EEC Membership Research Articles

‘Women Against the Common Market’

ABSTRACT This article explores women’s activism in the early 1970s through the organisation ‘Women Against the Common Market’ (WACM), founded by the former left-wing Labour MP Anne Kerr. WACM carved out a distinct niche among the growing collection of Eurosceptic organisations. Women were believed to be more ambivalent about EEC membership, and WACM was established to boost this perception. The group’s early successes came, in part, due to the flamboyant and dogged efforts of its founder. But, Kerr’s untimely death in 1973 deprived the group of a significant role in the EEC referendum two years later, leading subsequent histories to downplay its relevance. This is the first full-length study of the organisation. The article unpacks the group’s internal structures and membership, identifies its links with existing Eurosceptic organisations, and analyses the effectiveness of its campaign tactics. WACM campaigners deployed traditional categories, such as ‘housewife’, but the fact that women were important consumers gave them crucial licence to speak about all variety of political issues, including trade policy, international relations, and democracy itself.

‘Isolated British Europeans’: How EEC Membership Helped the Gibraltarians Secure British Citizenship, 1962–1981

ABSTRACT The ‘European’ strand of modern Gibraltarian identity, exemplified by the territory’s 96 per cent ‘Remain’ vote in the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum, owes much to the fact that joining the EEC with Britain in 1973 enabled Gibraltarians to bypass the UK’s increasingly restrictive immigration regime, which since the first Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962 had reserved the right of abode for the British-born and their descendants. In 1981, when British citizenship was redefined and split into three new categories, it was Gibraltar’s place within the EEC, and the rights associated with membership, that proved the decisive factor in securing full British citizenship, uniquely amongst Britain’s dependent territories at the time. Although this concession has been seen as a case of racial exceptionalism, this article places the Gibraltarian campaign for British citizenship in its historic context, and shows that it was not simply the result of short term political calculation but a long term recognition that European integration offered Gibraltarians a new set of rights, over and above other territories, and a means of binding themselves closer to the UK. After Brexit, Gibraltarians may once again occupy a unique position as citizens of the only British territory within the Schengen zone.

Foreign Occupation and Support for International Cooperation

AbstractA growing literature investigates how historical state repression affects later political outcomes, but little attention has been given to whether violence during foreign occupation affects support for international cooperation. This article investigates this issue by analyzing the 1972 Danish referendum on membership in the European Economic Community (eec)—an organization seen at the time as being dominated by Germany. The analysis shows that municipalities that experienced more German-inflicted violence during the German occupation of Denmark (1940–1945) in World War II had a higher rate of no votes in this referendum. This effect seems to have worked through increased support for Danish far-left parties that were associated with the Danish resistance movement and that actively used anti-German sentiment in their campaigns against eec membership. The results suggest that foreign-inflicted violence can be a substantial hindrance for popular support for international cooperation and that political parties play an important role in translating historical grievances into mass political behavior.

Turkey’s EEC membership as a canvas of struggle for identity: The NSP versus the JP

AbstractThis article uncovers the relationship between the intra-paradigm power struggle of two rival political parties in 1970s Turkey and their identity formations. Given the economy-laden context of Turkish–European relations in the 1970s, the (re)production of Europe as an identificatory reference between the National Salvation Party (NSP) and the Justice Party (JP) is of special interest. This investigation will help shed light on how the power relations—that both actors were situated in—can be mirrored through their struggle for identity. Moreover, will it contribute to highlighting the functionality of foreign policy in the production of identity. In analytical terms, this study borrows case-restricted concepts from the post-structuralist theory of international relations, and gathers its case data from the 1970s National Assembly records.

