It has been argued that non-user-friendly theories are usually unsuccessful. One can similarly assert that books that are not easy to read will have no important impact. This, however, should not be the case of The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality that has been recently published by Oxford University Press. Its editors, Wiemer Salverda, Brian Nolan and Timothy M. Smeeding, have provided us with a 700-page volume that includes 27 chapters, all devoted to a specific aspect of economic inequality. This book should be of interest to a vast audience since none of its chapters is technical. All chapters are clearly written and accessible, even for non specialists. This Handbook covers almost all the themes that are of importance to those interested in economic inequality, whether from a theoretical, empirical or policy making perspective, which is a great achievement indeed. Before making some remarks or mentioning some minor shortcomings of this Handbook, let me quickly review each of its chapters. The book starts with an introduction (Chapter 1) where the editors explain the goal of this Handbook and quickly survey the content of each chapter. The title of the second chapter is Equality: Its Justif ication, Nature and Domain and its author is John E. Roemer. This chapter explains very clearly the evolution of philosophical thought on the topic of distributive justice during the past forty to fifty years. Starting with Rawls’ attack on utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice, and following Nozick’s anti-egalitarian manifesto, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Roemer summarizes the fundamental contribution of Dworkin in his two papers on What is Equality?, namely, once the equality of initial resources is implemented, inequalities in outcomes which are a consequence of choices (preferences) are morally acceptable. Though Cohen (On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice) approved Dworkin’s introduction of responsibility into egalitarian theory, he stressed, for example, the fact that individuals who were poor in their childhood may end up having preferences that are not ambitious enough so that they cannot then be held responsible for