The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973

128 SHOFAR Summer 1993 Vol. 11, No. 4 quantity and quality of data is due in no small measure to the richness of documentation from the Cairo Geniza and to the impressive corpus of publisned Geniza research by Goitein, Mann, Assaf, Gil himself, and many others. Gil describes PalestinianJewry from within and without. The complexities ofcommunal organization are carefully delineated, as are the ongoing relations between it and the rest of world Jewry. Gil emphasizes the elements ofJewish communal continuity in the land from the days of the Second Commonwealth to the Islamic Middle Ages. The Palestinian Yeshiva was, as he repeatedly points out, not the heir but the living continuation of the Sanhedrin. The final brief chapter (pp. 826-837) surveys the event that not only marked the end of nearly five centuries of Muslim rule in Palestine, but constituted the death blow for its autochthonous Jewish community. The Crusader conquest totally transformed the demography of Palestine and brought to a disastrous close the period that Gil has so admirably reconstructed. Scholars will debate many of the points made by Gil, but none who deal with this period will be able to ignore his work. Norman A. Stillman Judaic Studies and History Departments State University of New York, Binghamton Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967-1970, by David A. Korn. Boulder, co: Westview Press, 1992. 326 pp. $36.00. The War ofAttrition ofMarch 1969 to August 1970 between Israel and Egypt, which has been regarded as a passing event in the course of the Arab-Israeli Wars, is the one most disregarded by researchers. But the War of Attrition was a major confrontation and acquired a unique character distinguishing it frol]l the other wars for two main reasons: the special type of war it was, and Soviet direct military intervention in the war. David A. Korn's book on the War of Attrition is an important contribution to the understanding of this chapter of violence in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Based on interviews with Americans, Israelis, and Egyptians as well Book Reviews 129 as on documents that were never published, including his personal notes from the period he was a deputy chief and the chief of the political section at the American embassy in Israel from 1967 to 1971, the book offers a very detailed account of the events between 1967 and 1970. There are two main sections in this book-the first (the first four chapters) describes the background of the War of Attrition, while the second (the remaining ten chapters) gives the account of the war itself. In the first section Korn reviews the problems created by the Six-Day War that led to the War of Attrition. The Six-Day War had had decisive results on three levels, and therein lay the seeds of the War of Attrition. The most momentous result was the new territorial situation that was seen from the start by all parties concerned-Israel, the Arab States, and the superpowers -as a situation that would have to be altered. The second outcome of the Six-Day War was the decisive gap in the relative military power ofIsrael and Egypt, given the overwhelming Israeli victory in the war. The third outcome was a central function of the other two: the increased involvement of the superpowers, mainly the Soviet Union, in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the close of the Six-Day War both sides to the conflict, Israel and Egypt, sought to find a political solution to the crisis created in the war's aftermath, but the kind and shape of the political solution was conceived of in different fashion by each side. While Egypt insisted that Israel get out of all the territories occupied in the Six-Day War but would not agree to give Israel full peace even if it did withdraw, Israel aspired to gain full peace with its Arab neighbors while still retaining some of the territory it captured from them in the Six-Day War. The international attempts, including Gunnar Jarring's mediating efforts and U.S.-Soviet exchanges, failed not only to resolve the conflict but also to...

