Electoral Formula Research Articles

Is Duverger's Law Working in South Korea? An Analysis of District-Level Elections 1988–2012

How do electoral rules shape competition? District level data from South Korea's seven legislative elections since democratization (1988-2012) provides a means to test one of the oldest findings in political science: Duverger's Law. South Korea provides a unique opportunity to analyze variation in mixed election rules, where seats are allocated in both single member districts (SMDs) and by a nationwide party list by proportional representation (PR), as the country has used three different electoral formulas over the time period. Through quantitative analysis, evidence of a gradual reduction in the number of candidates is evident as is a more nuanced influence of regionalism on vote concentration.

Los efectos de las reglas electorales sobre el éxito de las mujeres en las elecciones presidenciales en América Latina

En la última década, varias mujeres han sido candidatas exitosas en las elecciones presidenciales latinoamericanas. Pero este logro histórico ha estado limitado a pocos países de la región. ¿Cuáles son las causas principales de que en unos países las mujeres sean candidatas exitosas y en otros países no? Este artículo desarrolla argumentos basados en la teoría institucionalista y propone que es necesario buscar las explicaciones en las características institucionales de los países. Los elementos que incrementan la permisividad de los sistemas electorales para la elección de las mujeres son la fórmula electoral para la elección presidencial, las reglas constitucionales que prohíben la elección de los parientes de los expresidentes, la presencia de cuotas legislativas para la elección de mujeres y la prohibición de la reelección presidencial inmediata. El efecto de la permisividad institucional no es automático sino que está condicionado al nivel de desarrollo humano de la sociedad. Metodológicamente, se estima un modelo de regresión con el fin de explicar el porcentaje de votos que obtuvieron las mujeres en las últimas tres elecciones presidenciales en 19 países latinoamericanos. Sin embargo, la validez del modelo se confirma posteriormente con la identificación de casos anómalos.

The contingent effect of institutions: Electoral formulas, ethnic polarization, and election quality

This paper builds on existing studies linking formal electoral institutions to democracy. It reveals that there is an interactive effect between the electoral formula and the levels of ethnic polarization that systematically influences the quality of elections and the probability of government turnover. Proportional representation is associated with better elections and more frequent government turnover than single-member district majority formulas in ethnically polarized countries. However, the opposite is true when ethno-cultural groups are not numerous or polarized. This study contributes to the existing literature on formal political institutions by presenting evidence that the electoral formula's impact on governance is contingent on the context in which such institutions operate.

The Institutional Framework of the 2012 Elections in Ghana: Consolidating or Reversing Democratic Achievement?

The 2012 elections were peaceful, but the results were contested by the New Patriotic Party in a petition brought to the Supreme Court challenging the National Democratic Congress and the Electoral Commission of Ghana. Revelations during the hearing of the petition raised some disquiet about the abilities of the ECG and the integrity of Ghana's electoral institutions. The fallout from the 2012 elections demands a critical intellectual engagement with the institutional foundation of the elections. There were several institutional changes in the Ghanaian system in the build-up to the elections as well as changes in the general political economy of the country that have made access to public office particularly attractive. This article reviews the institutional context of the elections and examines the constitutional and non-constitutional rules relating to electoral governance, focusing on such issues as electoral management, delimitation of constituencies and assembly size, electoral formula, voting procedure and ballot structure and the party system. It demonstrates how these institutions were implicated in the challenges relating to the electoral process during the 2012 elections, providing insights into how to overcome them.

Concede and Move On? One Nation Labour and the Welfare State

The idea that Labour has already lost the argument on welfare with the Conservatives, and with it the general election, is probably overplayed. If truth be told, Labour's construction and subsequent defence of the welfare state has always been something of a double‐edged sword for the Party, earning it brickbats as well as support, and sometimes as stranding it in the past, committing it to promises that were undeliverable and ultimately self‐defeating. The political response by Ed Miliband and Ed Balls to the welfare trap set for them by David Cameron and George Osborne owes as much to New Labour as it does to ‘One Nation Labour’. That said, the latter does seem to be informing the Party's policy response, in particular its emphasis on restoring the contributory principle. Whether, however, this is practical politics given the inherently hybrid nature of Britain's welfare state and its heavy skew toward help for the elderly is a moot point. And whether ‘One Nation’ actually helps or hinders the Party in its quest for workable policies and a winning electoral formula is similarly debateable. Certainly, however much it is tempted to do so, Labour shouldn't waste too much valuable time trying to counter widespread myths about welfare. Nor should it overreact and obsess about the issue—or, indeed, pour out detailed policy too soon, if at all. Obviously, Labour needs to provide a direction of travel. However, that should focus not so much on welfare itself but on what the Party is proposing on the economy, on housing and on wages.

