Electoral Constraints Research Articles

How budget trade‐offs undermine electoral incentives to build public housing

AbstractHousing shortages and rising rents have increased demands for affordable housing. In this paper, we examine whether electoral constraints can undermine local politicians' incentives to build public housing. Empirically, we draw on the full‐count census of all housing built in Germany, data on 19,685 local elections between 1989 and 2011, and an original survey. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we demonstrate that incumbents are not rewarded, but rather experience moderate electoral losses after constructing new public housing. We then show that these losses are not primarily driven by homeowner opposition or native–foreigner competition. Instead, electoral punishment is largest in economically disadvantaged municipalities with relatively affordable housing, as voters prioritize spending in other local policy areas that are crowded out by public housing. Survey evidence demonstrates that electoral constraints emerge when voters' short‐term spending preferences conflict with municipalities' long‐term goals to provide affordable housing.

Do two-party systems hamper defection from undemocratic candidates?

Do the electoral constraints imposed by two-party systems make citizens less likely to defect from undemocratic candidates? I employ two innovative candidate choice experiments fielded in England to answer this question. Specifically, I implement two designs manipulating the number and effective number of parties displayed between two and three, exploiting England’s party system characteristics. Contrary to expectations, I find that Labour and Conservative identifiers do not defect more from undemocratic in-partisan candidates when they face three (effective) parties–Labour, the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats–rather than just the two major parties. Instead, defection from undemocratic in-partisans to the out-party drops and relocates to the Liberal Democrats, even when the latter have no chance of winning. These findings highlight that having three parties does not generate more defection from undemocratic politicians and, consequently, does not reduce risks of democratic backsliding through this mechanism.

The connections—and misconnections—between the public and politicians over climate policy: A social psychological perspective

AbstractWe review findings from social psychology and related fields to examine the bidirectional relationship between the public—what are their views about climate change and the need for policies to address the climate crisis—and the politicians who are making (or not making) climate policy and beholden to electoral constraints. We illustrate social psychological pressures that influence policy support and their relevance to how policies emerge from coordinated action and how barriers impede policy progress. We review two factors that have been the focus of research within communication, political science, and psychology and that are relevant to how climate policies are promoted (or undermined): activists and the media. We examine the process by which activists amplify and transmit the preferences of the public to politicians, and how research on persuasion and social norms helps understand how this effect can be amplified or diminished. We also describe how the media environment can amplify or diminish the roles of the public and the politicians in influencing each other. As the world confronts the climate crisis, research from social psychologists, environmental psychologists, political scientists, and communication scholars has examined the interrelations between the public, politicians, media, and activists, but largely in a disconnected way. The current paper provides a social psychological framework to integrate these approaches and, in so doing, suggest new directions for research and theory‐guided ways to influence policy around climate change.

Economic Notes on the Concept of Political Power

ABSTRACT These notes offer an unusual perspective on democracy by interpreting key categories of political science through the lens of economics, specifically drawing from the ‘theory of the firm’ literature. Due to incomplete contracts, political power is conceptualized as a variable quantum that balances power resources with constitutional and electoral constraints. Accordingly, the proposed model is used to explain how the amount of power can vary over time, what its determinants are, and what mechanisms can lead to political regime change in an era of world polarized by democracies and autocracies.

Terrified or Enraged? Emotional Microfoundations of Public Counterterror Attitudes

AbstractDespite the widespread assumption of terrorism's “terrifying” effect, there has been little systematic testing of the specific emotional microfoundations underlying public opinion about terrorism. While fear is one well-recognized emotional response to terror threats, in societies where terrorism is rare, anger may play a more pivotal role, with distinct consequences for citizens’ downstream political attitudes. To test the impact of these emotional mechanisms on public opinion in the wake of terrorism, I employ a multi-arm mechanism experiment (n = 5,499) in the United States that manipulates both exposure to news about different types of terror attacks and the encouraged emotional response. I supplement this experimental study with observational analyses of the emotional content of social media posts in the wake of sixteen real-world terror attacks in the United States. I find that not only is anger the dominant emotional response to terrorism across both studies, but also that punitive motivations and support for retaliation are both directly shaped by experimentally induced anger after exposure to news about terrorism. These findings illuminate strategic incentives shaping militants’ use of terror tactics, electoral constraints leaders face in formulating counterterror policy, and the emotional mechanisms fueling cycles of political violence.