Antropología portuguesa contemporánea, casi medio siglo desde abril

Este artículo es una propuesta de cartografía de la antropología portuguesa, durante el período que comenzó con la transición a la democracia, en 1974, y se extiende hasta nuestros días. Al movilizar la producción de antropólogas y antropólogos, a partir de los trabajos producidos, desde las universidades y la investigación, y desde el papel del Museo Nacional de Etnología, el texto comienza por situar en un tiempo largo la trayectoria de la disciplina, caracterizada por el cosmopolitismo de lo nacional, que se combina con lógicas coloniales, en un enfoque de la nación y del imperio, que se continúa hasta el 25 de abril de 1974. La Revolución de los Claveles inaugura un período de ruptura y creatividad, en el que la antropología portuguesa responde a su propia manera a la propuesta de «democratizar, descolonizar y desarrollar» que se inicia entonces, con una clara expansión de la disciplina en el nuevo marco democrático, a la que se agregan los fondos y el optimismo resultante de la adhesión a la CEE. Este tiempo de ampliación sería violentamente interrumpido, debido a los reflejos de la crisis, provocando la contracción del campo disciplinario y la búsqueda de nuevos caminos. En un momento en que los contornos de la ciencia neoliberal parecen sofocar la capacidad de expansión de la disciplina, limitando los horizontes de los más jóvenes practicantes de la antropología en Portugal, los rastros recientes ponen el énfasis en las/os antropólogas/os en las sociedades futuras. [pt] Este artigo é uma proposta de cartografia da antropologia portuguesa, no período que se abre com a transição para a democracia, em 1974, e se prolonga até à actualidade. Mobilizando a produção de antropólogas e antropólogos, a partir das obras produzidas, do lugar nas universidades e na investigação, e do papel do Museu Nacional de Etnologia, o texto começa por recolocar num tempo longo o percurso da disciplina, pautado pelo cosmopolitismo do nacional, que se conjuga com lógicas coloniais, numa abordagem da nação e do império, que se continua até 25 de Abril de 1974. A Revolução dos Cravos inaugura um período de ruptura e criatividade, em que a antropologia portuguesa responde, a seu modo, à proposta de «democratizar, descolonizar e desenvolver» que se então se inicia, com uma evidente expansão da disciplina no novo quadro democrático, a que acrescem os fundos e o optimismo resultantes da adesão à CEE. Este tempo de ampliação seria violentamente interrompido, devido aos reflexos da crise, de que resulta a contração do campo disciplinar, e a busca de novos caminhos. Num tempo em que os contornos da ciência neoliberal parecem sufocar a capacidade de expansão da disciplina, limitando os horizontes dos mais jovens praticantes da antropologia em Portugal, os trilhos recentes colocam a ênfase no lugar das antropólogas/os nas sociedades futuras.

Sovereign Independence, but ‘A Family of Nations’ to Belong to

There is a tension between sovereignty and close international cooperation. Establishing an independent state requires consolidation of its internal authority and international recognition. In the case of Ireland the principle of national self-determination and the right to an independent republic had to compete with British determination to confine the Irish Free State within the British Commonwealth framework, despite inherent contradictions in the concept of dominion home rule. The preferred Wilsonian model of the freedom of small nations collapsed within 20 years. Post-war Ireland, refused UN admission, resistant to western defence cooperation citing partition, and having broken with the Commonwealth, was for a time very isolated, with economic and demographic viability also under serious pressure. A complete change of direction led to EEC membership, seen more as enhancing rather than diminishing sovereignty, to which Ireland remains attached. The federalist vision of the EEC's founders, once a potential obstacle, is no longer seen as realistic.