The purpose of the article is to analyze the foreign policy of Syria in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. The authors revealed the role of Syria in the Middle East conflict. It was found out that the basis of Syrian foreign policy in the specified chronological framework was the fight against Israel. The article shows the position of Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Israel and various Lebanese forces, groups and denominations (Maronite Christians, Muslims, etc.) during the Lebanese civil war, the positive and negative aspects of Damascus's intervention under the mandate of the League of Arab States (LAS) in the Lebanese civil war. The study provides an analysis of the main directions of Syria's foreign policy in the chronological boundaries like the fight against Israel; allied relations with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries, rapprochement with Iran since 1979; joint actions and contradictions with the OPP, Lebanon and Iraq; relations with Libya; the role of Syria in the Arab League; etc. The important role of the United States in the Near East is noted. The authors note Israel's reliance on military force in solving the Middle East crisis, the role of the Soviet Union in supporting Syria in the international arena and the anti-Israeli foundation of Damascus' foreign policy. The research methodology includes interdisciplinary fundamental principles and approaches. The main methodological approaches include the principle of historicism. Historicism is used to study the development of Syria's foreign policy relations with other countries and international organizations during this period. The study is based on archival materials like diplomatic documents, correspondence, agreements, statements and other official documents related to Syria's foreign policy. The goal a comparative legal method is to compare Syria's approaches and actions in the international arena with other countries in the region. The combination of these methodologies allows to conduct a more comprehensive and deeper analysis of Syria's foreign policy activities during the given historical period and identify the essence and features of the country's foreign policy strategy at that time. As a result, the authors conclude that Syria's foreign policy in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s was characterized by a clearly pronounced anti-Israeli orientation. In Lebanon, Syria set a course to create a state loyal to it and supported pro-Syrian groups in every possible way. Relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization were ambiguous, but for all the disagreements, the main unifying force of Syria with the Palestine Liberation Organization was an anti-Israeli orientation. Since 1979, the rapprochement with Iran has begun. The main allies of Syria were constantly the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries, which provided Damascus with powerful financial, economic, diplomatic and military assistance.

The Revelations of 1967New Research on the Six Day War and Its Lessons for the Contemporary Middle East Michael Oren (bio) What Lessons Does One Learn for the Present from the June War of 1967? One may begin to search for instructive insights by looking at a scenario that will probably sound familiar to most observers of the Modern Middle East. The scenario begins with an Arab leader who, though beloved by much of the Arab world, is feared and hated by other Arab leaders. He is a military dictator who is widely rumored to have stockpiled weapons of mass destruction—who has used non-conventional weaponry even against his fellow Arabs. He has openly defied UN resolutions, and evicted UN observers from his territory. He poses a fundamental challenge to the West—and one Western country accepts that challenge and goes to war. The fighting proceeds far more swiftly than anybody anticipates. The once-thought-formidable forces of the Arab dictator rapidly collapse. And as the Western army advances, it is greeted by much of the local population, not as occupiers, but as liberators. That situation does not obtain indefinitely, however. Soon there are acts of armed resistance against the occupation force—acts viewed throughout the region as legitimate attempts to achieve liberation, but seen by much of the West as acts of terror. Does that scenario sound familiar? Of course it does. To anybody following America's involvement in Iraq it certainly should. Yet the circumstances just described pertain not only to America's year-old intervention in Iraq, but to events that transpired 37 years ago—in May–June 1967—in the period leading up to the Six Day War. Then, as now, there was an Arab dictator—not Saddam Hussein, but Gamal Abdul Nasser, the president of Egypt—who was beloved by many people throughout the Arab world, but feared and hated by other [End Page 1] Arab leaders. Nasser was rumored to have stockpiled weapons of mass destruction, and was the first Middle-Eastern leader to introduce non-conventional weaponry into the region, using poison gas against the Saudis during the Yemeni civil war in 1962. Nasser had defied UN resolutions and evicted UN observers from his territory. He therefore posed a fundamental challenge to the West—to one Western-style country in particular, the State of Israel. Nasser threatened to wage a war of annihilation against Israel and to cast its Jewish inhabitants into the sea.1 Israeli leadership did not wait around to see if Nasser was serious about that threat. On 5 June 1967, Israel acted preemptively. It attacked Egypt and its Arab allies, and the war proceeded far more rapidly than anybody anticipated. Nasser's forces crumbled; and though it is hard to imagine today, in many areas they captured, Israeli forces were greeted as liberators.2 That situation did not last long, however. Soon the Israelis became targets of acts of resistance—acts viewed as legitimate throughout the region, but seen by Israel and its allies as acts of terror. Since that period (May, June 1967), every major event, every milestone in the Arab-Israeli conflict—the War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur War, the Lebanon War, the whole peace process, the question of Israeli settlements in the territories, the status of Jerusalem—all of these events have been the direct outcome of 6 days of intense fighting 37 years ago. There does not seem to be another example in history of an event that was so short and so limited geographically that has had such profound, long-term regional, and indeed global, ramifications. It seems safe to say that, for statesmen and military leaders, both in the Middle East and beyond, the Six Day War never really ended. For historians, it is only just beginning. It is only just beginning thanks to the declassification of tens of thousands of formerly top-secret documents in archives across North America, in Great Britain, in Israel, and even in the former Soviet Union, and the publication in Arab countries, Jordan in particular, and in England, of memoirs of former decision-makers and military commanders. These new sources provide us with unprecedented...