Resource disparity and multi-level elections in competitive authoritarian regimes: Regression discontinuity evidence from Hong Kong

Much research has been done to study how competitive elections affect autocracies and their opposition. Electoral institutions, however, may have different social and political effects. In this paper, I examine the effect of an understudied electoral institution: lower-level elections. I argue that elections at grassroots levels tend to favor the ruling party by allowing it to more fully utilize its resource advantage to buy political support, which would in turn undermine the opposition's ability to develop a local support network that is important to its struggle for democratization as well as for elected offices. Evaluating the effect of lower-level elections is empirically challenging because the effect is likely to be confounded with voter preference. I tackle this identification problem by taking advantage of a quasi-experiment afforded by the electoral formula of Hong Kong, which allows me to use a regression discontinuity design to test my causal argument. I find strong statistical evidence supporting my argument; the ruling elite's aggressive expansion in the District Councils, the lowest elected tier, aims to drive out the opposition elites, who, by occupying a District Council seat, are able to increase their vote share of that constituency by 4–5 percentage points in a subsequent legislative election.

Do political parties matter for turnout? Number of parties, electoral rules and local elections in Brazil and Bolivia

Does the number of political parties influence voter turnout in developing democracies? Some scholars argue that large party systems facilitate matching voter preferences with a specific party, increasing turnout. Others argue multiparty systems produce too many alternatives, decreasing turnout. In developing democracies, there is debate over whether these institutions matter at all. We argue that party systems do matter for turnout in developing countries, but the relationship between turnout and the number of political parties is conditional on the electoral formula. Under proportional representation systems, large numbers of parties increase turnout. Under winner take all systems, large numbers of parties depress turnout. Since electoral rules also influence the number of parties, we use an innovative sub-national research design, taking advantage of local variation in the number of parties that is largely unrelated to the electoral system. Specifically, we test these relationships by analysing turnout data at the municipal level in Brazil and Bolivia, countries with very different electoral rules. Overall, we find evidence that party systems influence turnout, but in different ways depending on the election rules.

Ureditev volilnih enot v državnozborskem volilnem sistemu

V prvem delu članka so predstavljeni nekateri vidiki oblikovanja volilnih enot v volilnih sistemih, zasnovanih na proporcionalni volilni formuli. Drugi del članka je namenjen analizi volilnih enot v volilnem sistemu za volitve poslancev v Državni zbor Republike Slovenije. Poudarjeni so dejavniki, ki so sprožili nastanek specifčne trinivojske ureditve z osmimi volilnimi enotami, nacionalno ravnjo delitve mandatov ter 88 volilnimi okraji. Sledi analiza ureditve volilnih enot in volilnih okrajev z vidika izpolnjevanja načel enake volilne pravice, homogenosti in kompaktnosti.

Presidentialism and Voter Turnout in Legislative Elections

What is the influence of presidentialism on legislative turnout? Does it matter for electoral participation if the presidential and legislative elections are held on the same day or not? If any, what is the confounding impact of the electoral system type? This article uses a sample of more than 450 democratic legislative elections between 1990 and 2010 to evaluate these three research questions. Distinguishing three types of regimes: (1) parliamentary systems, (2) presidential systems with concurrent presidential and legislative elections and (3) presidential systems with non-concurrent presidential and legislative elections, we first evaluate the impact of each of these three system types on legislative turnout in a multivariate framework. We find that the first two regime types have higher turnout figures than the third regime type. In a second step, we examine whether citizens participation in any of the three system types interacts with the electoral formula in their country. Our results indicate that proportional representation has a moderate positive impact on turnout in presidential systems with non-concurrent presidential and legislative elections, a negative impact in presidential systems with concurrent legislative elections to the states two highest offices and no impact in parliamentary systems.

BALLOT STRUCTURE, DISTRICT MAGNITUDE AND CONSTITUENCY-ORIENTATION OF MPs IN PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND MAJORITY ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Many studies have been devoted to the way electoral institutions shape the representative process in general, and of the relation between legislators and their local constituency. Yet, the majority of these have been hardly comparative. And when they compared countries, these countries rarely differed in many aspects of the electoral system. This article takes a different perspective by looking at the effect of the electoral formula, district magnitude and ballot structure on how important the constituency is for MPs in three countries that differ on these three components of the electoral system: Belgium, France and Portugal. And the results, though they should be confirmed by analyses on more countries, provide interesting insights. In particular they show that the difference in nature between single and multi-member districts is more important for constituency-orientation than differences between multi-member districts. Second, the article shows that the effect of electoral institutions is not straightforward: its impact is stronger on attitudes towards the constituency than on actaul behaviours of legislators regarding their constituency.