The Catholic Church in Ireland Today

Studies • volume 106 • number 421 9 The Catholic Church in Ireland Today The Catholic Church in Ireland Today1 Gerry O’Hanlon SJ In the middle of summer 2016, commenting on a controversy surrounding Ireland’s national seminary, St Patrick’s College Maynooth, the country’s leading broadsheet, The Irish Times, had this to say in an editorial: The Maynooth controversy would once have given rise to major public disquiet. That it no longer does so reflects the Church’s recent history. Many Catholics have long since abandoned the institution – its princes, priests and politics – and are choosing to interpret the faith according to their own conscience.2 Coincidentally, earlier in the same year, an academic study in the field of the sociology of religion was published with the title Transforming PostCatholic Ireland.3 The author, Gladys Ganiel, in explaining her choice of title, refers explicitly to an article written by Archbishop Diarmuid Martin of Dublin in 2013 titled ‘A post-Catholic Ireland?: Renewing the Irish Church from within’.4 Ganiel defines a post-Catholic Ireland in terms of ‘a shift in consciousness in which the Catholic Church, as an institution, is no longer held in high esteem by most of the population and can no longer expect to exert a monopoly influence in social and political life’.5 She argues that the future of faith in Ireland will depend on the development of ‘extra-institutional’ forms of religious expression (religion practised outside or in addition to the institutional Catholic Church).6 Her analysis ties in with the frequently observed characteristic of modern Catholicism in Ireland – and indeed further afield – as becoming individualised and de-institutionalised. With the new emphasis on personal conscience as opposed to magisterial teaching, this is sometimes referred to as the ‘Protestantisation’of the Catholic Church in Ireland. Dr Martin himself has spoken and written frequently about the crisis confronting the Irish Catholic Church, warning that it ran the risk of becoming an ‘irrelevant minority culture’.7 I propose in what follows to describe briefly some of the background to this crisis and then to suggest some ways forward. 10 Studies • volume 106 • number 421 Gerry O’Hanlon SJ Background to the crisis ThetraditionalCatholicismwhichisnowbeingsupersededinIrelandhadmany distinguishing features.8 It was a defining characteristic of Irish nationalism and identity, with ‘a monopoly on the Irish religious market’, a strong relationship with state power, elevating the status of cleric to extraordinary heights and emphasising the evils of sexual sin.9 This was Catholicism with high levels of religious practice, a stress on rule-keeping and sin, a strong ethos of sacrifice and delayed gratification, a familiarity with austerity and a hope for fulfilment in the after-life. It was characterised by a deep popular devotion featuring the likes of the rosary, benediction, sodalities, indulgences and processions. It provided comfort and fuelled the spiritual and ethical imaginations of its adherents, and had a deeply committed, global missionary outreach. However, its un- and even anti-intellectual nature meant that it was ill-prepared for the challenges posed by a late-emerging modernity in Ireland. It was a religion in which the voice of the priest, the bishop, and the Pope could rely on its formal authority to get a serious hearing, not just from the faithful, but also from the politician. A paternalistic ethos reigned and was almost universally accepted. Apart from the popular devotion already mentioned, this was Catholicism deeply institutional in form, dependent on a type of clericalism which was vulnerable to a more critical culture. From the 1960s onwards this more critical culture emerged in Ireland. The influence of television and other media, economic development and increased urbanisation, foreign travel, EEC membership and enhanced educational opportunities all conspired to open Ireland up to the waves of critical questioning and secularisation already well advanced in many other parts of Europe. Internally, the Church was at best lukewarm in its reception of the Second Vatican Council – there was liturgical change which was received for the most part positively, some increased lay involvement, not least in various episcopal commissions established in the wake of the Council, and a real energy around some issues of social justice (not least in the establishment of...

Keeping your Friends Close: British Foreign Policy and the Nordic Economic Community, 1968–1972

AbstractThe Nordic Economic Community (Nordek) was a short-lived and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to strengthen cooperation between the four Nordic states. While the importance of the project to Britain has often been overlooked, this article suggests that Whitehall took considerable interest from the start. It demonstrates how, although officially neutral, London sought first to mitigate the effects of Nordek, then to undermine its establishment and, finally, in the wake of Nordek's collapse, to guard against its re-emergence. The aim throughout was to protect three central tenets of British foreign policy: EFTA unity in light of the second veto, Britain's own application for EEC membership and a cohesive Western Europe militarily integrated in NATO. However, the article highlights the absence of a coherent strategy towards tentative Nordic integration and the mixed success this brought, the interdependency of Anglo-Nordic relations in the pursuit and success of British foreign policy goals and the relative decline of the Britain's influence in the Nordic region.

