Abstract
This article argues that electoral politics acts as an important constraint on presidential decision-making in war. Going beyond the existing literature’s focus on cases of conflict initiation, it outlines how electoral pressures push and pull presidents away from courses of action which may otherwise be deemed strategically optimal. Importantly, however, these electoral constraints will not just apply on the immediate eve of an election but will vary in strength across the electoral calendar. Together, this conceptual framework helps explain why presidential fulfilment of rhetorical pledges made on the previous campaign trail may be belated and often inconsistent. To probe the plausibility of these arguments, case studies of the closing stages of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq are outlined, drawing on archival and elite interview material. These episodes demonstrate that electoral accountability can be a powerful factor affecting wartime decision-making, but its effect is non-linear, and not easily observed through a narrow focus on particular timeframes.
Highlights
This article argues that electoral politics acts as an important constraint on presidential decisionmaking in war
This paper has argued that electoral considerations act as an important constraint on presidential decision-making in war
It noted that we may usefully conceive of electoral pressures as part of a balancing act between the strategic preference and the electoral preference of the president, whereby electoral considerations push and pull the president away from what is deemed the strategically optimal course of action
Summary
This article argues that electoral politics acts as an important constraint on presidential decisionmaking in war. Conceiving of the decisionmaking process as a balancing act between the president’s often competing interests as both Commander-in-Chief and holder of the highest elected office, it shows how electoral pressures pushed and pulled each president away from courses of action he deemed strategically optimal.
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