Bringing the boys back home: Campaign promises and US decision-making in Iraq and Vietnam

This article argues that electoral politics acts as an important constraint on presidential decision-making in war. Going beyond the existing literature’s focus on cases of conflict initiation, it outlines how electoral pressures push and pull presidents away from courses of action which may otherwise be deemed strategically optimal. Importantly, however, these electoral constraints will not just apply on the immediate eve of an election but will vary in strength across the electoral calendar. Together, this conceptual framework helps explain why presidential fulfilment of rhetorical pledges made on the previous campaign trail may be belated and often inconsistent. To probe the plausibility of these arguments, case studies of the closing stages of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq are outlined, drawing on archival and elite interview material. These episodes demonstrate that electoral accountability can be a powerful factor affecting wartime decision-making, but its effect is non-linear, and not easily observed through a narrow focus on particular timeframes.

Shirking and Slacking in Parliament

How and why do the activities of members of parliament (MPs) change in response to electoral constraints? In this article, we draw on unique and newly collected data from the Swiss federal chambers and two cantonal parliaments (Basel‐Stadt and Basel‐Land) to explore the effects of electoral constraints. Leveraging variation in mandatory term limits, we study the extent to which term‐limited MPs engage in shirking—that is, move away from their principal, whether it be the party and/or voters—and slacking—that is, reduce their parliamentary activities. Our analysis, which draws on a combination of novel roll‐call votes and speech data, yields mixed results: while there is no evidence of shirking by term‐limited MPs in the cantonal parliaments, we find some indications of such behavior among term‐limited legislators in the federal chambers. These latter legislators also engage in some limited slacking, which is not observable in the cantonal parliaments. Our findings shed light on the (political) implications of term limits and the effect of electoral constraints on legislator behavior.

One or two arenas? The break-up between national and regional elections

ABSTRACT This paper shows that the role of national electoral dynamics on regional elections is highly mediated by institutional and electoral constraints at the regional level. Using data on statewide parties’ electoral competition in regional and national elections in Spain and Italy, results show that the contamination of regional elections is lower in regions where decentralization has travelled further and where strong regionalist parties dominate electoral competition. The paper also shows that these two channels -more regional authority and more regionalist competition- shape the regional manifestos of statewide parties by increasing their pro-regional positions. These findings represent a contribution to a better understanding of the extent to which regional elections are a separate electoral arena from the national one.

Presidents, Politics, and Military Strategy: Electoral Constraints during the Iraq War

How do electoral politics affect presidential decisionmaking in war? As both commander in chief and elected officeholder, presidents must inevitably balance competing objectives of the national interest and political survival when assessing alternative military strategies in war. Yet, how and when electoral pressures influence decisionmaking during an ongoing conflict remains unclear. Drawn from the logic of democratic accountability, two mechanisms of constraint may be inferred. First, presidents may delay making decisions that are perceived to carry excessive electoral risk. Second, electoral pressures may have a dampening effect, causing presidents to water down politically sensitive courses of action to minimize any expected backlash. Recently declassified documents and interviews with senior administration officials and military figures illustrate these mechanisms in a case study of decisionmaking during the second half of the Iraq War. Both George W. Bush's surge decision of 2007 and Barack Obama's decision to withdraw troops in 2011 are shown to have been profoundly influenced by concerns related to the domestic political calendar. These findings call for further study of the nuanced ways in which the electoral cycle shapes wartime decisionmaking.

Electoral Uncertainty, Political Constraints, and Political Capabilities in Cross-Border Investment

In this paper we explore an under-researched dimension of political risk: electoral uncertainty. Using 56,996 M&A and greenfield investments into 55 countries, we show that close upcoming elections...