Polskie reakcje na I rozszerzenie Wspólnot Europejskich o Wielką Brytanię, Danię, Irlandię (1961-1973)

The primary objective of this paper is to examine the response of the authorities of the Polish People’s Republic to the extending scope and range of European integration in 1961–1973. The following countries applied for EEC membership in this period: the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. The analysis is conducted on the basis of press releases of the Polish Press Agency (PAP) as well as features published in newspapers and magazines (“Trybuna Ludu”, “Polityka”, “Nowe drogi”, “Ideologia i Polityka”), as well as academic periodicals (“Przegląd Miedzynarodowy”, “Przegląd Zachodni”).

A Strategy for Greece: Democratization and European Integration, 1974-1975

This article sheds light on what drove Greece’s European policy in the aftermath of the dictatorship in 1974. Despite evident geostrategic and economic motivations, the article stresses the centrality of the political and democratic dimension. Greece’s transition to democracy saw the emergence of a strong link between the European option and the democratization process, especially in the mind of the country’s political elite. Constantinos Karamanlis, the Greek prime minister, capitalized greatly on the prospect of EEC membership as part of his transition strategy to safeguard democracy.

Masters and Servants: Economists and Bureaucrats in the Dispute over Norwegian EEC Membership in 1972

AbstractIn the dispute over Norwegian EEC membership in 1972, a large number of economists in academic life and public administration took part in organised opposition against future membership. Their efforts to prevent economic and financial integration with the Common Market are important for understanding the depth and strength of Norwegian Euroscepticism. This article shows how this scepticism was rooted in the economic profession's reasoning about economic planning and economic policy making. Special attention is given to the opposition from economists within the government apparatus itself, as this both diminished the authority of the government's pro-membership arguments and challenged norms regulating civil servants’ conduct.

The Year that Israel Considered Joining the European Economic Community

AbstractThe history of Israel–EU relations has received considerable scholarly attention. The conventional starting point for this history is almost invariably April 1958, when Israel became the third country in the world to request the establishment of a diplomatic mission in Brussels. The background and the lead up to that request, however, have been largely neglected. The article seeks to fill this scholarly lacuna by relating the hitherto untold story of Israel's exploration in 1957 of the possibility of obtaining full economic and political EEC membership. A centrepiece of the article is the revelation of the 1957 clandestine meeting(s) between Shimon Peres, then director general of the Israeli Ministry of Defence and special envoy of Prime Minister David Ben‐Gurion, and Jean Monnet, in which the two discussed possible full Israeli membership in the EEC. The article is based on some newly revealed archival documents and interviews with former high‐ranking Israeli officials.

The 'Unwanted Suitor': West Germany's Reception, Response and Role in Ireland's EEC Entry Request, 1961–3

This article is the first methodical analysis of the West German reception of the Irish application for EEC membership. It suggests that Ireland misread the signals of the West German foreign minister in mid1961 and, contrary to Irish expectations, that it was the Economics Ministry in Bonn rather than the Foreign Office that quickly transformed into a supporter of the Irish application. The economic arguments against Irish full membership of the EEC were never strong. Senior officers of the West German Foreign Office maintained reservations about the Irish application on 'political grounds', even though the FRG played a key role, in concert with the Netherlands, in convincing the other more sceptical members of the EEC in October 1962 that Ireland should be permitted to commence full membership negotiations. Irish non-membership of NATO remained a potentially complicating factor thereafter. Dublin's diplomatic efforts to assuage German and European anxieties during 1961 and 1962 about Ireland's non-membership of NATO were not misdirected, notwithstanding the Irish application for EEC membership was contingent upon the outcome of the British application.