Was Duverger Correct? Single-Member District Election Outcomes in Fifty-three Countries

In districts where only one seat is contested, the electoral formula (plurality or majority) should be a major determinant of the number of parties that receive votes. Specifically, plurality rule should generate two-party competition while other institutional arrangements should generate electoral fragmentation. Yet tests of these propositions using district-level data have focused on a limited number of cases; they rarely contrast different electoral systems and have reached mixed conclusions. This study analyses district-level data from 6,745 single-member district election contests from 53 democratic countries to test the evidence for Duverger's Law and Hypothesis. Double-ballot majoritarian systems have large numbers of candidates, as predicted, but while the average outcome under plurality rule is generally consistent with two-party competition, it is not perfectly so. The two largest parties typically dominate the districts (generally receiving more than 90 per cent of the vote), and there is very little support for parties finishing fourth or worse. Yet third-place parties do not completely disappear, and ethnic divisions shape party fragmentation levels, even under plurality rule. Finally, institutional rules that generate multiparty systems elsewhere in the country increase electoral fragmentation in single-member plurality districts.

INSTITUTIONAL VARIATION AND THE EFFECTS ON DISTRICT COMPETITION: THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA

How do alterations in electoral rules shape competition? This article analyses district level competition in six legislative elections in South Korea (1988–2008) to identify whether Duvergerian pressures are restricting the number of competitors. South Korea provides a unique opportunity to analyse variation in mixed election rules, where seats are allocated in both single-member districts (SMDs) and a nationwide list by proportional representation (PR), as the country has used three different electoral formulas over the time period. Through quantitative analysis, evidence of a gradual reduction in the number of candidates is evident, despite a history of regional voting, thus resembling Duvergerian expectations.

The Lega Nord and fiscal federalism: functional or postfunctional?

This paper addresses the question of whether the Italian Lega Nord pursues functional policies in spite of its postfunctional rhetoric (politics of simulation) or pre-material policies that are in line with its dominant postfunctional discourse (politics of identity). The analysis focuses on fiscal federalism because this is an area that links together both economic issues – fiscal autonomy is seen as highly functional to the economy of those regions of Italy which form the Lega Nord's strongholds – and identity matters – federalism is claimed and justified on the basis of the existence of a distinct territorial community with its own cultural values and social cohesion. The paper concludes that the Lega combines postfunctional rhetoric and ‘formal’ policies on the one hand, with functional ‘actual’ outcomes on the other. This combination, which hitherto appeared to be a winning electoral formula, has recently run into difficulties.

Party systems, electoral systems and constraints on corruption

This article explores the relationship between the party system, electoral formulas and corruption. Previous research has focused on the various incentives for political actors to monitor, or engage in corruption based on variations in the electoral formula. However, the electoral formula has mainly served as a proxy for the party system – whether multi-party or two-party. In this analysis, I test directly the relationship between party systems and corruption and in addition, add a degree of nuance to the established line of thinking within this literature. I argue that two-party systems in countries with predominantly single-member district (SMD) electoral formulas will demonstrate lower corruption on average than multi-party systems in SMD countries. However, I argue that this interaction effect does not play out in countries with proportional representation (PR). I test this hypothesis on 70 democratic and semi-democratic countries from 1987 to 2005 and find strong empirical support for the claim that multipartism in SMD countries is associated with higher levels of corruption, while the party system’s relationship with corruption plays no role in PR countries.

The Rise of Gender Quota Laws: Expanding the Spectrum of Determinants for Electoral Reform

The seminal work of Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (1994), limits the definition of electoral reforms to those affecting electoral formulas, district magnitudes, assembly size, or electoral thresholds. Following this definition, studies on electoral reform have put political parties and their motivations at centre stage. Expanding the definition of electoral reform, however, requires a move beyond parties to explore the multiple possible sources of change. This article examines the most common reforms ofrecent years, electoral gender quota policies, and points to at least four explanations for the adoption of gender quota laws. Based on extensive data from gender quota campaigns, the article suggests that the literature on this topic would benefit from efforts to broaden the analytical focus to include the role of agency, group interests, anddiscursive struggles, and to call attention to the possibility of causal diversity by revealing different routes to electoral reform.