The Electoral Constraints on Inter-Party Mobility of Candidates: The Case of Pakistan

This article investigates the electoral constraints on the inter-party mobility of candidates. We argue that the prevalent mode of interactions among candidates, voters, and parties in local, district-level electoral markets shapes the strategic constraints faced by potential party switchers. We suggest that strong linkages between voters and political parties reduce the market value of the candidates outside of their political parties, thereby constraining their inter-party mobility. These expectations are evaluated using candidate- and district-level data from Pakistan from 1988–2013. The results show that the strength of voter-party linkages in an electoral district, as measured by the lack of electoral volatility and the extent of straight-ticket voting in national and provincial elections, has a positive effect on the propensity of candidates to switch parties.

The Electoral Constraints on Inter-Party Mobility of Candidates: The Case of Pakistan

The Electoral Constraints on Inter-Party Mobility of Candidates: The Case of Pakistan

Political Dynasties, Electoral Institutions and Politicians’ Human Capital

This article focuses on political dynasties’ potential consequences, and particularly investigates whether and when they lead to the selection of dynastic politicians with relatively lower education levels. I exploit the different electoral constraints faced by distinct subsets of Italian local politicians to identify whether weaker constraints on political selection processes induce the selection of dynastic politicians with lower education levels relative to their non‐dynastic peers. The analysis – which covers almost 540,000 Italian local politicians active during the period 1985–2012 – indicates that a political selection process controlled by politicians rather than the electorate favours dynastic individuals with relatively lower levels of education.

Congressional Jet-Setting: Lame Duck Travel and Majority Party Advantage in the House

Opportunism can surface at any point in a congressional career. It is especially likely to arise in the final term of office, when electoral constraints are absent, and, as research has shown, retiring legislators opportunistically prioritize leisure over representational responsibilities. This article explores how the majority party in Congress helps its retiring members to substitute leisure for work. It focuses on official foreign travel, a controversial political perquisite whose consumption is controlled by the majority party and is known to be subject to abuse by retiring and nonretiring incumbents. Using an original dataset spanning the 107th to the 111th Congresses, the article demonstrates that retiring members of the House majority not only travel more than retiring minority members, but also more than nonretiring members of both parties. The study has implications for political opportunism, ethics in government, and majority party advantage in Congress.

The French politics of retrenchment (2007–2012): Institutions and blame avoidance strategies

While the semi-presidential French regime and the reinforcement of ‘presidentialization’ under Nicolas Sarkozy have often been associated with the idea of disruptive and heroic changes, France’s post-crisis budgetary policy appeared strongly embedded in the previous commitments made by President Sarkozy and relied largely on measures of a gradual and low-profile nature without significant U-turns. In order to explain this result, the article emphasizes the effects of French institutions on government capabilities and on the potential allocation of blame and the related political strategies connected with the electoral cycle and timing. In addition, it also explores the specific characteristics of the French national crisis and its perceptions by top bureaucrats, as well as the nature of the external macro-constraints that influenced French budgetary policy, whether originating with markets, international organizations or the European Union.Points for practitionersThis article emphasizes the importance of institutions and political strategies in cutback management. The main argument is that budget reduction policies are embedded in political and electoral constraints that strongly affect their design and choices. The article provides many empirical elements about the specific characteristics of the French national crisis and how French governments reacted to the 2008 crisis. It puts emphasis on the specificities of French political institutions and the strong exposure to blame. The French political strategies of blame avoidance are described between 2008 and 2012, as well as the nature of the external macro-constraints that influenced French budgetary policy, whether originating with markets, international organizations or the European Union.

How Lame are Lame Ducks?

