort, good behaviour, etc.) and ad hoc group rights (to us according to our social status, age, gender, etc.)—comes cognitively on line among children in a specific sequential order. Furthermore, the particular stage sequence that Damon’s theory traces, which begins with first-person wants, proceeds to ad hoc claims to group rights, and then on to strict equality, and beyond, can be accounted for in terms of the basic mechanisms of developmentalism: de-centration and growth towards greater conceptual ‘‘adequacy’’. That is to say, higher stages are not just different from lower stages. They are ‘‘better’’ insofar as they constitute a more sophisticated understanding of distribution problems. The highest stage marks the ability to draw judiciously on the range of distributive criteria in consideration of their relevance to the situation at hand and its social goals and purposes. In Kristjansson’s own attractive wording of it, ‘‘the oldest children 64 B. Maxwell

Can Moral Obligations Be Empirically Discovered?

hese are good days for empirically minded philosophy .It is now common tosee philosophers cite laboratory studies in support of their theories , and agrowing number of philosophers are conducting their own psychological experi-ments .F rom a wormOs eye perspective ,it looks a little bit like there is a method-ological revolution taking place .Gone are the days when philosophers had to readpsychology journals covered in discrete bindings so as to hide a perverse interest inthe latest sexy results .At least that is true in most areas of philosophy .Lately ,themethodological revolution has been gaining ground in ethics . Philosophers nowroutinely site the burgeoning empirical literature on moral judgment. T he majorityof this work has been descriptive in nature .Psychology and neuroscience are beingused to determine what goes on in peopleOs heads when they decide that somethingis morally right or morally wrong .T raditionally minded ethicists continue to feelinsulated from the onslaught of empirical moral psychology .Ethics has long beenin the business of telling us how we ought to behave ,rather than merely describinghow we do behave .Such normative claims appear to have a kind of immunity toempirical investigation. Psychology can reveal what we morally detest, but itcannot reveal what we should detest. Or so it would seem. In this chapter ,I wantto explore this supposition and argue that empirical methods can actually shedlight on what we ought to do .Along the way ,I will also make some other contro-versial claims .I will say that morality has an emotional basis ,and I will endorse aform of relativism. Of course ,such conjectures require much more discussion thanI can of fer here .My arguments will be preliminary ,and I will content myself withhaving shown how ,in principle ,one might go about trying to discover obligationsMidwest Studies in Philosophy , XXXI (2007)© 2007 Copyright T he A uthorsJournal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing ,Inc .271

Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory

Previous articleNext article No AccessPhilosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory*Tamara Horowitz Tamara Horowitz Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 108, Number 2January 1998 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/233809 Views: 146Total views on this site Citations: 19Citations are reported from Crossref © 1998 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Paul Rehren, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong How Stable are Moral Judgments?, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 31 (Jul 2022).https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00649-7Shang Long Yeo A Bayesian analysis of debunking arguments in ethics, Philosophical Studies 179, no.55 (Aug 2021): 1673–1692.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01721-1Sergiu Buscaneanu Tertium datur: Multi-attribute reference points and integration choices between the European Union and Eurasian Economic Union, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23, no.44 (Dec 2020): 627–644.https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120974012Shang Long Yeo Defusing the Regress Challenge to Debunking Arguments, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50, no.66 (Aug 2020): 785–800.https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2020.31Ruth Weintraub Peer disagreement and counter-examples, Philosophical Studies 177, no.77 (Mar 2019): 1773–1790.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01284-2Tomasz Żuradzki The Normative Significance of Empirical Moral Psychology, Diametros 17, no.6464 (Jun 2020): 1–5.https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1626Alex Voorhoeve, Arnaldur Stefánsson, Brian Wallace Similarity and the trustworthiness of distributive judgements, Economics and Philosophy 35, no.33 (Dec 2018): 537–561.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267118000457Sandra Dreisbach, Daniel Guevara The Asian Disease Problem and the Ethical Implications Of Prospect Theory, Noûs 53, no.33 (Sep 2017): 613–638.https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12227Camilla Colombo Doing, Allowing, Gains, and Losses, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21, no.55 (Nov 2018): 1107–1118.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9949-8MICHAEL NEUMANN Testing Rationality, Dialogue 57, no.0303 (Mar 2018): 615–631.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217318000094Margherita Arcangeli Thought Experiments in Model-Based Reasoning, (Jan 2017): 463–493.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30526-4_21Regina A. Rini Debunking debunking: a regress challenge for psychological threats to moral judgment, Philosophical Studies 173, no.33 (Jul 2015): 675–697.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0513-2Joanna Demaree-Cotton Do framing effects make moral intuitions unreliable?, Philosophical Psychology 29, no.11 (Dec 2014): 1–22.https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.989967Regina A. Rini Psychology and the Aims of Normative Ethics, (Sep 2014): 149–168.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_162Regina A. Rini Making Psychology Normatively Significant, The Journal of Ethics 17, no.33 (May 2013): 257–274.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-013-9145-yAlex Barber Hedonism and the Experience Machine, Philosophical Papers 40, no.22 (Jul 2011): 257–278.https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2011.591850Neil LEVY, Yasuko KITANO We're All Folk: An Interview with Neil Levy about Experimental Philosophy and Conceptual Analysis, Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 19, no.00 (Jan 2011): 87–98.https://doi.org/10.4288/jafpos.19.0_87Felipe De Brigard If you like it, does it matter if it's real?, Philosophical Psychology 23, no.11 (Feb 2010): 43–57.https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080903532290Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell Human Nature and the Best Consequentialist Moral System, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2002).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.304384