Effect of District Magnitude on Electoral Corruption under a Block Vote System: The Case of Thailand

What causes corruption? Most literature on corruption take into account the role of culture and socio-economic development though few studies have not even begun to look for another explanation such as institutions in explaining this corruption menace. Within institutionalist literature, there are generally two strands which center upon two different concepts in explaining corruption - accountability and personal vote. Yet, the theoretical framework in this study will rely exclusively on the concept of personal voting since it would be more compatible with the nature of research used in this study - within country analysis. By exploring Thailand's three general elections for the lower house (1992, 1995, 2007) with the same type of electoral rules- block vote, the study aims to examine the impact of district magnitude (elements of electoral rules: ballot structure, district magnitude, electoral formulas) as a key determinant of the level of corruption. The effect of district magnitude on corruption will be analyzed against the backdrop of the block vote system controlling for year and region. Based upon the personal vote argument, the study contends that in the context of block vote, large district magnitude would put more pressure on a candidate to distinguish himself/ herself from his/her party’s teammates as well as candidates from different parties, which in turn provide the likelihood for the use of corruption as one of their electoral strategies. The findings from this study show that the levels of corruption at a nationwide level for all three years are relatively the same. More importantly, the study found that district magnitude is related with corruption, that is, a large district magnitude is associated with a greater degree of corruption. Finally, the study shows that region is strongly associated with the level of corruption - highest in the Northeast and lowest in the South and in Bangkok. Keywords: Thailand; electoral corruption; personal vote; candidate-centered electoral rules; block vote; district magnitude DOI: 10.3860/apssr.v10i2.1901 Asia-Pacific Social Science Review 10:2 (2010), pp. 43-58

The Norwegian Electoral System and its Political Consequences

The electoral system is an integral part of any representative democracy, and the choice of system is an important framework for individual behavior and party competition. An electoral system is a result of compromise between parties with vested interests in the system setup. However, no system satisfies all ideal claims. This article is an introduction to the electoral system used in parliamentary elections in Norway; it emphasizes the political consequences of vital elements such as the balance between provincial and compensatory seats, and the geographical distribution of seats and electoral formulae. In sum, the system introduced in 2003 is more proportional in terms of the parties’ share of seats compared with votes, and the geographical distribution has become more systematic and less skewed, although the ideal of one vote-one value has not been achieved. Both the present and previous electoral systems combine elements reflecting different principles and concerns such as increased proportionality, on the one hand, and the fear of a fragmented party system on the other. The analyses show a complex interplay between different parts of the system. One and the same system may have different effects depending on the balance between the parties and between electoral districts. Thus, in order to study the effect of changes in the electoral system one needs to use simulations based on election outcomes over time.

Sistema electoral y sistema de partidos en México (1994-2000)

En este trabajo sobre el sistema electoral y el sistema de partidos políticos en México, exploramos las consecuencias que han tenido la fórmula electoral y el umbral efectivo, la magnitud de las circunscripciones y el tamaño del Congreso legislativo, en los niveles de desproporcionalidad existente en el poder legislativo desde las elecciones federales de 1994. Así mismo, como extensión de ese esfuerzo, mediante diversos índices politológicos profundizamos en los efectos que ha tenido en el sistema de partidos. En particular, interesa estudiar los niveles de concentración y competitividad, la fragmentación y número efectivo de partidos, la polarización y volatilidad del voto. En suma, pretendemos determinar cuál es el impacto institucional del llamado «periodo de reformas» en la conformación de un nuevo sistema de partidos políticos mexicanos.

THE IMPACT OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM ON DELEGATE ALLOCATIONS IN THE 2008 AMERICAN PRIMARIES

The 2008 American primaries demonstrate the impact of the electoral system on the results. Statistical analysis of voting data assess the proportionality used in each of the parties' electoral formulas, and its impact on the outcomes. The Democratic Party uses more proportional formulas than the Republican Party. In the Democratic Party, the proportional representation formulas had a direct mechanic influence in determining the party nominee. This in contrast to the Republican Party, where it seems that voter behaviour changed due to the electoral formulas.

Party system fragmentation in Morocco

This paper examines the fragmentation in the party system of Morocco. First, we describe the party system, taking into account the origin and nature of the Moroccan multi-party scene, the transformations in the party system that have taken place since Independence, and its present divisions. Second, we examine the influence of the electoral system on fragmentation, considering such elements as seat allocation in constituencies, the electoral formula, and the electoral barrier. Third, we explore some characteristics of fragmentation, using as indicators Rae's fractionalisation index, the effective number of parties, and the parties in government coalitions. In this regard, we analyse the differences between electoral and legislative fragmentations, the evolution of fragmentation – by comparing elections in which different procedures were followed – and the party system that has emerged as a result of these processes. Lastly, we outline the main consequences that fragmentation has had on the Moroccan political arena.