Egyptian President Gamal Research Articles

An In-Depth Analytical Study Of The Works Of Sayyid Qutb: Ideology, Influence, And Legacy

Sayyid Qutb, born in 1906 and executed in 1966, was a prominent Egyptian writer, educator, and Islamic theorist. He played a significant role in shaping modern Islamic thought and was a key figure in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood during the 1950s and 60s. Qutb’s writings, particularly his most famous book “Ma‘âlim fî al-Tarîq” (Milestones), published in 1964, became central to the ideology of Qutbism. In “Milestones”, he critiqued contemporary societies, arguing that despite their technological progress, they lived in a state of “Jâhiliyyah” (ignorance), disconnected from true Islamic principles. Qutb advocated for a resurgence of Islam through jihad to restore a purer form of the faith. His works have greatly influenced modern Islamic movements. After being convicted of plotting to assassinate Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Qutb was executed in 1966. His writings, including “Fî Ẓilâl al-Qur’ân” (In the Shade of the Qur’ân), continue to impact debates on Islamic governance and the role of religion in political life.

The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973

The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973

Constraints and Adjustments in the US–Yemeni Relations

This article analyzes the course of US–Yemeni relations from the 1940s to the present and aims to explain the reasons for the twists and turns in bilateral relations. It argues that the US government never developed a unique “Yemen policy” and that its attitude toward that country was determined largely by its ties with Saudi Arabia. Yemen began to loom large in US foreign policy in the early 1960s when Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser intervened on behalf of the Republicans who staged a coup against the Royal imamate regime, which relied on Saudi support. The article shows that President John Kennedy looked favorably on the new Republican regime in Yemen despite the robust relations that existed between the United Statesand Saudi Arabia. In addition, it argues that despite the war in Yemen, which lasted from 1962 to 1970 and caused instability in this region, this country did not loom large in US foreign policy. This was largely due to the British presence in south Yemen and especially in the port of Aden, which lasted until 1967. The article shows how the British withdrawal from Aden increased Yemen’s value in the eyes of US policymakers, but even then, no effort was made to fashion a unique policy toward this country. In addition, the article demonstrates how Washington’s attitude changed in 1969 when the country was divided into North Yemen, which tended to regard the Soviet Union as its protector and South Yemen, which continued to rely on US aid. And lastly, the article traces US–Yemeni relations from 1990, when the country reunited, until the present. It demonstrates how the bilateral relations were affected by the superpowers’ rivalry during the Cold War, the fight against terrorism, and disagreement between the Republican and the Democratic parties in the United States.

Jordan's position regarding the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization until 1967

The Palestinians had representatives in the League of Arab States since its founding in 1945 despite its occurrence under the British Mandate, and the representatives of Palestine in that era were Musa Al-Alami, Abdul Karim Al-Alami, Ahmed Hilmi Abdel-Baqi and Ahmed Al-Shugairi, respectively.In the first Arab summit conference in 1964 called by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Palestine Liberation Organization was created to express the will of the people of Palestine and for there to be a body demanding their rights and self-determination. The conference mandated the representative of Palestine, Ahmed Al-Shugairi, to contact the Palestinians and write a report on that to be submitted to the following Arab summit conference, Ahmed Al-Shugairi made a tour during which he visited the Arab countries and contacted the Palestinians there. During his tour, the draft national charter and the articles of association of the Palestine Liberation Organization were drafted. Here are lists of the names of candidates for membership in the first Palestinian conference, which was held in Jerusalem between March 28 and June 2 of 1964 and was opened by King Hussein bin Talal. The conference was known as the First Palestinian National Council for the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Warda: A Novel by Sonallah Ibrahim