Brief Report| December 01 2022 Brief Synopses of New Arabic-Language Publications: Annotated Arabic Bibliography: Brief English Reviews of New Arabic-Language Releases in Critical Arab Scholarship Gabi El-Khoury Gabi El-Khoury Librarian and Head of Documentation, Centre for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut. Email: gaby@caus.org.lb Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Contemporary Arab Affairs (2022) 15 (3-4): 94–101. https://doi.org/10.1525/caa.2022.15.3-4.94 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Gabi El-Khoury; Brief Synopses of New Arabic-Language Publications: Annotated Arabic Bibliography: Brief English Reviews of New Arabic-Language Releases in Critical Arab Scholarship. Contemporary Arab Affairs 1 December 2022; 15 (3-4): 94–101. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/caa.2022.15.3-4.94 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentContemporary Arab Affairs Search Labib W. Kamhawi, The Palestinian Cause and the Israeli Problem: A New Vision (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2022). 128 pp. ISBN 978-9953-82-992-0 There is an Arab consensus or almost complete unanimity that the Zionist presence in the Arab region is the basis of all the problems that plague the area and threaten international stability and peace. Thus, the prosperity and stability of the Arab world depends on changing this racist state and freeing occupied Palestinian and Arab land. This Arab position has always been consistent in viewing the Zionist occupation as an existential threat to Palestinians and Arabs alike. However, this unified Arab position on the Israeli occupation has been shaken, if not considerably undermined, by several key events. These include the signing of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978 and the disengagement of Egypt from the Arab–Israeli conflict; the signing of the Oslo... You do not currently have access to this content.

Review

Utilizing primary sources, this study analyzes the process of and main reasons for the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) de facto recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1980. In 1979, the ROK government prepared to recognize the PLO, which represented a significant departure from its previous Israel-centered Middle East policy and could have clashed with the US diplomatic posture. At a time of high uncertainty in US-Arab relations, ROK’s policy shift was understood in terms of strengthening the independence of ROK’s diplomacy. Although the ROK government confirmed the US and Japanese stance of disapproval of the PLO, it considered both explicit recognition, which would have the effect of approval, and unilateral declaration, which would lower the burden on the ROK in PLO relations. After the PLO recognition, the US government used economic support as a lever to pressure the ROK. Facing this expected friction with the US, the ROK’s pursuit of independent diplomacy was based on the following factors. First, on the economic front, the steady supply of oil and the expansion of the construction market were considered, and, indeed, South Korea’s exports to the Middle East reached a peak after the PLO recognition. Second, regarding the political aspect, the comprehensive diplomatic strategy, which sought to improve relations with the Arab states as a whole, was based on Park Chung-hee’s perception of independence, with the aim of gaining the upper hand in the diplomatic confrontation with North Korea. Third, with respect to the international aspect, in the 1970s, Europe no longer followed the US-centered policy in the Middle East, and the ties between the Communist bloc and the PLO were loosening. Overall, the ROK’s recognition of the PLO was an attempt at independent diplomacy and an important example of harnessing international currents. However, it was limited by the confusion of ROK’s diplomatic tones between Israel and the Palestinians and by the overemphasis on external economic gains.

عملیة میونخ (أقریت وکفر برعم*) سبتمبر 1972م

Western literature on Soviet policy in the Middle East is fraught with controversy over such crucial mues of substance as the chief objectives and major thrust of Soviet behavior. There is a substantial body of evidence which suggests that Soviet policy in the Middle East--in particular Soviet policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict that changed dramatically in the first months of 1973. It was possible in the late 1960s and early 1970s to ascertain four distinct viewpoints or "tendencies of opinion" among Soviet leaders and political elites, with regard both to Soviet policy in the Middle East and to Soviet global policy. They are: Cooperative image, Competitive image, Antagonistic image and Hybrid image. Ideologues in the Party elite disliked the appearance of superpower condominium which any joint US- Soviet peace plan would be sure to generate.

