Electoral Competition Research Articles

Pious people, patronage jobs, and the labor market: Turkey under Erdoğan’s AKP

AbstractIn fragmented societies, electoral competition often entails using public office to advance group interests. Using individual-level polling data from 2012 to 2018, we analyze whether age cohorts entering the labor market before and after the religiously conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed power in Turkey experienced different public employment outcomes based on their religion and religiosity. Our analysis reveals that under the AKP rule, pious Sunnis (who constitute a large part of the society) significantly increased their presence in public sector employment (notably among women) and in high-status private jobs (notably among men). Furthermore, the subset of highly religious Sunnis (only 9.3% of the population) improved their likelihood of being employed in the public sector compared to other pious Sunnis and everyone else. Our findings are likely to be driven by the lifting of the headscarf ban in public employment and AKP’s strategic use of public employment and resources to reward like-minded groups in both the public and private spheres.

Unpacking electoral competition: campaign spending, vote distribution and turnout in Chilean mayoral elections

ABSTRACT We examine the complex relationship between campaign spending and electoral outcomes in local elections. We focus on (1) how spending influences the distribution of votes across candidates; (2) its impact on voter turnout; and (3) the differential effects of different types of campaign spending. Using the case of Chile’s 2016 mayoral elections, a candidate-level dataset, and linear regression techniques, we estimate the impact of campaign spending on the share and dynamics of votes obtained. The study reveals that an additional investment of 50 cents per voter correlates with an average 5% increase in vote share as a proportion of elegible voters. This increase is attributed to a double effect: mobilizing new voters and attracting support from competitors. The disaggregated analysis shows that radio advertising is especially impactful for campaign dissemination. These results enrich the literature on electoral strategies, campaign finance dynamics and financing regulations in multi-party systems.

Exploring voter turnout dynamics in polarized elections: A group-rule utilitarian framework

Do differentiated policies encourage higher voter turnout than centrist policies? This paper uses the citizen-candidate model and group-based utilitarian approach of costly voting to study how political polarization affects voter turnout under positive voting costs. Two parties enter the electoral competition with a pre-commitment on the platforms, and the winner implements their ideal policy. Comparative statistics results demonstrate that under positive voting costs, the expected turnout is always positive in the presence of political polarization and is only zero when the policies converge. In addition, the expected turnout rises with increased polarization and decreases with voting costs. This study exhaustively demonstrates that positive voter turnout is feasible only when policy differentiation exists.

No coalition is an island: how pre-electoral coalitions at the national-level shape local elections

ABSTRACT The rise of populist parties has affected the structure of electoral competition on the national level. To evaluate the depth of such changes, this paper examines whether pre-electoral coalitions (PEC) that contested the 2021 Czech general election aiming to replace the populist ANO in the government were replicated at the local level. Using the probit multilevel model estimated on the dyads, the results indicate that local pre-electoral coalitions were more likely to form if they were based on two (of three) pre-electoral coalitions that contested the 2021 general election. The strength of the populist party, however, does not increase the probability of anti-populist PECs. Instead, parties in local opposition are more likely to coalesce together, no matter which party governs. In addition, forming PEC in the Senate election is associated with a higher probability of forming the same PEC in local election.

Mafia and Political Competition Redirecting Votes not Discouraging Candidates

ABSTRACTThe efforts of organized crime to affect the outcome of elections have been well documented. In the present paper, we exploit the staggered enforcement of Law 164/1991, an anticrime measure that mandates dissolution of the city council in the case of suspected mafia infiltration, to show that political competition in municipal elections in Italy, measured by the win margin between the two “strongest” candidates and the Herfindahl index, increases sharply in the first election following a compulsory administration in dissolved municipalities compared to the control group of municipalities that have never been subject to council dissolution. We find that this effect of the anti‐mafia policy remains slightly significant up to the third election after dissolution, after which time it disappears. The paper suggests that mafias manipulate electoral outcomes principally by affecting voter behaviour, rather than by discouraging unfriendly candidates. We investigate several channels that might be driving these results.

