Abstract
What is the effect of state legislative term limits on interest group contribution decisions? Although much literature examines interest group behavior, and a separate literature examines the effect of term limits on state legislatures, to date little work has been done to bring these literatures together. In this article, we test the theory that interest groups view contributions as long-term investments in legislators. Snyder (1992) finds this effect in the US Congress, and in this article we test this argument in a new institutional setting. We find that interest groups use term limits as a cue to decrease their investment in legislators who get termed out of office and that this effect is as strong as or stronger than increasing the competitiveness of the election.
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