Egyptian President Gamal Research Articles

Israel's entry to Africa, 1956–61

From 1956 to 1961, Israel established a presence in Africa that constituted a remarkable diplomatic achievement. When the Gold Coast became Ghana in March 1957, Israel's consulate in Accra became its first embassy in Africa. Israel experienced its first serious setback in Africa in January 1961, when Ghana, Guinea and Mali signed an anti‐Israel declaration at the Casablanca conference. This initiative of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser condemned Israel as ‘an instrument in the service of imperialism’. Yet while Israel feared it had lost what it had achieved in sub‐Saharan Africa since 1957, the toll was primarily psychological, for the Israelis had, by 1961, achieved their main objective in Africa.

Escalation or Containment? Egypt and the Palestine Liberation Army, 1964–67

Three decades later, the circumstances that led to the Arab–Israeli war of June 1967 bare again the subject of scholarly attention as the end of the Cold War and the release of official documents in the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and Israel have allowed surviving participants to compare notes and made possible the detailed reconstruction of decision-making in those states. Much of this historiography has focused on the critical two months immediately preceding the start of hostilities, giving rise to broad agreement that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser “stumbled into the crisis rather than provoking it deliberately,” through miscalculation and ill-advised brinkmanship. However, there is still no consensus regarding the relationship between Nasser's decisions in spring 1967 and his policy toward Israel in the preceding three years, partly because the dearth of official documents from the Egyptian side has made it difficult to substantiate his real intentions and “historicize” his crisis behavior. Most recent studies tend to skim over the earlier period, if they cover it at all, or now accept the view that Egyptian strategy before 1967 was essentially defensive, based on deterrence and containment, and that Nasser ultimately shifted course due to perceptions of threat that steadily heightened in the course of the previous three years due to the revival of the Arab “cold war,” fear of Israeli nuclear power, and deteriorating relations with the United States, all set against a background of the debilitating military entanglement in Yemen and economic malaise at home

The economic diplomacy of the Suez crisis

Diane Kunz describes here how the United States employed economic diplomacy to affect relations among states during the Suez Crisis of 1956-57. Using political and financial archival material from the United States and Great Britain, and drawing from personal interviews with many of the key players, Kunz focuses on how economic diplomacy determined the course of events during the crisis from start to finish. In doing so, she provides both an excellent case study of the role of economic sanctions in international relations and a solid treatment of the American use of such sanctions against a Middle Eastern country.The crisis was prompted by the Eisenhower administration's decision not to fund the Aswan High Dam, triggering the takeover of the Suez Canal Company by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Responding to events, the American government imposed economic sanctions against Great Britain, France, Egypt, and Israel, with varying degrees of success.Because of its weakened financial position and misguided decisions, Kunz says, the government of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden proved most vulnerable to these tactics. Indeed, American economic pressure caused the British government to withdraw its troops ignominiously from Egypt. France, on the other hand, had borrowed sufficiently prior to the crisis to be able to withstand American pressure. For Israel, Kunz says, the threat of sanctions symbolized the Eisenhower administration's wrath. Israel could forego American funds, but, dependent on the goodwill of a great power for survival, it could not take a stand that would completely alienate the United States. Only Egypt proved immune to financial warfare.Kunz also illuminates the general diplomacy of the Suez crisis. The American government was determined neither to alienate moderate Arab opinion nor to become too closely intertwined with Israel. As such, this account has significant lessons for American policy.Originally published in 1991.A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

Nasir's Egypt and the Reemergence of the Palestinian National Movement

The post-1948 reemergence of the Palestinian national movement is generally traced to the mid1960s, specifically to the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization at the initiation of the Arab League and with the special patronage of Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir. However, such an analysis overlooks the fact that some Palestinian institutions continued to function during the 1948-49 period and others began to regroup shortly thereafter to address the new social and political needs of a displaced and stateless people. In addition, throughout the 1950s and early 1960s politicized Palestinians participated in the entire spectrum of political parties and movements, from the Muslim Brethren to the Arab Nationalist Movement. All of these activities, whether specifically Palestinian or more generally Arab nationalist or Islamic, should be understood as laying the groundwork for the establishment of a larger, diaspora-wide Palestinian political entity. Indeed, 1964 and the founding of the PLO may be better understood as the natural conclusion of the first chapter of the national movement's reemergence rather than as its beginning, as it is often presented. While the role of Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir in supporting the establishment of the PLO is acknowledged (although, at least among