Multinational Democratic Federations: Comparing India with Multi-level Systems from the Global North

In this article, we compare the Indian experience with that of some of the multinational and multi-level polities from the Global North, namely Belgium, Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom. We first summarize the essence of multinationalism. Drawing from our comparative examples of the Global North we then show how dominant narratives of state nationalism condition the extent to which the state can accommodate plurinational difference through self-rule, shared rule and ethno-symbolic recognition within these states, and then compare and contrast this with the Indian experience. Despite the stickiness of elite narratives on the meaning of the state during state formation and democratization, we highlight the ability of electoral competition to push multi-level politics into a more accommodative or majoritarian direction. We illustrate this with reference to India including the 2024 General Election Outcome.

An Empirical Analysis of Invalid Voting in Municipal Elections

ABSTRACTThis paper examines blank and null voting in Brazilian mayoral elections using a large dataset covering 5570 municipalities between 2000 and 2020. The study finds that more competitive elections reduce blank and null percentages, with re‐election scenarios leading to more valid votes. Blank and particularly null voting are found to be more prevalent in municipalities where a second round is possible. Economic factors and age categories also contribute to determine unconventional voting patterns. The results also highlight important differences between blank and null voting patterns and between urban and rural areas, the later suggesting that more sophisticated voters tend to be less prone to invalidate the vote.

Electoral Incentives and Negotiated Settlements: Legislative Deliberation on the Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines

Some conflict‐experiencing countries undergo both violent and electoral competitions. In other words, electoral competition evolves while nonstate actors struggle to realize their political and cultural demands by arms. Although increasing attention has been paid to the interplay between domestic political dynamics and violent conflict, we still know little about how the electoral calculations of legislators shape their response to negotiated settlement, possibly influencing conflict processes. By examining the congressional records of the House of Representatives in the Philippines, this study conducts quantitative text analyses to assess the impacts of electoral incentives—shaped by executive popularity, district ethnic composition, and the occurrence of conflict‐related violence—on legislators' response to negotiated settlement. The results demonstrate that legislators are sensitive to constituents' views on conflict settlement by showing support or opposition to negotiated settlement, anticipating their electoral fortunes in the next election.

Closer to the people? Determinants of citizen–MP contact in Africa

AbstractIn this paper, we investigate the determinants of contact between citizens and Members of Parliament (MPs) in Africa by combining theories of contact developed in advanced Western democracies with theories of clientelism developed in the Global South. Based on Afrobarometer data matched with constituency‐level electoral data, we provide a first analysis of the determinants of citizen–MP contact in 32 African countries, encompassing a broad range of regime types. We find that smaller districts and single‐member districts strengthen contact across regime types, while electoral competitiveness is only positively associated with contact in more democratic settings. In line with clientelist theories of public resource access, district links to national ruling coalitions are positively associated with contact, but we find little evidence of partisan bias. Overall, we find that contact theories travel remarkably well across regions and regime types, and we caution against interpreting clientelistic contacts as harmful for democracy.

Democratization and Peace after Civil War—What Difference Can International Engagement Make? Insights from Liberia

Abstract What role can international engagement play for the relationship between post-conflict democratization and conflict recurrence? Empirical evidence indicates that democratization risks triggering violence. Consequently, some scholars criticize the liberal peacebuilding approach, which centers on the promotion of democracy and competitive elections with the aim of fostering peace after civil wars. This article (1) illustrates the risks and potential of post-conflict democratization and (2) traces the effect of international support in this context. It builds on the existing literature yet goes beyond the concentration on peacekeeping forces and places particular attention on democracy promotion. The analysis draws on rich empirical data from Liberia, which is an ideal case to explore this relationship. Twice, democratic elections followed in the wake of a devastating civil war in Liberia. The first post-war elections in 1997 are often cited as an example of how externally induced democratization triggers renewed violence. The democratization process following the end of the second civil war in 2003, in contrast, is regarded as having strengthened peace. The analysis shows that international (democracy) support constitutes a key explanatory factor in the Liberian case by reducing and even substituting for the weakness and lack of credibility of local democratic institutions and procedures.

