Effect of District Magnitude on Electoral Corruption under a Block Vote System: The Case of Thailand

Abstract. Duverger's propositions concerning the psychological and mechanical consequences of electoral rules have previously been examined mainly through the lens of district magnitude, comparing the properties of single–member district plurality elections with those of multimember proportional representation elections. The empirical consequences of multimember plurality (MMP) rules, on the other hand, have received scant attention. Theory suggests that the effect of district magnitude on the number and concentration of parties will differ with regard to whether the allocation rules are plurality–based or proportional. I test this theory by drawing on a uniquely large–sample dataset where district magnitude and electoral formula vary but the basic universe of political parties is held constant, applying regression analysis to data from several thousand Hungarian local bodies elected in 1994 consisting of municipal councils, county councils, and mayors. The results indicate that omitting the variable of electoral formula has the potential to cause significant bias in estimates of Duvergerian consequences of district magnitude. In addition, the analysis of multi–member plurality elections from the local election dataset reveals counter–intuitively that candidate and party entry may increase with district magnitude under MMP, suggesting important directions for future investigation of MMP rules.

Duverger's propositions concerning the psychological and mechanical consequences of electoral rules have previously been examined mainly through the lens of district magnitude, comparing the properties of single–member district plurality elections with those of multimember proportional representation elections. The empirical consequences of multimember plurality (MMP) rules, on the other hand, have received scant attention. Theory suggests that the effect of district magnitude on the number and concentration of parties will differ with regard to whether the allocation rules are plurality–based or proportional. I test this theory by drawing on a uniquely large–sample dataset where district magnitude and electoral formula vary but the basic universe of political parties is held constant, applying regression analysis to data from several thousand Hungarian local bodies elected in 1994 consisting of municipal councils, county councils, and mayors. The results indicate that omitting the variable of electoral formula has the potential to cause significant bias in estimates of Duvergerian consequences of district magnitude. In addition, the analysis of multi–member plurality elections from the local election dataset reveals counter–intuitively that candidate and party entry may increase with district magnitude under MMP, suggesting important directions for future investigation of MMP rules.

District magnitude, personal votes, and government expenditures

Over the past thirty years a well-developed body of theory has emerged describing how different electoral laws interact with voters' preferences to promote particular party systems.' In this study, I test several empirical predictions generated from this theory. Specifically, I examine hypotheses relating the electoral formula, which describes how votes are translated into seats, and the district magnitude, which indicates the number of seats to be distributed, to the number and representation of parties in a party system. The immediate influence of these electoral laws on a party system is straightforward.2 The electoral formula shapes the party system by limiting the representation of small parties. The majority formula, for example, allows only the party with the majority of the votes to gain office, while proportional representation (PR) formulas distribute multiple seats to parties according to their vote share. The district magnitude influences the party system by limiting the number of parties that can be represented. For these reasons, electoral systems with large district magnitudes and proportional representation (PR) formulas are expected to be more equitable in their distribution of seats and provide representation for more parties than systems with small district magnitudes and majority electoral formulas.3 In designing a test of these hypotheses, one must recognize that the influence of electoral laws on party systems depends crucially on the political context in which they operate.4 In a polity with several strong local parties, for example, the majority formula may lead to as large a party system as a PR system. In addition, the extent to which district magnitude can influence the number of parties gaining representation depends on the number of parties competing for office. In a polity where three parties compete, district magnitudes greater than three will not constrain the number of parties represented from these districts. Thus, electoral laws merely promote, within their political context, particular party systems.5 As a consequence, a rigorous test of the aforementioned hypotheses must control for contextual factors that might influence the electoral results independently of the electoral laws. This test requires data from elections with two characteristics: identical voter preferences over a constant set of parties and variation in electoral formula and district magnitude. Actual elections, unfortunately, have never completely satisfied these requirements. Faced with this constraint, scholars have examined the existing data from a variety of angles, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. Most often, scholars have used cross-national studies which allow for comparisons of party systems from nations with a broad range of electoral formulas and district magnitudes.6 These studies enhance our appreciation of a wide variety of electoral systems but are unable to control for voter