The 'Unwanted Suitor': West Germany's Reception, Response and Role in Ireland's EEC Entry Request, 1961-3

This article is the first methodical analysis of the West German reception of the Irish application for EEC membership. It suggests that Ireland misread the signals of the West German foreign minister in mid-1961 and, contrary to Irish expectations, that it was the Economics Ministry in Bonn rather than the Foreign Office that quickly transformed into a supporter of the Irish application. The economic arguments against Irish full membership of the EEC were never strong. Senior officers of the West German Foreign Office maintained reservations about the Irish application on 'political grounds', even though the FRG played a key role, in concert with the Netherlands, in convincing the other more sceptical members of the EEC in October 1962 that Ireland should be permitted to commence full membership negotiations. Irish non-membership of NATO remained a potentially complicating factor thereafter. Dublin's diplomatic efforts to assuage German and European anxieties during 1961 and 1962 about Ireland's non-membership of NATO were not misdirected, notwithstanding the Irish application for EEC membership was contingent upon the outcome of the British application.

The 'Unwanted Suitor': West Germany's Reception, Response and Role in Ireland's EEC Entry Request, 1961-3

This article is the first methodical analysis of the West German reception of the Irish application for EEC membership. It suggests that Ireland misread the signals of the West German foreign minister in mid-1961 and, contrary to Irish expectations, that it was the Economics Ministry in Bonn rather than the Foreign Office that quickly transformed into a supporter of the Irish application. The economic arguments against Irish full membership of the EEC were never strong. Senior officers of the West German Foreign Office maintained reservations about the Irish application on 'political grounds', even though the FRG played a key role, in concert with the Netherlands, in convincing the other more sceptical members of the EEC in October 1962 that Ireland should be permitted to commence full membership negotiations. Irish non-membership of NATO remained a potentially complicating factor thereafter. Dublin's diplomatic efforts to assuage German and European anxieties during 1961 and 1962 about Ireland's non-membership of NATO were not misdirected, notwithstanding the Irish application for EEC membership was contingent upon the outcome of the British application.

Spanish Political Parties and the European Union: Analysis of Euromanifestos (1987–2004)

This article analyses the nature of Spanish political parties' attitudes towards the EU. Three main dimensions of the EU process and of its impact on the member states are focused upon: identity, representation and scope of governance. The analysis shows how European integration as an independent variable has impacted the party system. Then, how each political party has individually adapted to the new circumstances by changing its positions and policies since 1986, when Spain got the EEC membership. We maintain that, although the EU issue is not one of intense political contestation, and therefore it is not very salient for party competition, the historical cleavages of the Spanish party system still affect the party stance on the EU. On the whole, the European issue has been absorbed by the Spanish party system without any particular disruption, in a context of party wide-spread Europhilia.

De Gaulle's Race to the Bottom: The Netherlands, France and the Interwoven Problems of British EEC Membership and European Political Union, 1958–1963

AbstractWhy did de Gaulle veto the United Kingdom's accession to the European Economic Community in 1963? This article addresses the interlinked struggles over British accession and European political union in the early 1960s. The focus is on the crucially conflicting relations between de Gaulle and the Netherlands, his main opponent on both issues. Who won the Franco-Dutch battle and why? This article assesses these questions on the basis of new multi-archival material and highlights a hitherto largely unnoticed rhetorical battle, which explains the course of events and reveals a previously largely unnoticed logic behind de Gaulle's manoeuvring in the intertwined negotiations over European political union, the Common Agricultural Policy and the UK membership bid.

“Was there a vacuum of policy?”