BOOKS IN REVIEW Sonallah Ibrahim Warda: A Novel Trans. Hosam Aboul-Ela. New Haven, Connecticut. Yale University Press. 2021. 376 pages. MANY OF SONALLAH IBRAHIM’S novels explore how former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser’s version of socialism was “a dream.” Yet Warda, originally published in Arabic in 2000, examines the fate of the Dhofar Liberation Front, an Arab Marxist movement that sought to drive the British out from Oman and Yemen in the 1960s and 1970s. This political movement is intertwined with the Egyptian narrator’s personal dreams and memories of Warda, the nom de guerre of an Omani activist with whom he fell in love at Cairo University in the late 1950s. Informed by impressive research, the novel tells the little-known story of the Dhofar Liberation Front, an eclectic mix of Arab intellectuals, herders, and tribal folk who were initially drawn to the group because they desired a more equitable society. The novel opens in 1992 with the narrator’s, Rushdy’s (presumably the alter ego of the writer), dreams of Warda. Because of the disturbing dreams, Rushdy heads to Oman to find Warda, which means “rose” in Arabic. He ties in his quest with a visit to relatives, his cousin Fathy, and his wife, Shafiqa, who work in Oman. The novel alternates between Rushdy’s point of view, set in the shiny, superficially modern yet repressive Oman of 1992 and the “found” xeroxed diary of Warda set in the 1960s and 1970s, delivered mysteriously to the narrator, in ironically, Western brand-name plastic bags. No novelists, thus far, have examined the Dhofar Liberation Front that sprang to life out of the zeitgeist and context of the 1960s. After the Egyptian setback with Israel in 1967 and the British retreat from Aden, the DLF gained more popular support in the Arab world. At this time, the Russians and the Chinese were eager to expand their sphere of influence in the Arabian Gulf— they threw money and ammunition at this small Marxist group, which they might have ignored at another historical juncture. Through Warda’s diary, Ibrahim gives us a sense of the nitty-gritty life “on the ground” of a committed revolutionary in the DLF, a woman no less. Warda is a feisty, liberated character, who is at first doctrinaire but eventually rejects violence and even questions the goals of the DLF by the end. Her diary details the phases of the movement through a personal lens: 1960–1965, Warda’s training and recruitment in Lebanon ; Arrival to the Dhofar Mountains, 1965–1968, division of the area and guerilla operations against British targets; 1968–1970, Warda’s withdrawal as a fighter and work on literacy and feminist projects with local women; 1970–1972, Sultan Said Bin Taimur’s overthrow by his son, Qaboos, with the support of the British in 1970 (members of the DLF are co-opted by Qaboos with payoffs and financial incentives); 1972–1975, in-fighting among members and retreat from Sultan Qaboos; and finally, 1975, members hiding in caves. Warda and her lover, Dahmish, another fighter, plan a suicidal trek across the Saudi desert, to sneak back into Oman and revive the movement. Being a revolutionary might seem glamorous to the naïve, but Warda finds out that soldiering in the desert is cruel and demanding . Throughout her diary, she offers serious ruminations on political ideology and fascinating tidbits about other revolutionary groups on the world stage. She also describes violent guerilla operations, nasty power struggles, and executions of deserters. Ibrahim’s penchant for the absurd is palpable in the diary. Warda makes some wry observations about the difficulties of trying to lead traditional, uneducated men in her militia—and not all of the creatures of the desert are warm and fuzzy . . . SONALLAH IBRAHIM 96 WLT AUTUMN 2021 0 deserts her, and her father succumbs to religious charlatans. Married as a teen to a man twice her age, Nancy watches her husband get drunk every night. When he dies in an accident at a tuna-packing plant, she wonders if she’ll be granted “a moment alone with the 2,500 cans containing my deceased husband.” When disease attacks her uterus, she...

Драматургія Саад аль-Фараджа в контексті розвитку театральної справи в Кувейті другої половини ХХ століття

The purpose of the article is to study the activities of theaters in Kuwait in general and the interpretation of their contemporary Arabic drama on their scenes in particular against the backdrop of political events in the Middle East in the second half of the twentieth century. The author focuses on the creative work of Sa’ada al-Faraj, a famous actor, theatrical figure, playwright, and public figure in Kuwait. The researcher focuses on political circumstances that have brought about the actualization of individual topics that affect Sa’ad al-Faraj’s plays, analyzes how the confrontation between Israel and the Arab world, the policies of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser influenced the speculations of the creative intelligentsia of Kuwait. Essential for the author of the article is the problem of political censorship in modern Kuwait, which caused the short-lived scenic life of a number of plays Saad al-Faraj. Much of the intelligence is devoted to the peculiarities of poetry in drama Sad al-Faraj. In the time of his creative establishment, the artist was under the significant influence of European innovative movements in the twentieth century, and this greatly influenced the artistic image of his texts. In the center of the researcher’s attention is a play by Sa’ad al-Faraj “Tradition is another nature”, which clearly show the receptions of the epic theater Bertolt Brecht. The methodology of the research is to apply political science in order to expedite the full disclosure of the public context in the activities of Kuwait theaters and the works of playwright Sa’ad al-Faraj. Introducing the work of the Kuwaiti playwright in the world context, the author relies on system-structural and comparative methods. Essential in considering a particular dramatic work was the use of theatrical-critical analysis. The novelty of the work. For the first time, comprehensively and using political methodology and drawing on an art-study analysis, the activities of theaters in Kuwait in the second half of the twentieth century have been explored. The scientific circle introduces important information about the creative work of Sa’ad al-Faraj, which is carried out an art-study analysis of his play “Tradition is another nature”. Conclusions. Summarizing the above mentioned in Kuwait, all the major theatres were under the supervision of the governmental censor, which, according to al-Faraj, found it desirable to use the theatre only to disseminate culture ‘by presenting random and irrelevant examples from the repertoire of world theatre’.

