Emergence Of Rights Research Articles

Primitive society and law

The article is devoted to the study of the process of the emergence of rights in the primitive society of the period of savagery and barbarism. The time frame expands from the beginning of the birth of life (about 4.1 – 3.7 billion years ago) to the invention of methods of cultivation of land and the primary division of labor and the invention of ancient civilization of Sumerians of writing (respectively 6,500 years - 3,100 years BC). The social and anthropological reasons for the emergence of law (needs of common habitation, normative consciousness), the world-view basis, the nature of the binding character of the original rules, their interrelation with morality, are substantiated. The original rules of conduct in the form of prohibitions (taboos), custom, rite, worship and ritual were alloy, a mixture of divine and natural, magical and psychological. These mono norms formed the core of primitive law as the form of proper, necessary behavior, the most significant factor of the force of which was the joint residence and the mutual benefit of acting concertedly.In the absence of political power in the primitive society, they also supported the authority of tribal leaders, elders, healers, healers and sorcerers. With the emergence of religion and systems of morality, these norms receive a new religious and value justification and differentiate from those norms of morality that do not require more stringent, compared with them, sanctions. Thus, the social interaction in the process of living together and the elaboration of the rules of this residence, the improvement of the methods of resolving conflicts and disputes provided the ground on which the archaic right of the primitive society has grown, which in the form reached us in the relevant earliest historical sources, according to the constant scientific tradition, is called customary law.Article received 20.11.2018

PERLINDUNGAN HAK ANAK PASCA PERCERAIAN ORANG TUA

Marriage after will give rise to legal consequences for both parties, not least the child of the marriage. The result is the emergence of rights and obligations. In fact, many households are unable to realize these goals and finally divorced, whereas marriage laws make every effort to reduce the number of divorces, as a result of divorce not only to parents but to children as well. Do not let children of divorce who have got the psychological burden, plus more for the rights of civilización the form of children's rights is not fulfilled by the parents. This paper has discussed the protection of children's rights after the divorce of both parents, which to answer is used legal research with a legislative approach and a conceptual approach. Legal protection for children both before and after divorce is needed to minimize the occurrence of things that are not desired by the child itself, such as the absence of affection, the child becomes neglected and the child also cannot get along as a child.Keywords: legal protection, divorce, and children's rights.

A TUTELA JURISDICIONAL COLETIVA E O SISTEMA DE PRECEDENTES NO DIREITO BRASILEIRO

The advent of the social state caused the emergence of rights of a collective nature and mass conflicts, making it necessary to create mechanisms for collective tutelage, given the incapacity of the classical process to promote the adequate protection of these new litigation. Aiming to solve this situation, a system of collective tutelage has been created, whose objective is the protection of diffuse, collective and individual homogeneous rights. However, this system proved incapable of solving the excessive number of demands that overwhelm the Judiciary, which has made it necessary to establish a system of binding precedents in order to achieve greater consistency and stability in the jurisprudence. In view of this context, the present study aimed to analyze the Brazilian system of collective tutelage, through the examination of collective actions and procedural incidents of resolution of repetitive cases that are part of the Brazilian precedent system. The methodology followed the deductive method, using doctrinal and legal research on the researched topic.

Spousal Abuse

This article investigates an overlooked aspect of Chinese legal modernity: how legal change influenced changes in individual consciousness. The article traces in particular the emergence of rights thinking in divorce cases from the 1930s and 1940s by examining the process in which grievances about domestic abuse were transformed from mostly informal and inchoate disappointments into formal, legally actionable complaints under the provisions of the Republican Civil Code of 1929–1930. Case records suggest that popular perceptions about the degree of cruelty that was “tolerable” in marriage were shifting as abuse came to be viewed less as a matter of fortune or fate and more of law and justice. The deployment of legal rights by wives seeking to divorce on the basis of intolerable cruelty, however, met with limited success. Judicial decisions mostly affirmed the preservation of marriage, consolidating a modern form of conjugal patriarchy.

The Philosopher's child: critical perspectives in the Western tradition

Part 1 Ancient children: Socrates's children, Gareth B. Matthews Aristotle's children - formation through Genesis, Oikos and Polis, Daryl Tress. Part 2 Modern children: Thomas Hobbes's children - the emergence of reason and the emergence of rights, Peter O. King John Locke's children, David Archard Immanuel Kant's children - Kant and the family, Arnuf Zweig John Stuart Mill's children - liberalism and the school of obedience, Susan M. Turner. Part 3 Twentieth-century children: Ludwig Wittgenstein's children, Phil Shields John Rawls's children - their moral status, Samantha Brennan and Robert Noggle.

Socioeconomic Human Rights: Past and Future

This is an exploration of the sources of and economic proclaimed in major twentieth century international human instruments. Efforts are made to explore particular sources of such and state duties in order to reconsider certain widely supported propositions. One of the propositions examined in this paper is the idea that something termed social rights evolved from the late nineteenth century as part of an expanding conception of national citizenry. The late British historian, T. H. Marshall, has incomparable influence on the literature concerning human through his thesis of a three-stage development of the of citizens, this ending with the emergence of rights.' Marshall's work draws rather sharp lines between such rights, identified with the availability of protection programs to every citizen as a matter of legal right and earlier approaches to protection that were based on means tests, programs that had little direct effect on inequality and that were not woven into the fabric of citizenship.2 A second issue that is addressed is the relationship between centuries old paternalistic ideas about the socioeconomic welfare of the poor which led to programs designed to promote protection at the national level and current interpretations of internationally prescribed and economic rights. Did the organized international community, during the quarter century following World War II, seek to go beyond paternalistic conceptions that focus on the duties of states rather than of the individuals? Or, alternatively, did that community merely prescribe a lowest common denominator of state duties in the name of human rights?

Models of rationality and mental health rights

The sudden and often controversial development of mental health rights may blind us to the fact that these rights have developed unevenly. For example, the right to treatment for those involuntarily committed to mental institutions has emerged much more quickly and comprehensively than has the right for these individuals to refuse treatment. Why is this the case? The emergence of rights is related to changes in ideologies. It is also related to the mobilization of legal resources. This article focuses on the link between ideological change and the uneven emergence of these two rights. The ideologies are based on psychiatrists’ beliefs and perceptions of mental patient rationality. The right to treatment and the right to refuse treatment respectively are related to two quite different models of rationality. Psychiatric textbooks and other general work in mainstream psychiatry show that the model of rationality consistent with the right to treatment has been far more prevalent and central to practicing psychiatry than has the model that is closer to the right to refuse. The first part of the paper briefly documents the uneven emergence of the two sets of rights. Part II develops the models of rationality and shows how the respective rights are related to the models. The third part demonstrates the prevalence and centrality of one of the models consistent with the right to treatment, while Part IV looks at how and why the other model is subordinated.