Practice, Semiotics, and the Limits of Philosophy John J. Stuhr Ralph Waldo Emerson famously wrote that each generation must write its own books or, rather, the books for the next generation. Many American philosophers have shared this goal and have taken up this task. They have wanted to think forward, wanted reconstruction in philosophy, wanted their own, new, original relations to the universe. If this is possible, how is it possible? This is a pragmatic question, but it seems to be a particularly difficult question for those pragmatists who are committed to: pluralism (such that the books that speak to one person may not address or be alive for or be instrumental for another person); time and finitude (such that change, precariousness, and difference are ineliminable, and that theorizing is always situated and provincial); and practice (such that beliefs are habits of meaning-full, meaning-giving, embodied action.). In their illuminating and genuinely original new books, both Robert Innis and Richard Shusterman provide substantial resources for reconstruction in philosophy today. Here is the "cash-value" of this claim: If you have not already done so, you should buy these books and then you should read them. In Pragmatism and the Forms of Sense: Language, Perception, Technics, Innis presents us with a scholarly tour de force—a book that draws on figures familiar to members of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy as well as on European authors too often at (or beyond) today's professional canonical margins. Beginning with the observation that we have experiences in which we "fuse" with the probes or instruments we employ and that extend us to the world in new ways, and reaffirming the view (from John Dewey, Ernst Cassirer, and others) of tools and language both as ways of making the absent present, Innis develops the "'probal' nature of language and technics as embodied in, and as embodied forms of, perception" (Innis 2002, 3): "Language and technics are treated in this book as twin 'forms of sense,' that is, vast weblike systems of meaning-making in which we dwell, into which we have extended ourselves, and upon which we must fatefully rely. They are also 'forms of sense' in that they shape, form, and mold the very channels in which our body-based perceptual systems grow and develop. Language and technics are alike in not [End Page 73] just shaping but also growing out of their perceptual, actional, and social roots" (3, 4). "We attend from them," Innis writes, "for attending to something"; both language and technics have this "from/to" structure" (3). Innis thus develops an account of the irreducible sociality (83), nature, scope, and consequences of systems of signs and systems of tools—and of the ways in which their forms are embodied in perception while also being embodied forms of perception. At the close of his introduction, Innis writes: "What I am arguing for is, then, the analytical, descriptive, and normative power of a set of overlapping and mutually reinforcing ways of thinking"—thinking with the combined conceptual resources of pragmatism and semiotics—"about our embodiment in language and technics as forms of sense. I am exploring and attempting to justify, what I consider to be pivotal forms, of sense abut the forms of sense" (14). What is most distinctive and, I think, most important here is Innis's understanding of the ways in which meaningful perception saturates language and tools while, at the same time, they seep through and constitute perception. As Innis writes at the end of his first chapter on the perceptual roots of linguistic meaning, "Not only, then, is perception embodied in language; language is embodied in perception" (50). And, as for language, so too for technics. So, what is the analytical, descriptive, and normative power of this view? The descriptive power, the phenomenological illumination, of Innis's account of meaning-taken and meaning-making seems immense. His "rotations" of pragmatists and semiotic theorists recast and advance the insights and theoretical strengths of each, and his examples—particularly, I think, his discussions of aesthetic experience and art—make clear the relevance and practical applicability of this theory. Let me close this portion of my "fan...
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