Elite Bargains Research Articles

The Rules of the Game: Unpacking Patronage Politics in Yemen

This article examines the dynamics of autocracy in Yemen through the lens of elite bargaining and decision-making inside networks of patronage. It identifies the informal of inclusion, exclusion, rewards, and punishments that guide elite behavior and traces changing patterns of patronage distribution since 1994. In doing so, it provides insights into the survival of the Yemeni autocracy, the obstacles to reform, and potential opportunities to avert an impending crisis. Much has been written recently in the press, government documents, and academic literature on the immediate security, socio-economic, and political crises in Yemen.1 As such, the purpose of this article is neither to examine in detail the specific challenges threatening the Yemeni regime, nor to predict what constellation of factors could overwhelm the central government and/or result in a widespread humanitarian crisis. Instead, it aims to take a step back from immediate destabilizing factors to explore the underlying organization of power in the country. More specifically, it will unpack the informal rules of the that guide elite decision-making and bargaining within the domestic political context. In doing so, this article will provide insights into the survival of the Yemeni autocracy, the obstacles to meaningful reform, and potential opportunities to avert an impending crisis. It aims to contribute to the literature on the dynamics of autocracy and the study of informal institutions, while the same time opening the black box of patronage politics for policymakers who engage the Yemeni regime on issues of political, economic, and security reform. The Organization of Power and Informal Institutions On paper, Yemen has an elected parliament and president, a multi-party system, an independent judiciary, and the framework for a democratically elected local government. In reality, however, these institutions do not produce or transfer political power. Instead, power and wealth are produced and transmitted through a highly informal, yet deeply patterned web of tribally- and regionally-based patronage relationships. To understand the dynamics of the Yemeni autocracy, one must look beyond written laws and formal democratic institutions to the informal of the game that govern political behavior. In an attempt to operationalize the study of informal institutions, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky suggest that at a minimum scholars must answer three basic questions: First, what are the actors' shared expectations about the actual constraints they face ... Second, what is the community to which the informal apply ... and third, how are informal enforced?2 This article will loosely follow Helmke and Levitsky's framework. Drawing on extensive fieldwork,3 it will first identify the relevant community to which the informal of patronage politics apply. It will then identify actors' shared expectations of the that guide political behavior. Outlining these rules of the will clarify what political actions are acceptable and which are considered crossing in the Yemeni context. The discussion of red lines will highlight the extent to which demanding political or economic reforms, especially those that encourage institutional formalization and democratic accountability, are a radical departure from the status quo. Next, it will address the consequences or punishments associated with breaking the of the game. These punishments, or enforcement mechanisms, are often subtle, hidden, or even illegal.4 Finally, the article will conclude with a brief analysis of the changing patterns of patronage inclusion and exclusion since President 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih consolidated power throughout Yemen after the 1994 civil war. To some extent, this article is an exercise in simplification. The informal institution of patronage politics is a product of a complex game of elite bargaining between Salih and his clients. …

The Strategic Use of Referendums: Power, Legitimacy, and Democracy

The Strategic Use of Referendums: Power, Legitimacy, and Democracy. By Mark Clarence Walker. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 166p. $49.95.This book portrays the referendum as a consequence of elite bargaining. Mark Walker describes this electoral device as one that arises from an executive–legislative struggle where competing groups attempt to gain political legitimacy from the masses, even in nondemocratic states. Political elites thus use the referendum to settle disputes that appear irresolvable in the traditional chambers of the power, or, as E. E. Schattschneider indicated in The Semi-Sovereign People (1960), to expand the scope of the conflict to enhance one's political advantage. The referendum process is thus subject to manipulation—by the choice of wording, the timing of the vote, the subject matter, and even the interpretation of the results.

Electoral Systems and Elite Bargaining in Central Asia

Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions and Pacts. By Pauline Jones Luong. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 344 pp., $60.00 (ISBN: 0-5218-0109-5). Over the past decade, a new generation of political scientists in the West have discovered Central Asia—a region composed of five states: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Central Asia caught the imagination of these political scientists for three reasons. First, in a world in which regions have tended to be durable constructs, Central Asia stands out as the exception. It is a new region, having been invented by the dissolution of the Soviet state in December 1991. Second, interest grew because of the remarkable social experiment going on in Central Asia. This is a region marked not only by the simultaneous construction of new states, new regimes, and new economic systems, but also, amidst all this turbulence, by the forging of new relationships between these emerging political economies and the international system. Finally, the events of September 11, 2001, introduced a security component. Three of these states—Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—share a border as well as national communities with Afghanistan. The importance of Central Asia, therefore, is undeniable. What is also beyond debate is that our knowledge of this region, at least in the United States, is cursory. This reflects several factors. It was hard to gain access to this region during the Soviet period. After 1991, other difficulties emerged. It was hard to accumulate the required training—or to have the patience and creativity—to carry out fieldwork in …