From cooperation to normalization? Jordan–Israel relations since 1967

This article deals with the relations between Jordan and Israel from 1967 until 2015. The mutual interest of the Hashemite regime and the Zionist movement, namely to oppose the Palestinians, created the first opportunity for cooperation, which developed into economic ties and intelligence exchanges during the reign of King Abdullah I. A real strategic alliance between Jordan and Israel was formed in the 1950s, when Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser, together with other nationalist Arab elements, tried to subvert King Hussein’s regime and topple him. Israel unhesitatingly came to the side of the Hashemite ruler to protect Jordanian territorial sovereignty. This perception of Jordan informed Israel’s policy, which aimed to aid Jordan in confronting new challenges to the regime. The fact that Israel has stood by the Hashemite regime through most of its existence indicates a strategic partnership that will sustain, even if the peace treaty were to be revoked one day.

Filiation or Affiliation? Nasser and Children in Egyptian Literature

Among the growing number of literary works that have (re)-imagined the character of late Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, several Egyptian novels and autobiographies have represented him through the eyes of children, who, in one way or another, directly were affected by his personality, decisions, speeches, or ideas. The perspective of children offers these works a rare opportunity to approach Nasser in ways that the world of adults may not. It can indicate the incomprehensibility of the situation in which children find themselves vis-à-vis Nasser. Children's incomplete knowledge of the political context of their lives, these works suggest, may drive them to adopt different responses toward Nasser than those advanced by their families. More importantly, I argue that these works capture the children's developing awareness of the significance of Nasser at moments of severe familial crises, during which their fathers emerge as the most negatively affected ones. In so doing, these works place children in an uncomfortable, unsettling position where the father's place loses its unassailable authority. The tension is all the more aggravated when the attack on the father at the hand of Nasser's regime is accompanied by the child's growing respect and love for Nasser. As this article will demonstrate, these works pit biological fathers against Nasser—the figurative father of the nation, children included—and, at times, demand a certain belonging from children. They, in other words, corner children between filiation and affiliation, in Edward Said's articulation of the terms, where the forced absence of the father is juxtaposed with a sudden presence of Nasser in the child's world.

The “Three Circles” Construction

Abstract The discursive tradition of referring to three identities, the Arab, the African, and the Islamic, as cohesive, concentric “circles” began with Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, who invoked the trope in his 1955 revolutionary handbook. Nasser's project, which challenged Western hegemony through a politics of neutrality, inspired Malik Shabazz to understand U.S. domestic coloniality in terms of overlapping diasporas. In exploring Shabazz's invocation of this trope, I here sketch a sociohistorical and political portrait of Black, Arab, and Islamic leaders who befriended Malcolm X. Shabazz's relationships with Arab American Muslim community activists, African leaders, Arab Muslim leaders, and the African American Cairo expat community not only represent these circles but also reveal their malleability. Rejecting ossified nation-state boundaries, Shabazz created a vision of a Black Atlantic Islam.

THE DOMESTIC SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD EGYPT, 1955–1957

In the wake of the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, China’s Communist government developed close relations with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. China’s conciliatory diplomacy toward Egypt and other non-communist countries in the Arab world has long intrigued historians, who have interpreted this campaign as a way to break out of diplomatic isolation and gain political influence in the Middle East. Such an interpretation neglects the relevance of Sino-Egyptian relations to Chinese domestic politics, especially the Communist Party’s interest in incorporating Muslims into its vision of the Chinese nation. By using relations with Egypt to present China as a staunch supporter of global Islam, the government encouraged all its citizens—and Muslims in particular—to reaffirm their allegiance to Chinese nationalism and the Communist government that championed it.

