Great Souls, Common Judges, and the Modern Science of Politics

Abstract

Robert Faulkner's Case for Greatness criticizes modern authors’ allegedly excessive egalitarianism and relativism in ways that fall short of its subtle and thorough treatment of the ancients. John Rawls may rightly be faulted for his disregard not only of greatness but all political virtues and qualities. But his mildly egalitarian social theory does not actually deny that greatness, or other claims to political merit, might exist; it holds only that claims of merit cannot ground particular kinds of social and economic inequality. Hannah Arendt has her own well-developed theory of greatness, and her criteria for judging greatness are no more relativist than Faulkner's own. To the extent that she stresses equality, she does so rightly, as spurious claims of greatness are very often used to excuse deep ascriptive inequalities. Finally, Faulkner's reliance on ancient models slights excellent modern reasons for thinking that judgments of who or what is great give rise to disagreement and social strife rather than political unity or glory. And his treatment of modern thought strangely neglects the modern political science that uses legal and political institutions, not philosophical mirrors to princes, to channel the most praiseworthy kinds of greatness while preventing the triumph of the worst.