Historical Legacies and Their Impact on Post-Communist Voting Behaviour

OVER THE LAST DECADE THERE HAS BEEN a spirited debate among comparativists as to whether the post-communist transition reflects the earlier transition process in Latin America and Southern Europe or whether it is unique. 1 While the literature is far-ranging and diverse, the central debate is whether the past influences the transition process to such an extent that key comparative concepts such as democratisation or modernisation lose their utility. 2 Transitologists realise that the historical experiences of post-communist countries are distinct from those of Latin American and Southern European countries. However, they question whether these experiences are determinant of behaviour and, especially, of institutions. For example, Przeworski argues that all democratising countries ‘are determined by a common destination, not by different points of departure’. 3 This debate is important because it not only highlights key differences in the interpretation of the institutional choice of regimes but also provides a contrast over the determinants of political behaviour. 4 For transitologists, general factors such as the mode of transition, institutional design and elite bargaining allow the comparison of the post-communist transitions within a broader framework. Those who embrace a legacies perspective argue that the stark differences in behaviour and institutions throughout Eastern Europe demonstrate the limitations of inter-regional as well as intra-regional comparisons. 5 An issue that has figured prominently in this debate is post-communist voting behaviour. One of the implicit assumptions of much of this literature is that socio-economic (development) variables can largely account for post-communist voter choice. More specifically, the economic voting which is so prevalent among electorates in developed countries is also found to be a feature of post-communist electorates. For example, in their analysis of Polish voting Heyns & Bialecki find that socio-economic factors largely accounted for the early support of Solidarity. 6 In seeking to understand the rise of former communist parties, Pacek argues that post-communist electorates engaged in retrospective voting, which punished the incumbent reformers. 7

Subsistence Crises, Managerial Corruption and Labour Protests in China

Subsistence Crises, Managerial Corruption and Labour Protests in China

Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan

From the perspective of approaches focusing on political culture or social movements, Jordan seems an unlikely candidate for political liberalization. Yet, it has experienced the most far-reaching liberalization of any Arab country. By viewing the transition process as an unfolding series of bargains between government and opposition elites, this study accommodates both the reality that the decisions taken at each step reflected the self-interested calculations of a small group of people and the equally undeniable fact that those calculations were forged in a historical and normative context that constrained certain options while fostering others. This study traces the predispositions and calculations that propelled government and opposition elites from one decision locus to the next to illustrate how the interaction of a monarchy and an Islamist-dominated opposition actually promoted the initiation of political liberalization in Jordan and how the subsequent practice of political contestation generated a momentum of its own.

Political Bargaining and Democratic Transitions: A Comparison of Nicaragua and El Salvador

This article examines the relationship between pact-making and democratic transitions in Nicaragua (1988–1997) and El Salvador (1990–1997). We argue that the process of elite bargaining about regime change affects the prospects for the consolidation of democracy. We emphasise three factors: (1) the choices key actors make as they bargain about bargaining, (2) their willingness to ‘under-utilise’ their power and (3) the influence of historical and structural contingencies upon the key choices made. Essential to our discussion of historical and structural contingencies is the interrelation of domestic and international actors and the importance of demilitarisation and institutional reform. We argue that these three factors favoured El Salvador more than Nicaragua, although neither nation has overcome the political polarisation characteristic of transitional regimes.

Improving the Process of Constitutional Reform in Canada: Lessons from the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Constitutional Rounds

AbstractThis article explores ways of improving Canada's constitutional reform process by systematically comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional rounds during three phases: agenda-setting, elite negotiation and ratification. The objective is to draw lessons from these experiences for future attempts to achieve formal constitutional change. The author argues that both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown processes were seriously flawed, but in rather contrasting ways. The Meech Lake process was too closed, narrowly representative and tightly controlled by government elites. The Charlottetown process was poorly managed. It lacked focus, economy and coherence in agenda-setting and selection of items for negotiation, and integration and unified leadership in its elite bargaining structures and processes. The consultative referendum used in the Charlottetown process operated successfully, but still needed organizational fine-tuning and more effective meshing with established ratification procedures. What is required is a more finely balanced and closely integrated “blended” process of parallel elite and citizen-based consultative and participatory structures operating in all phases of the constitutional process. Within this framework, the author offers a comprehensive list of proposals for addressing and overcoming the shortcomings of earlier constitutional reform efforts.