Strategic voting in two-round elections: confirming the learning hypothesis in the Czech presidential elections of 2013–2023?

ABSTRACT This paper explores whether strategic voting can also be identified in two-round electoral systems. We use aggregate data at the level of Czechia’s 206 microregions to assess the incidence of strategic voting in the Czech presidential elections using two-round elections between 2013 and 2023. We find the following evidence of a considerable rise of strategic voting in the 2023 presidential election: (1) rise of support for the two strongest candidates nationally, as well as at the level of individual microregions; (2) decline of strategic failure and sincere voting indicated by shifting values of the second-first loser ratio; (3) increased electoral competition approaching strong competitive two-party dominance as shown by Nagayama diagrams. These results point to the importance of the ‘learning hypothesis’ that strategic voting in new democracies tends to increase as voters (but also political elites) become more experienced with the electoral process. Furthermore, while we present a case study of a Czech presidential election, we also make an important contribution to the literature on strategic voting. Therefore, a theoretical contribution of this study also lies in its effort to apply the Duvergerian logic to a very different context of presidential elections in which electoral competition is highly personalised.

Competitive elections and tactical exclusion in Africa: Insights from unopposed candidacy in Tanzania

Competitive elections and tactical exclusion in Africa: Insights from unopposed candidacy in Tanzania

Party Competition Over Democracy: Democracy as Electoral Issue in Germany

Elected leaders increasingly undermine liberal democratic institutions with the support of their voters, openly challenging liberal democratic institutions in election campaigns. However, political scientists thus far have lacked the theoretical and empirical tools to study the role of elections in democratic backsliding. This article theorizes the degree to which democracy in general and liberal democracy more specifically can and should be conceptualized as valence and positional issues in multiparty electoral competitions of established liberal democracies. By investigating how German citizens and parties of the postwar period spoke about democracy per se and liberal democracy in their regional and national election manifestos, this article shows that democracy per se and liberal democracy, in particular, have been issues of different qualities in German postwar elections. While parties have used references to democracy in general as a mixed issue, showing both signs of valence and positional issues, parties’ emphasis on liberal democracy is shaped by a positional logic. Social and direct democracy have also been positional issues. Studying democracy and its various conceptions as electoral issues will help us address many important questions concerning the stability of democracies, shifting researchers’ focus to the competition of parties over citizens’ support for reforms that undermine or stabilize liberal democracy.

Does Proportionality Increase Turnout? A Study of Adaptation to Oscillating Electoral Systems

Does proportionality increase turnout? This article studies a national electoral reform in early twentieth-century Argentina that was implemented asymmetrically across districts, creating a natural laboratory in which some districts oscillated between electoral systems across elections. Leveraging this unusual variation in a difference-in-differences design, this article shows that a shift from multi-member plurality rules towards a slightly more proportional system—which removed one-third of the contested seats from the grasp of the dominant party—led to a four percentage point increase in turnout. An investigation into causal mechanisms indicates that more proportional rules, by increasing the odds that smaller parties obtain seats, promoted strategic party entry and intensified electoral competition, both between and within parties. These findings complement existing quasi-experimental results that focus exclusively on elections in European democracies, confirm that parties are able to adapt immediately to changes in electoral rules, and refute the belief that proportionality does not affect turnout in Latin America.