This article aims to analyse changes in Britain's policy towards the EEC between January 1963, when the first British application for EEC membership was turned down, and March 1966, when Harold Wilson's Labour government won the general election for the second term and began seriously to contemplate the possibility of second application.There have been a number of studies on the failure of the first UK application, and in recent years, several studies have been published on the Labour government's decision for the second application. However, no substantial historical account has been published yet on the attitudes of the Conservative governments of Harold Macmillan and Sir Alec Douglas-Home towards the EEC between January 1963 and October 1964, the period between General de Gaulle's veto and the British general election. It seems as if there were a vacuum of policy towards the EEC within the British government in this period. We do not know precisely how the British government reacted to the failure of the first application, how they reformulated their policy towards the EEC, and how this process of policy re-examination under the Conservative governments affected the Labour government's policy towards the EEC in their first term in the office.In this article, the following points will be shown by examining archival materials in the National Archives, UK; Soon after the breakdown of the negotiation for EEC membership, the Macmillan government came to the conclusion that in the long term there was no alternative other than seeking eventual EEC membership. They also concluded that there was no hope of a second try in the short term as long as General de Gaulle remained in power. The immediate objective for Britain became establishing and maintaining a link between the EEC through such existing devices as ministerial meetings of the WEU. After October 1963 when Douglas-Home became the Prime Minister, this policy remained largely unchanged and a serious study began at an official level of the long-term implication of EEC membership for Britain's future. This study was completed shortly before October 1964, reaffirming the desirability and inevitability of EEC membership.Policy re-examination carried out under the Conservative governments thus set the tone of opinion among key officials in key departments of the Whitehall in favour of EEC membership. This official attitude was part at least of the reason why the Wilson government, after an initial period of hesitation over the issue of EEC membership when they toyed with ideas like reinvigorating the Commonwealth or a bridge-building between the EFTA and the EEC, came to the same conclusion as the previous governments and began serious consideration about how to achieve the long-term objective of EEC membership.

Closer to Brussels than to Rome? The EU as the new external referent for a secularised Irish society and a redefined Catholic identity

As soon as Ireland submitted its first application for EEC membership in 1961, Brussels became another external referent alongside Rome for an Irish society that increasingly looked to outside influences. If the Irish Catholic Church first was reluctant for Ireland to join in the European project, it soon realised the importance of embracing the project, if only to control it. Brussels has nonetheless seriously challenged Rome’s position as Ireland’s main external point of reference in the last four decades, to the extent that the Irish Catholic Church is now perceived as yet another institution. It remains, however, quite influential in Irish politics and so a force to be reckoned with when it comes to analysing the island’s perception of the European project. The present article consists above all of a general review of the way EEC membership has transformed the relationship between Church and State in Ireland for almost fifty years now.

Harold Wilson's EEC Application: Inside the Foreign Office, 1964-7

The story of how Harold Wilson came to submit Britain's second application to join the EEC is a curious one. The Labour Prime Minister had been a vociferous opponent of Harold Macmillan's attempt to ‘join Europe’ earlier in the decade and spent much of his first years in power seemingly pursuing alternative policy options, most notably a doomed attempt to revitalise the Commonwealth. But at some point in 1966—most probably in the wake of the disastrous July sterling crisis—Wilson seems to have decided that the UK should seek once more to gain admittance to the European Community and turned his formidable party-management skills to the task of persuading a deeply divided Labour government to endorse a second bid for membership. A formal application was submitted in May 1967—only promptly to share the fate of the earlier Macmillan attempt and to be rebuffed by General de Gaulle. This time it would take the French President two press conferences rather than one to persuade the British that France would not permit the enlargement of the EEC: the ‘velvet veto’ of May needed to be followed up by the rather more clear-cut veto of November 1967. But the net effect was to confirm what many observers had suspected all along, namely that Britain's road to EEC membership would be firmly barred until President de Gaulle left office. It would not be until after the General's resignation in 1969 that the second application was revived, and membership negotiations did not begin until after Wilson had lost the General Election in June 1970. Thus, Edward Heath and not Harold Wilson was the British Prime Minister to append his signature to the Treaty of Accession which brought the UK into the EEC.