The relationship between district magnitude and turnout remains hotly debated, and previous studies suggest positive, negative, and nonlinear effects depending on other institutional characteristics. This article contributes to the empirical literature by conducting a quasi-experimental test on the effect of district magnitude in a context of a single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system with weak partisan ties: municipal council elections in Japan. Exploiting a credible source of exogenous variation in district magnitude and using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, we reveal that a 5-seat increase in an average-magnitude district reduces turnout by 4 percentage points, which accounts for a 6.9% drop in the size of the electorate. We reason that, in the context of SNTV with weak parties, higher district magnitude leads to information overload, which may lower voters’ incentives to turn out.

The relationship between electoral systems and corruption in a large sample of contemporary democratic nations is analysed in this article. Whereas previous studies have shown that closed-list proportional representation is associated with greater (perceived) corruption than open-list PR, it is demonstrated here that this relationship fails to hold once district magnitude is considered. The theory underlying this study draws on work on ‘the personal vote’ that suggests that the incentives to amass resources – and perhaps even to do so illegally – increase with district magnitude in open-list settings but decrease in closed-list contexts. Extending this insight, it is shown that political corruption gets more (less) severe as district magnitude increases under open-list PR (closed-list PR) systems. In addition, once district magnitude exceeds a certain threshold – the estimates here are that this is as low as fifteen – corruption is greater under open lists than closed lists. Only at small district magnitudes (below fifteen) is closed-list PR associated with more corruption, as conventionally held. These results hold for alternative measures of corruption, for different sets of countries analysed, for different measures of district magnitude and regardless of whether the political system is presidential or parliamentary, and of the number of parties.Using an objective measure of corruption in public works contracting, corroborating evidence is also presented from Italian electoral districts. In Italy's open-list environment in the period prior to 1994, larger districts were more susceptible to corruption than smaller ones.

We analyze relationship between electoral systems and corruption in a large sample of contemporary democratic nations. Whereas previous studies have shown that closed-list proportional representation is associated with greater (perceived) corruption than open-list PR, we demonstrate that this relationship fails to hold once district magnitude is considered. The theory underlying our study draws on work on the personal vote that suggests that incentives to amass resources - and perhaps even to do so illegally - increase with district magnitude in open-list settings but decrease in closed-list contexts. Extending this insight, we show that political corruption gets more (less) severe as district magnitude increases under open-list PR (closed-list PR) systems. In addition, once district magnitude exceeds a certain threshold - our estimates are that this is as low as 15 - corruption is greater in open list than in closed list settings. Only at unusually small district magnitudes (those below 15) is closed-list PR associated with more corruption, as conventionally held. Our results hold for alternate measures of corruption, for different specifications of country cases to be included, for different measures of district magnitude, and regardless of whether political system is presidential or parliamentary and number of effective parties. Using an alternative, objective measure of political corruption, we also present corroborating evidence across Italian electoral districts. Within open-list environment characterizing Italy for eleven legislative periods that spanned second half of twentieth century, larger districts are more susceptible to suspected political corruption than smaller ones. This finding is consistent with underlying model that predicts that larger electoral districts are associated with higher levels of corruption in open-list settings. It is robust to inclusion of various important control variables, including per capita wealth and efficiency of judiciary.

Citizens' freedom to choose representatives: Ballot structure, proportionality and “fragmented” parliaments

A large literature reviews the effects of constitutional arrangements and electoral rules on various aspects of QoG. The state of the debate, so far, is not one that provides straightforward answers regarding the important institutions, the magnitude of the effects, or even their direction. Through a meta-analysis of the relevant literature, we seek in this chapter to evaluate the relationship between electoral rules and corruption. The results of the meta-analysis suggest support for an individual accountability mechanism that transcends the crude majoritarian–proportional distinction. We show that absence of corruption can be positively correlated with systems in which district magnitude is at its lowest (plurality systems) and its highest (proportional systems). The important electoral system features appear to be those that cultivate a “personal vote,” strengthening accountability between voters and individual legislators.

