Effects Of Term Limits Research Articles

Public Means for Private Ends? Local Electoral Incentives and Public Welfare Expenditures

Abstract The literature on distributive politics explores changes in public expenditures vis-à-vis the electoral incentives of politicians. In theory, term-limited politicians are not inclined to increase spending in the absence of re-election prospects. The Philippine case shows otherwise. Guided by theories and studies on Philippine local politics and the effects of term limits on electoral incentives, this article argues that even term-limited politicians can be driven to increase spending if they have a family member intended to succeed them in an upcoming election. Estimates from regression models that used panel data on public expenditures and elections in Philippine provinces and cities from 1992 to 2018 confirm this. Overall, this study provides insights on how electoral incentives and public spending behavior of term-limited politicians change once membership in a political family is factored in.

Term Limits and Environmental Treaty Commitments

Abstract How does political accountability in democracies affect leaders’ incentives for international cooperation? We consider how term limits should affect international environmental agreement (IEA) participation. Pursuing environmental protection as a public good coincides with the political survival incentives of democratic leaders. Term limits decouple leaders’ policy priorities from their political survival incentives, discouraging IEA participation. However, prioritization of environmental concerns increases with economic development. As such, the effect of term limits on IEA participation should be strongest in rich democracies. We test these arguments using data from the International Environmental Agreements Database from 1970 to 2011. Democratic leaders, particularly in rich democracies, sign fewer IEAs when freed from the reelection motive. We also consider the potential that term limits could favor IEA participation if doing so aligns with a leader's preferences. This potential should be greatest in poor democracies where citizens place less emphasis on environmental protection, though we find little evidence for this expectation. The findings have important implications for understanding the determinants of IEA participation and the political accountability–international cooperation relationship. Whereas some argue that electoral incentives that cause leaders to favor present over future concerns undermine environmental cooperation, our results suggest that political accountability in democracies can promote treaty participation.

The effect of term limits on patterns of interest group contributions in state legislatures, 2006–2010

What is the effect of state legislative term limits on interest group contribution decisions? Although much literature examines interest group behavior, and a separate literature examines the effect of term limits on state legislatures, to date little work has been done to bring these literatures together. In this article, we test the theory that interest groups view contributions as long-term investments in legislators. Snyder (1992) finds this effect in the US Congress, and in this article we test this argument in a new institutional setting. We find that interest groups use term limits as a cue to decrease their investment in legislators who get termed out of office and that this effect is as strong as or stronger than increasing the competitiveness of the election.

Assessing the Effects of Municipal Term Limits on Fiscal Policy in U.S. Cities

The arguments for and against term limits have been the subject of debate since the mid-1990s. Proponents claim term limits bring new energy and ideas to government, while opponents argue they shift power to special interests and the bureaucracy. Analyses of the true effects of term limits have been focused on their implementation at the state level. This article examines the effects of term limits on taxation, city employment, and spending on other public policies at the municipal level. Using data from the U.S. Census Bureau and pooled cross-sectional time series models, the authors find that the presence of term limits has only a modest effect on economic and distributive public policies in U.S. cities as a city’s economic milieu has a greater effect on taxation and policy expenditures.

The Contemporary Presidency: “An Excess of Refinement”: Lame Duck Presidents in Constitutional and Historical Context

Well into President George W. Bush's second term, history appears to be repeating itself—second terms are far more problematic than first terms. Are problematic second terms inevitable, and if so are they caused by the Twenty‐second Amendment? In this article I explore the constitutional and historical dynamics of presidential term limits, focusing on the leadership and clerkship roles the president performs in the constitutional system, constrained by the dynamics of political time. The article examines the classic arguments for and against term limits, comparing Hamilton's focus on stability to Jefferson's concern for tyranny. It then surveys the scholarship on second term problems to tease out the effects of term limits from the more general problem of second terms. I conclude with an analysis of second term and term limit problems from a political time perspective, suggesting that presidents are more constrained in the pursuit of their constitutional functions by the dynamics of regime cycles than they are by term limits. It appears that term limits add little to the functions of the presidency in the constitutional order.