Between the ballot and the bullet: rebel-to-party transformations and the structure of the competitive field

ABSTRACT When rebel groups transition to electoral parties and participate in the democratic process, the prospects of peace are often fragile. We argue that rebel parties’ capacity to effectively participate in the electoral arena and contribute to post-conflict stability is contingent on the nature and legacies of the wartime competitive field. Where rebels and politicians shared claims of representation over their constituents in wartime, we argue that elections-related violence is likely in postwar elections when the rebels transition towards political parties. These former rebel parties challenges established electoral holds of political actors who previously represented the community at the ballot box while collaborating with insurgents. The transformation from wartime allies to direct electoral competition creates new incentives for violence, especially where violence is already normalized. Conversely, where established politicians maintain hegemonic representation of their constituency, they create strong barriers to entry for former insurgents in the electoral realm. As a result, the incentives for violence are much reduced. We analyse the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s transformation into the United Bangsamoro Justice Party after the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro.

Does a voter's decision to sit out an election depend upon where others stand?: Some quasi-experimental evidence on the effect of local concentrations of voters and electoral competitiveness on voting participation

This analysis uses plausibly exogenous changes in electoral boundaries to investigate how voting participation is affected by local concentrations of voters who favor majority or minority parties. Novel instrumental variable and difference-in-differences models suggest that – even while accounting for overall electoral competitiveness – participation rates increase where there exist greater concentrations of voters who support majority parties, but a similar effect is not evident for less-popular, minority parties. Furthermore, this effect is driven by spending patterns of the dominant party in the local district.

Individual Electoral Competitiveness: Undecided voters, complex choice environments and lower turnout

The number of citizens that are undecided in their vote choice has risen in Western democracies. Polling in Britain shows that a significant proportion of the population do not know who they will vote for. Against a backdrop of partisan dealignment and party system fragmentation, there are more parties on the ballot and more citizens ‘free to choose’. Partisanship continues to be important for voting and lacking an identity is a predictor of aggregate voter volatility. A growing literature conceptualises this availability of voters as individual-level electoral competitiveness, stating that undecided citizens are subject to high levels of competition for their vote. I use this framework and apply theory from the decisionmaking literature to offer why these conditions may depress turnout. I construct a measure of undecided voters who are ‘in competition’ and show that this accounts for 40% of the British Election Study Internet Panel respondents. I demonstrate that those who are in competition are less likely to vote. They are more often those without a partisan identity and those who pay less attention to politics, but being in competition is not related to constituency marginality. The results help explain a key determinant of abstention in British elections and suggest low levels of participation may be due to complex choice environments and citizen indecision. However, they provide a positive outlook for pluralistic democracy as voters do deliberate between the party perspectives on offer.

Selective Exposure and Electoral Competition

Selective Exposure and Electoral Competition

Outsourcing Machines. How Programmatic Parties Include Clientelistic Strategies

What explains that programmatic parties may combine their policy offers with clientelistic dispensation? Prevailing knowledge suggests that parties top-down diversify linkages, targeting their program at wealthier voters while providing particularistic inducements to poorer ones. Yet, these frameworks fail to explain the variety of strategies used by politicians to link voters within the municipal context, where voters’ socioeconomic status and electoral competition are less likely to vary. I argue that programmatic parties may engage in clientelism at the municipal level when they receive bottom-up demands. Leveraging evidence from 97 in-depth interviews conducted during multiyear fieldwork in three Chilean municipalities, this article shows why and how programmatic parties outsource the cost of clientelism to neighbourhood associations in exchange for targeted distribution to solve the groups’ demands. By showing that clientelism in programmatic-oriented settings is demand-driven, the article draws attention to territorially-rooted local groups as key actors that help to explain the variety of strategies parties use to link with voters.

Electoral competition, electoral uncertainty and corruption: Theory and evidence from India

In this paper we study the effect of electoral competition on corruption when uncertainty in elections is high, as is the case in many developing countries. Our theory shows that in such a context high levels of electoral competition may have perverse effects on corruption. We illustrate the predictions of the model with village level data on audit-detected irregularities and electoral competition from India. Our results imply that accountability can be weak in such contexts, despite high electoral competition.