The Place of Africa, in Theory: Pan‐Africanism, Postcolonialism, Beyond

AbstractTwentieth‐century African theory translated two destructive diasporas – of peoples by the slave trade, of lands by empire – into a creative third: a pan‐Africanist philosophy of decolonization that recovered Africa's pluralism as a powerfully “diasporic” defiance of imperial taxonomies. Comparing a 1967 lecture given in Cairo by Senegalese poet‐president Léopold Sédar Senghor with a 1955 treatise on the philosophy of revolution by Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser (Jamal cAbd al‐Nasir), and both with Achille Mbembe's 2001 On the Postcolony, this essay shows how Senghor marshals race/culture hybridities, Nasser historical/geographic alignments, and Mbembe temporal entanglements to deconstruct monolithic constructions of “Arab”, “Black”, and “African” being, space, and time – and to pluralize and “world” a continent. It argues that the logics of trans‐territoriality and trans‐temporality that informed Third World solidarity in the 1950s–1970s represent a forgotten legacy of pan‐Africanism to postcolonialism and to global theory generally. Africa's place, in theory, decenters Eurocentrism.

‘Why are they shooting?’: Washington's view of the onset of the War of Attrition

This article examines the episode of an almost-forgotten war in the history of the Middle East conflict – the War of Attrition. While everyone agrees that the War of Attrition ended on August 7, 1970, there is controversy over when the war broke out. Some consider it to have begun in the summer of 1968 and others believe that it began with the bloody events that occurred immediately after the Six Day War. The IDF considers March 8, 1969 to be the day the war broke out because from that day on there was continuous fighting with the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal. To show the American and Israeli failure, in the first four months of hostilities along the Suez Canal, to understand that the area was facing renewed conflict and another round of war. A direct consequence of that failure was the inability of both sides to adopt a suitable policy towards the emerging crisis. The article examines the beginning of the War of Attrition in the diplomatic arena, the Egyptian aims and objectives, and the American reaction. Other than presenting the facts, this article examines what the United States thought of the Egyptian moves, if and how much the United States was influenced by those moves, and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's reaction to the steps taken by the Americans. Since the main focus is on the American foreign policy, most of the sources used for this article are American. In order to complete the picture, it is also important to examine the Israeli point of view and the last part will focus on that.

The Egyptian Government's Role in Re-Establishing the Hotel Industry in Cairo (1953–1957)

This article analyzes the role of the Egyptian Government in reviving and improving the Egyptian hotel industry in the revolutionary period. It provides a case study of a country with large political problems, but at the same time pursuing a dream—a dream that was expensive and demanding. Tourism was understood to be an important tool in promoting political stability and providing some legitimacy to a political system opposed by the major powers in the world. This study will examine the Egyptian Government's role in re-establishing the hotel industry as an important economic sector in Egypt during the period from 1953 to 1957, which was considered a critical political period. The year 1953 marked the beginning of the official plans to increase the hotel facilities in Cairo with the establishment of the Tourism Department; and 1957 marked the end of Suez Crisis of 1956. The study utilized unpublished U.S. Department of State documents that show that the hotel industry was used as tool to put pressure on the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952–1970) to accept U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and was one of the main issues negotiated between the two countries after the Suez Crisis.

Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don't: The Eisenhower Administration and the Aswan Dam