Negotiating democracy: transitions from authoritarian rule

This book explains why some countries succeed in installing democracy after authoritarian rule, and why some of these new democracies make progress toward consolidation. Casper and Taylor show that a democratic government can be installed when elite bargaining during the transition process is relatively smooth. They view elite bargaining in twenty-four transitions cases, some where continued authoritarianism was the result, others where a democratic government was the result, and a third outcome where progress towards consolidation was the end product.

Beyond the Crystal Ball: Modelling Predictions about Quebec and Canada

Within the field of Canadian politics, intense debate over the constitution is a central and abiding concern. Given the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, it is suitable to reflect on Canada--and especially Quebec--as a political entity in the greater setting of North America. The passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which creates economic alternatives for Quebec, (1) makes this an especially appropriate time to examine the prospects for significant (or macro) constitutional change. (2) Neither executive federalism nor popular referenda have succeeded in producing lasting agreement on basic principles of government between Quebec and the Rest of Canada (ROC). After the intense conflict over the Charlottetown referendum, while much of Canada retreated into constitutional hibernation, Quebeckers, possibly buoyed by anticipated passage of the NAFTA, boldly elected fifty-four members of the independantiste Bloc Quebecois (BQ) in the federal election of 1993, and a separatist Parti Quebecois (PQ) government in the provincial election of the following year. Given the passage of the NAFTA and the political uncertainty that still exists in post-referendum Quebec and Canada, constitutional issues promise to attain even greater centrality. Thus, the time is right for appraisal of constitutional problems and prospects within a new theoretical frame of reference. After all, one of the few apparent points of agreement about previous rounds of bargaining is that time pressure and lack of foresight are enemies of constructive change. (3) This research note introduces to the study of Canadian politics a new technique for predicting the outcome of bargaining over key issues. Although the paper's aim is modest--to describe the technique--it also outlines a more substantial research project that is currently underway and should provide insights into the outcomes of two fundamental issues facing Quebec-Canada relations in the aftermath of the 1995 referendum on sovereignty in Quebec. More specifically, the project seeks to predict the outcome of Quebec-Canada constitutional bargaining and the outcome of bargaining over a sovereign Quebec's attempt to join the NAFTA. The investigation unfolds in three stages. The first presents the Decisions Insights expected utility forecasting model. The second describes the current political and economic setting of the ROC and Quebec, and offers some predictions based upon the model as a means of presenting the outlines of a promising research program. The third and final stage encourages extension of the research project on both intellectual and practical grounds. Toward an Expected Utility Model Constitutional bargaining and negotiations among governments and interest groups can be studied in any number of ways. Conventional approaches combine (in varying degrees) empirical theory from political science and historical analysis. The result is a set of informative case studies that collectively trace the evolution of bargaining over distribution of power between the federal and provincial governments, most notably Quebec. (4) Models based on rational choice, or the application of microeconomic theory to the study of politics, are well suited to the analysis of the kind of bargaining that can be expected between Quebec, the ROC, and a range of others. These models begin with the assumption of self-interest and focus directly on how and why policies are made. The specific characteristics that link economic thought to political processes may be summarized as follows: first, methodological individualism as a point of departure; second, the assumption that individuals strive after their own interests in a rational way and try to maximize utility--this assumption may be called the fundamental behavioral hypothesis; and, third, use of methods and techniques of economic analysis. Thus, rational choice is a theoretical perspective with well-developed methods that can be applied to the integration of horizontal and vertical elite bargaining. …

Finland and the European Community: Changing Elite Bargains

The Finnish integration policy has been conditioned by the elite bargain struck in the European Community on the Single European Act which crystallized a compromise between market-oriented reforms and intergovernmental institutionalism. A similar political development has occurred in Finland where the elite bargain has included the application for EC membership. The move towards the EC has been facilitated by the changes in the Soviet and Russian policies, which have become less of a constraint on Finland's choices. The elite bargain in Finland has been rather loose and informal, partly because in the late 1980s the industry used the exit option by investing heavily in Western Europe. That is why it has needed little voice to convince the political leadership which has shifted to support the EC membership under internal and external influences.