NATO Enlargement—Was There a Promise?

Chinese foreign policy towards the Middle East is undergoing geopolitical and geostrategic transformation. In spite of the fact that there are constant determinants in China’s policy toward the Middle East and its major issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, new rules are being applied with regard to Chinese relations with the major powers that have interests in the region. This is understood to be a fundamental development and major change in determining the future and balance of power in the region, and perhaps in the world order. This study uses a ‘national interest’ approach to clarify the strategy that China has pursued in protecting its national interests in the Middle East, and in particular in the wake of the political developments that the region has been undergoing since 2010. The study gives a background history of Chinese foreign policy on the Arab–Israeli conflict, the recent changes in Chinese foreign policy regarding the Arab–Israeli conflict and the expected future of Chinese foreign policy on the Arab–Israeli conflict. Finally the study gives recommendations pertaining to Arab–Chinese relations.

Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East and The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization: An Uneasy Alliance Get access Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East. By Amnon Sella. London: Macmillan. 1981. 211 pp.£15.00.The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization: An Uneasy Alliance. By Galia Golan. New York: Praeger. 1980. (Distrib. by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.)289 pp.£15.25. M. E. Yapp M. E. Yapp 1School of Oriental and African Studies, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 58, Issue 1, Winter 1981, Pages 162–163, https://doi.org/10.2307/2618326 Published: 01 January 1981

Jerusalem's al-Aksa mosque on 20 July 1951, drew a revolver, and shot King Abdullah of Jordan dead as he and his fifteenyear-old grandson Hussein prepared for their afternoon prayers. The assassination of Abdullah, whose regime had long relied on British economic and military assistance, triggered a process that would eventually see the United States replace Great Britain as the principal champion of Jordanian territorial integrity and independence. In May 1953, Hussein ascended the Hashemite throne and commenced a long and increasingly violent rite of passage that culminated in 1970 in a showdown with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) guerrillas, the ideological heirs to his grandfather's assassin. He would emerge from that confrontation victorious, thanks not only to the tenacity and the craftiness he inherited from Abdullah but also to the support and encouragement he received from the United States. Jordan has seldom loomed large in scholarly accounts exploring US policy towards the Middle East during the quarter-century after 1945.1 Almost completely land-locked and ruled by a monarch whom many derided as an Arab munchkin, Jordan has usually been treated as a side-show by scholars preoccupied with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Because Jordan's neighbours include not only Israel but also Syria and Saudi Arabia, however, US policy-makers came to regard the Hashemite Kingdom as critically important to two broad US objectives in the region: the containment of revolutionary Arab nationalism and the preservation of Middle East peace. By supporting proWestern moderates like Hussein, US officials sought to fill a vacuum created by

On the Myth of the Connection Between the Holocaust and the Creation of Israel

Guest Editors’ Introduction

<p>New Zealand’s longest and most important campaign of the Second World War was in the Middle East. When New Zealand’s Middle Eastern war is discussed, the focus is usually on combat and the lives of New Zealanders on the battlefield. The limited discussion of life behind the lines is dominated by a picture of racism, drunkenness and debauchery with its focal point in Cairo. This thesis uses primary sources, including letters, diaries, photographs and soldier publications, and focusses on how New Zealanders saw the Middle East through the lenses of place, materiality and people. It assesses how New Zealanders experienced the Middle East as a series of geographic and imagined places, the material things they chose to acquire in those places, and the relationships they formed with the diverse range of people they encountered. An examination of these three topics reveals a complex and rich picture of respect and loathing, delight and disgust, wonder and disillusionment. Such a picture shows that the one-dimensional understanding of racism and poor behaviour is an entirely inadequate representation of New Zealanders’ Middle Eastern war, a war that would take them to Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Palestine, Syria, Jordan, Iran and Iraq. In moving beyond this conventional understanding, this thesis hopes to expand the picture of New Zealand’s long relationship with the Middle East – a relationship that stretches from the beaches of Gallipoli in 1915 to the mountains of Afghanistan in the present day.</p>