Effect of Term Limits on the Election of Minority State Legislators

of minority candidates. Those who support term limits vigorously contend that restricting legislators' tenure in office creates new oppor? tunities for minorities (Jacobs 1991), whereas opponents assert that term limits erode the potential for minority advancement (Bositis 1992). However, these conflicting views have been based primarily on conjecture because of a lack of reliable empirical data on limit? ing tenure and electoral outcomes (Mondak 1995), even though limitations on tenure in state legislatures began after the 1990 elec? tion. An extensive body of empirically vali? dated data necessary for in-depth analysis has been slow to develop because the effect of legislative term limits in most states has yet to be fully manifested and recorded (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000). Since the 2000 election, however, credible empirical data on the influence of term limits on the electoral

An Analysis of Welfare Effects of Legislative Term Limits

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of term limits forstate legislators. Legislators tend to pursue their ownobjectives and deviate from the interests of voters as theystay longer in office. However, such long-term incumbentsbecome more productive in transferring wealth to theirconstituents due to seniority they gain, and voters re-electthe incumbent. Term limits reduce the maximum seniority of adistrict's legislator and of other districts' legislators aswell, affecting the relative seniority of the legislator.Thus, the legislator gains relative seniority sometimes andloses other times under term limits. As a consequence, votersof a district may or may not benefit from term limits. Thewelfare effects of term limits depend crucially on the shapeof the voters' utility function.

Recruitment and Retention in U. S. Legislatures

Questions of recruitment and retention of legislators are central to our understanding of the nature of representative democracy. This essay traces the dominant perspectives and issues involved in the study of legislative candidates and legislative careers in the United States. A central theme of this essay is that congressional and state legislative scholars have tended to ignore each other's work. This is largely due to a difference in the unit of analysis, wherein congressional scholars concentrate on the individual while state legislative scholars concentrate on the institution. But two recent events in state legislatures have the potential to provide linkages between congressional and legislative research. The first is the increase in careerism among state legislators. The second is the effect of term limits.

Erratum – Predicting the institutional effects of term limits

Erratum – Predicting the institutional effects of term limits

Predicting the institutional effects of term limits

In this paper we develop a model to predict the seniority turnover, and transition consequences of term limit reforms for any institution with a regularized procedure for rotating membership. With this model we can predict the number of members who will be serving in their last term at any given time once an institution reaches a stable state under term limit reforms. For example, our results show that for the U.S. Senate current term limit proposals will result in a substantial increase in the number of “lame duck” members and a significant reduction in average seniority. We make no claims as to the public policy effects of term limit proposals. However, our model can be used to design a proposal that will maximize any benefits or minimize any public policy effects found to be associated with term limit reforms.

How Term Limits Enhance the Expression of Democratic Preferences

In the U. S. Term Limits case, the Supreme Court concluded that any legal restriction on the ability of incumbents to run for Congress is unconstitutional. This conclusion was based largely on the theoretical claim that term limits violate the fundamental principle of our representative democracy: "that the people should choose whom they please to govern them." This article shows that the Court's stated principle should have led it to the opposite conclusion, for the likely effect of term limits is actually to assist electorates in registering their democratic preferences. Term limits promote this goal in two principal ways: by reducing barriers to entry in political markets, and by solving a collective action problem facing voters who want to remove representatives whose seniority enables them to deliver government benefits to their districts. Although there are plausible objections to terms limits, none of them provides substantial grounds for believing that term limits are on balance undemocratic.

Term-Limit Logic: Paradigms and Paradoxes

The term-limit movement has drawn support from all quarters because members have been able to present term limitation as a "cure-all" reform. Yet term-limit proponents do not agree among themselves about the reasons for and likely impacts of term limits; rather, they can be divided into four competing groups of Term-Limit Progressives, Term-Limit Populists, Term-Limit Republicans, and Term-Limit Libertarians. This article identifies the distinct philosophical approach of each group and compares their expectations about the goals and effects of term limits and the likely impact of term limits on various political actors.