A lame duck session of Congress occurs when legislators meet after an election has been held but before the next Congress has taken office. Lame duck sessions are often criticized by the victorious party in the election, and a common critique is that the lame duck members — undisciplined by electoral constraints — vote irresponsibly. There are subtle but statistically significant differences between voting patterns in regular and lame duck sessions, as revealed by analysis of over 50,000 House and Senate roll call votes.During a lame duck session, members are slightly less likely to side with their own parties and less likely to vote at all. These patterns persist in very lame duck sessions — those that take place following the loss of majority status within a single house. In these sessions, however, a new pattern emerges: House members become more likely to cast bipartisan votes and Senators become less likely to do so. Beyond these voting patterns, it is difficult to say whether members vote more or less “responsibly” during lame duck sessions of Congress. Our analysis supports the primary findings of the existing literature on lame ducks. Past studies have found lame duck legislators to be less likely to indulge most special interests, but others suggest they may be more likely to indulge one particular special interest: their next employers. In this study, we explain how incentives change for lame duck legislators, briefly review past research on lame ducks, and present our statistical findings that support and add to the existing literature.

Imperfect Electoral Constraints and Taxation for an Economy with Ideological Parties and Ideological Voters

Journal of Anthropology and Archaeology is a peer-reviewed international journal, which publishes original papers promoting theoretical, methodological and empirical developments in the discipline of socio-cultural anthropology.

Dynamic Elite Partisanship: Party Loyalty and Agenda Setting in the US House

Legislators and legislative parties must strike a balance between collective and member-level goals. While there are legislative and reputational returns to co-ordinated behavior, partisan loyalty has a detrimental effect on members’ electoral success. This article argues that members and parties navigate these competing forces by pursuing partisan legislation when the threat of electoral repercussions is relatively low – when elections are distant. This study tests our theory by examining US House members’ likelihood of voting with their party on both partisan and non-divisive votes during the course of the election cycle in order to assess whether members strategically alter their levels of party loyalty as elections approach. It also explores whether majority parties strategically structure the agenda according to variation in members’ electoral constraints. This approach allows elite partisanship to follow a dynamic process, which is referred to here as dynamic elite partisanship. The results demonstrate that as elections approach, members are less likely to cast party votes, and parties are less inclined to schedule votes that divide the parties. At the same time, the study finds no evidence of strategic variation in members’ voting behavior on broadly consensual votes with election proximity.

Des difficultés d'entrer en politique : le mouvement Samoobrona dans la Pologne postcommuniste

Examining the participation of the leaders of the Samoobrona agricultural union in the 1993 Polish legislative elections allows one to consider the manner in which the electoral arena has been occupied by “newcomers” drawn from outside of the established political forces. While the rules governing competition have yet to be fully determined, these unions, which have more experience of peasant demonstrations than of electoral jousting, have devoted themselves to developing and promoting a dynamic and original platform. Far from being reducible to its strategic dimension alone, theirs is an apparently ad hoc effort aiming to reconcile the electoral constraints on candidates with the willfully atypical nature of their stance. However, this double game of adaptation and demarcation has proven to be particularly tricky for actors largely deprived of the resources that are becoming dominant in Post-Communist Poland. Struggling to control the dynamic of their campaign, the leaders of Samoobrona have ultimately found themselves incapable of redefining relations of representation in their favor and transforming their small group into a lasting political enterprise. ■

Dynamic Partisanship: Party Loyalty and Agenda Setting in the U.S. House

Legislators and legislative parties must strike a delicate balance between pursuing collective and member-level goals. While there are both legislative and reputational returns to coordinated behavior, party loyalty is known to have a detrimental effect on members' electoral success, which at least partially undermines parties' goal of seat maximization. We argue that members and parties navigate these competing forces by pursuing partisan legislation when the threat of electoral repercussions is relatively low. This condition is met when members are most insulated from electoral demands - when elections are distant. We empirically test our theory by examining House members' likelihood of casting a party vote over the course of the election cycle. In particular, we seek to assess whether members strategically alter their levels of party loyalty with respect to election proximity. We also explore whether majority parties strategically structure the agenda according to variation in members' electoral constraints. This approach builds upon the existing literature by providing for the possibility that individual- and collective-level partisanship follows a highly dynamic process, which we term dynamic partisanship. We find that with increasing proximity to election, members are less likely to cast party votes and parties are less inclined to schedule votes that divide the parties. In addition, we show that dynamic partisanship has important policy implications. In particular, bills introduced late in the election cycle are less likely to encounter partisan manipulation via amendments than those introduced when elections are distant.