Agreeing to Disagree: Elite Bargaining and the Revision of the Belgian Constitution

Cet article est une étude sur les essais de l'élite politique belge de résoudre les conflits entre Flamands et Wallons en offrant à chaque groupe une certaine autonomie dans le contrôle de leurs affaires économiques et culturelles. Malgré le fait que la réforme constittitionnelle établissant les principes généraux de cette décentralisation ait eu lieu en 1970 et que les institutions pour permettre l'autonomie culturelle aient été établies tout de suite après, ce n'est qu'en 1980 qu'on a promulgué la loi établissant l'autonomie régionale. Entre 1970 et 1980 six gouvernements ont mené des négociations pour tenter d'arriver à un accord sur la question, cependant, comme résultat des conflits soulevés par leurs essais, ils ont tons échoué et ils sont tons tombés.Dans cet article, l'auteur affirme que la littérature courante axée sur le conflit ethnique, mettant l'accent sur la gestion du conflit et limitant le rôle de l'élite politique à la solution de ce conflit, ne constitue pas une voie valable pour comprendre le processus de négotiation constitutionnelle. L'auteur soutient qu'une approche fondée sur des modèles de négotiation internationale, mettant l'accent sur le déroulement du conflit ainsi que sur sa gestion dans le processus de négotiation, est plus utile pour comprendre le succès on l'echec des négociations constitutionnelles en Belgique. Dans cet article on applique deux de ces modèles aux deux des plus récents tours de négotiations constitutionnelles: un cadre d'analyse général et une théorie de jeux dérivés d'un ensemble de matrices.

Ethnic conflict and elite bargaining: The case of Belgium

Ethnic cleavages have dominated Belgian politics for two decades, fragmenting the party system. Constitutional solutions have only met with limited success. In this article two theoretical approaches are applied to the Belgian situation: consociational elite accommodation and bargaining processes in conditions of common and conflicting interests. Bargaining theories, which deal with the actual process of accommodation and give adequate weight to contextual factors are found to explain the situation more adequately than theories which rely on a particular set of consociational ‘devices’.

American Pluralism: Theory, Practice, and Ideology

Previous articleNext article No AccessAmerican Pluralism: Theory, Practice, and IdeologyDarryl BaskinDarryl Baskin Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 32, Number 1Feb., 1970 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2128865 Views: 75Total views on this site Citations: 12Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1970 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Sheldon Gen, Amy Conley Wright Nonprofit Policy Advocacy in the United States, (Aug 2020): 1–21.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43696-4_1Ursula Hackett Theorizing the Submerged State: The Politics of Private Schools in the United States, Policy Studies Journal 45, no.33 (Jun 2016): 464–489.https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12170Daniel E. Chand, William D. Schreckhise Keeping score on congress: explaining variations in interest group ratings of US senators, Business and Politics 15, no.33 (Jan 2017): 401–433.https://doi.org/10.1515/bap-2012-0005Milorad M. Novicevic, Michael G. Harvey, M. Ronald Buckley, Daniel Wren, Leticia Pena Communities of Creative Practice: Follett's Seminal Conceptualization, International Journal of Public Administration 30, no.44 (Feb 2007): 367–385.https://doi.org/10.1080/01900690601150425Martin Sebaldt Auswahlbliographie, (Jan 2001): 369–405.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-90528-4_7William Collins -N- Party Democracy: The Role of the Minimal State, (Jan 1989): 122–159.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48409-4_5PJJS Potgieter Die Amerikaanse Staatsleer en die sanksionering van die bestaande orde, Politikon 8, no.11 (Feb 2007): 64–80.https://doi.org/10.1080/02589348108704787Winfried Steffani Vom Pluralismus zum Neopluralismus, (Jan 1980): 37–108.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86096-5_3Winfried Steffani Vom Pluralismus zum Neopluralismus, (Jan 1980): 13–84.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-97148-7_1 Norman H. Keehn A World of Becoming: From Pluralism to Corporatism, Polity 9, no.11 (Nov 2016): 19–39.https://doi.org/10.2307/3234433Herman Belz New Left Reverberations in the Academy: The Antipluralist Critique of Constitutionalism, The Review of Politics 36, no.22 (Aug 2009): 265–283.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670500022592Benjamin Zeitler Verbände als organisatorisches Spiegelbild der Gesellschaft: David B. Truman, (): 57–71.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90439-9_3