This article analyzes the Aswan Dam decision in terms of the interaction between individual perceptions and institutional priorities in the formulation of US foreign policy. The conceptual framework is drawn from the work of Richard Cottam and Richard Herrmann. After a background discussion of the history of both the Eisenhower and Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser Administrations, the article presents an analysis of the Eisenhower Administration's deliberations regarding the Aswan Dam decision. This analysis shows that US decision-makers interpreted and Nasser's actions according to a set of pre-established perceptions which clearly resulted in policies that contradicted the best interests of the US. In July 1956, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced the United States' refusal to fund the Aswan Dam in a manner that was intentionally humiliating to Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser. After explaining his decision to Egyptian Ambassador Dr. Ahmad Husayn, Dulles patronizingly suggested that Egypt should get along for the time being with projects less monumental than the Aswan Dam.1 This decision and its execution began a chain of events that would see war break out three months later, the severe decline in international prestige of Britain and France (two of America's closest Cold War allies), and the growth of Soviet influence over that would last until the early 1970s. This episode in US-Egyptian relations is considered to be critical to understanding the subsequent Suez Crisis and the Eisenhower Doctrine.2 Existing analyses of the policy have explored this decision in terms of the greater US reaction towards revolutionary Egypt, Cold War strategic considerations, and with respect to the relationship between Secretary Dulles and Congress.3 Literature addressing the adverse outcomes of US policy towards or the Middle East at large tends to focus on the failures of US officials to interpret the local concerns of actors in the Middle East and the tendency of US officials to view Arabs as an Oriental and inherently emotional group of people, while others focus on the undue deference to Israeli interests in the region.4 This article, on the other hand, endeavors to explore the Aswan Dam decision on its own. Though we acknowledge that other factors may have contributed to US policy towards Egypt, this article will argue that in the case of the Aswan Dam, the Eisenhower Administration was primarily bound by conflicting international and domestic priorities which encouraged decision-makers to adopt a conceptualization of the situation which eased these differences by selectively interpreting available information regarding Nasser and Egypt. Decision-makers, in short, developed a schema to describe Nasser in terms that would provide a rationale for US policy towards that was geared to prevent that policy from conflicting with other domestic and international priorities. Because the schema was at odds with the objective facts of the situation, the resulting policy decisions led to disastrous consequences for the United States. This article will analyze the Aswan Dam decision in terms of the interaction between individual perception and institutional priorities in the formulation of US foreign policy. The conceptual framework is drawn from the work of Richard Cottam and Richard Herrmann. After a background discussion of the history of both the Eisenhower and Nasser Administrations, the article will present an analysis of inter-administration deliberations regarding the Aswan Dam decision. This analysis will show that US decision-makers adopted a particular schema to interpret and Nasser despite available evidence that clearly contradicted the terms of the schema. The article analyzes the Eisenhower Administration's initial strategy of engagement with the Third World, the discussions on how to execute this strategy vis-a-vis the Aswan Dam, and finally the institutional awareness of adverse consequences to US interests should the Dam not be funded. …

“Logic dictates that they may attack when they feel they can win:” The 1955 Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal, the Egyptian Army, and Israeli Intelligence

Scholars usually agree that the Israeli decision to attack Egypt in October 1956 was motivated by fear of an impending attack by the Egyptian army. That fear was spurred by the news of a large arms deal concluded between Egypt and Czechoslovakia in September 1955. However, Czechoslovak and Soviet reports, used here for the first time, reveal that the Egyptian army was encountering serious difficulties while trying to absorb these weapons. Newly declassified military intelligence assessments reveal that Israeli analysts maintained, even after the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, that the Egyptian army was no match to the IDF. The article goes on to explore the strategic consideration that stood behind the Israeli decision to go to war. At the end of October 1956, Israel joined forces with Britain and France and attacked Egypt. For Britain and France, the immediate trigger for the decision to launch a military operation against Egypt was the announcement by Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser of the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, which had been under joint Anglo-French ownership. However, Nasser's support for the resistance movement in Algeria and his efforts to subvert pro-British Arab regimes in Jordan and Iraq also contributed to the Anglo-French motivation to bring about Nasser's downfall. The Israeli decision to go to war at the end of 1956 is described by historians of this period as being influenced by several factors, such as the Egyptian blockade of the Tiran Straits, the continuous Palestinian infiltration from Gaza into the Negev, the activity of the fedayin during late 1955 and early 1956, and the fear that, if not dealt with promptly, Nasser would be able to unite the Arab world and lead it into a war against Israel. Still, among all these factors, the fear of an impending Egyptian attack is considered one of the factors, if not the prominent factor.1 That fear was aroused by the Egyptian announcement of a massive arms deal with the Soviet Union at the end of September 1955 - a deal known as the 1955 Czech-Egyptian arms deal, since Czechoslovakia was acting as Moscow's proxy.2 Allegedly, David Ben-Gurion, Israel's Prime Minister, had assumed that once the Egyptian army acquired the sophisticated weapons that flowed from the Eastern Bloc, it would attack Israel. The escalation of hostilities on the Israeli-Egyptian border at the end of 1955 and the beginning of 1956 seemed to confirm that the confidence of the Egyptian army was growing and that it was indeed poised to attack Israel. However, when the Israeli army invaded Sinai at the end of October 1956, the fears that the Czech arms deal had somehow transformed the Egyptian army into a mighty war machine proved groundless, as the Egyptian army collapsed in front of advancing Israeli troops. Furthermore, no evidence of preparations to attack Israel was found. But what if Israel had known all this in advance? What if it had had a reliable way to gauge Egyptian military capabilities, as well as Egyptian intentions, before the war erupted? Would the Israeli leadership still have decided to join forces with Britain and France against Egypt? Newly declassified Israeli intelligence assessments and cabinet and General Staff discussions prove that Israel had foreknowledge of the true state of Egypt's armed forces. Moreover, newly declassified documents from the Soviet and Czech archives, which include reports from the Czechoslovak weapon instructors stationed in Egypt, show that this information was reliable. But if the Egyptian army posed little threat to Israel, why did Israel decide to attack Egypt? The last section of this article will try to piece together this historical puzzle. CZECHOSLOVAK WEAPONS INSTRUCTORS AND THE STATE OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY Most of the relevant documents in the Czech military archives do not directly discuss the activity of the Czechoslovak weapons instruction teams that were sent to Egypt in 1956. …

Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century

In Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, aptly subtitled From Triumphto Despair, Adeed Dawisha provides us a most compelling narrative. He tells of a time, not long ago, when Arabs still believed that a glorious futurewas ahead of them. Today, the very thought of a fiery, charismatic Arableader, adored by his people and rising to oppose the West, seems silly andunrealistic. But four decades ago, Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasserwas hailed as nothing less than a modern-day savior, and it seemed – if onlyfor an instant – that the unification of the Arab world was not just probable,but a historical inevitability. Dawisha goes beyond the successes, excesses,and outright failures that defined Arab nationalism at its height. Using awide variety of English and Arabic source material, he weaves a complicatedpicture, analyzing in detail how Arab nationalism was born and how itwould die just as quickly.Central to his argument is that, from the beginning, Arab nationalismfaced an uphill battle in its bid to win over an otherwise indifferent (and illiterate)populace. The author takes particular issue with George Antonious’thesis that leading up to World War I, the region’s elites and masses had beenstirred by “the Arab will to freedom.” It would prove terribly difficult for thenationalists to compete with entrenched pan-Islamic identities. For this reason,the most prominent early advocates of the nationalist ideal wereChristian, such as the Syrians Negib Azoury and Ibrahim al-Yajizi. TheMuslim elites were suspicious, seeing in Arab nationalism, with its secularemphasis, a perfidious plot to divide them ...

Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961 (review)

Reviewed by: Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961 Bruce J. Evensen (bio) Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961. By Peter L. Hahn. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. xii + 398 pp. On the eve of Israeli independence, Chaim Weizmann, the man who would become the new nation's first president, observed that those who came from outside the Middle East always overestimated the role they could play in bringing peace to the region. Weizmann's warning seems particularly prescient in analyzing U.S. policy in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Peter Hahn's detailed description of this period castigates Washington for failing to achieve Arab-Israeli reconciliation "because of limits U.S. leaders imposed on their peacemaking" (276). The limits Hahn has in mind are the efforts to stop the spread of Soviet influence in an oil-rich region seen as central to postwar recovery. Reading Hahn's carefully crafted narrative, however, would seem to suggest that Weizmann had it right. The "unrelenting antagonism" between Israel and her Arab neighbors (1), and not the myopia Hahn alleges, may well have led these sovereign states to resist initiatives they did not consider in their national interest, thereby scuttling peacemaking "on U.S. terms" (231). Hahn, an associate professor of history at Ohio State University and the executive director of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, reconstructs the power vacuum reluctantly filled by the United States following the collapse of British influence in the Arab Near East after World War II. Hahn sees Truman as "unsteady" and reactive. Eisenhower is characterized as proactive and "more consistent." Both administrations, however, appeared to "privilege Cold War security concerns over peacemaking ventures" (3). Hahn argues this approach prevented a peace settlement on issues ranging from borders to refugees to water rights. The United States, he suggests, "refrained from taking steps that might have led to peace" (277). Those steps, in Hahn's view, should have included Washington's collaboration with Moscow in imposing "a multilateral settlement" to end the conflict (279). Hahn's conclusion assumes something he gives little evidence for, namely, that Stalin was interested in settling outstanding differences between the Arabs and Israelis and that the parties to the dispute could have been coerced to embrace an imposed settlement. Hahn acknowledges that throughout the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies there was "a deep reluctance of Arabs and Israelis to make concessions or compromises" that might have advanced the peace process (2). Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to straddle these differences left "an ambiguous legacy" for his successors (19). Truman's policymaking [End Page 129] on Palestine was further inhibited by divisions within his own administration. The White House staff, key members of Congress, and organized public opinion reinforced Truman's internal inclination to support the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. This prospect was vigorously opposed by the Near East desk in the State Department and defense planners, who feared the outbreak of civil unrest in Palestine would destabilize the region and encourage Soviet meddling. Hahn is tough on Truman because of what he sees as Truman's vacillation between these two competing points of view. Truman embraces a two-state solution for Palestine in November 1947 only to favor a United Nations trusteeship four months later. Because Truman was "buffeted by public opinion" over Palestine, "ambivalence became a trademark of his policy" toward the region (32). Hahn believes that Truman becomes "more impartial" in his handling of Israel when he "refrains from overturning the handiwork of the State Department" in the post-independence period (68). Those initiatives on refugee resettlement and border disputes left U.S. officials "profoundly angry at Israel for its stubborn refusal to accept (American) counsel" (122). Hahn argues that President Eisenhower's international experience and practical "impartiality" in the ongoing Arab-Israeli dispute were critical in defusing the Suez-Sinai crisis in October 1956 (147). The decision of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal in July 1956 provoked "strenuous attempts" by Washington to contain the conflict (192). While Eisenhower...

Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East

Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, the United States pledged to give increased economic and military aid to receptive Middle Eastern countries and to protect - with US armed forces if necessary - the territorial integrity and political independence of these nations from the threat of international communism. Salim Yaqub demonstrates that although the United States officially aimed to protect the Middle East from Soviet encroachment, the Eisenhower Doctrine had the unspoken mission of containing the radical Arab nationalism of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom Eisenhower regarded as an unwitting agent of Soviet expansionism. By offering aid and protection, the Eisenhower administration hoped to convince a majority of Arab governments to side openly with the West in the Cold War, thus isolating Nasser and decreasing the likelihood that the Middle East would fall under Soviet domination. Employing a wide range of declassified Egyptian, British and American archival sources, Yaqub offers a comprehensive account of Eisenhower's efforts to counter Nasserism's appeal throughout the Arab Middle East. Challenging interpretations of US-Arab relations that emphasize cultural antipathies and clashing values, Yaqub instead argues that the political dispute between the United States and the Nasserist movement occurred within a shared moral framework - a pattern that continues to characterize US-Arab controversies in the 21st century.

Sharq Al-Adna/The Voice of Britain

This study of Sharq al-Adna - The Near East Broadcasting Station - attempts to review the history of the British government-operated radio station in light of political and military developments in the Middle East involving the UK after the end of the League of Nations/United Nations Palestine Mandate. An examination of Sharq al-Adna is important because it helps document both British and more widely western concerns about the Middle East in the 1950s, especially after Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956 after the June British departure. The article discusses western, and more specifically British, propaganda during the Second World War, and analyzes this station’s history with the aid of government documents that were declassified in the mid-1990s and to which the writer had access.

Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance

They were three of the most memorable figures of the twentieth century: David Ben-Gurion, Israel's indomitable founding father; Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, the charismatic Arab nationalist; and the young and dynamic John F. Kennedy. Now Warren Bass illuminates these three extraordinary men and their diplomatic struggles at the height of the Cold War, offering stunning new insights into the origins of today's Middle East. The Kennedy period, Bass writes, was no mere place-marker between Suez and the Six Day War, between the martial frostiness of Dwight Eisenhower and the Texas warmth of Lyndon Johnson. He shows how Kennedy sought greater influence in the Arab world, offering more foreign aid and a new diplomatic overture to Nasser, the Arab world's leading radical. For a while, Kennedy and Nasser engaged in a rich personal correspondence. But the rapprochement was cut short by Nasser's impulsive intervention in Yemen's civil war, which led Kennedy to deploy fighter jets in Saudi Arabia as a warning to Egypt. Meanwhile, Kennedy made the first major U.S. arms sale to Israel, providing it with advanced Hawk anti-aircraft missiles-a crucial policy shift that marks the origins of America's alliance with the Jewish state. But Kennedy also feared that Israel would get the bomb and demanded that Ben-Gurion open his secret nuclear reactor to U.S. inspectors, leading to a grave confrontation. Ultimately, Israel agreed to inspections-but continued its nuclear weapons program under the cover of intense secrecy. Drawing on meticulous research, Warren Bass paints a fresh, elegant portrait of the pivotal presidency that helped create the modern Middle East.