How do electoral rules affect the occurrence of legislative party switching? Existing research addressing this question is limited and does not reach a consistent conclusion. This article argues that electoral systems that encourage politicians to cultivate a personal vote dampen parties’ ability to retain members. The greater incentives to cultivate a personal vote in candidate-centred electoral systems result in politicians relying more on local supporters and less on party label for their re-election. In such systems, compared to party-centred systems, I expect that only parties that suffer electoral setbacks to be more likely to witness switching, as their candidates are less concerned with party labels, and local supporters might follow them to the new party, thus reducing switching costs. Drawing on data from 17 European democracies over the period 1990–2013, I find support for my hypothesis. While there is no direct effect of electoral rules on switching, the results suggest that this effect hinges upon parties’ ability to deliver seats: losing parties are more likely to witness switching in candidate-centred systems than in party-centred systems. Further findings also demonstrate how this effect is especially significant when district magnitude is large and the next election is approaching.

District magnitude and the personal vote

Previous literature has assumed that there is a trade-off between cabinet stability, by means of a majority manufactured by a single-seat plurality system, and the alleviation of regional conflict, by means of a more proportional electoral system. This study demonstrates that no such tradeoff exists. The objective of this study is to find an alternative electoral system which satisfies both the criteria of majority government and multiregional representation. In a quasi-experiment, an electoral system with a district magnitude of two (M2) satisfies both of the above criteria. The results of the study show that a district magnitude of two can provide a large diffuse party with a majority of seats for the same amount of voter support as the present plurality system. In addition, M2 rewards this large diffuse party with seats necessary to form a minority government at a much lower level of voter support than does the existing system. Thus, M2 solves the problem of underrepresentation of regions in the government party, and is at the same time even more advantageous to a large diffuse party than is the present electoral system. If the argument of this study is correct, beneficiaries of the existing system should not be averse to implementing it.

Electoral formulas and campaign practices in some nations encourage voters to consider the personal qualifications of candidates for legislative office, whereas individuating information about candidates is unavailable to voters in other nations. Where electoral rules and elite behavior foster the personal vote, the personal vote flourishes. However, it is unclear why voters respond to personal information about candidates. We test two competing hypotheses: that the personal vote reflects a general human tendency to attend to information regarding individuals' personal qualifications; and that the personal vote is an acquired behavior that emerges after voters are socialized to attend to personal information about candidates. We use counterfactual simulations to test these hypotheses. Specifically, we conduct laboratory experiments in which subjects drawn from Mexico and Venezuela-nations in which electoral rules ensure that the personal vote does not flourish-are provided the opportunity to consider candidates' personal qualifications. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that the personal vote stems from a general tendency in human decision making.

This chapter examines the variety of electoral systems in Europe. Electoral systems lie at the heart of democratic politics, influencing who citizens’ representatives are and having profound effects upon politics at large. The authors start by presenting the variety of electoral systems used across Europe, focusing on three key dimensions: electoral formulas, district magnitudes, and ballot structures. Then they discuss some of the main developments in electoral systems in Europe since 1945, highlighting shifts towards limited proportional systems and more ‘personalized’ systems. Finally, they probe deeper into the consequences of electoral systems, looking at effects on the nature of competition both between and within political parties.

This chapter examines the variety of electoral systems in Europe. Electoral systems lie at the heart of democratic politics, influencing who citizens’ representatives are and having profound effects upon politics at large. The authors start by presenting the variety of electoral systems used across Europe, focusing on three key dimensions: electoral formulas, district magnitudes, and ballot structures. Then they discuss some of the main developments in electoral systems in Europe since 1945, highlighting shifts towards limited proportional systems and more ‘personalized’ systems. Finally, they probe deeper into the consequences of electoral systems, looking at effects on the nature of competition both between and within political parties.