Economic Voting Research Articles

News Consumption and Economic Voting

Other SectionsAbstractINTRODUCTIONECONOMIC NEWS AND VOTINGSTUDY DESIGNCONCLUSIONFigureTableFootnoteReference

Credit or debit? The effect of issue ownership on retrospective economic voting

This paper examines issue ownership as a mechanism for understanding how voters’ expectations of parties’ issue competence impact retrospective voting. On the one hand, issue ownership can represent a stock of credit for parties to draw on, which may help incumbent parties escape punishment for poor performance. On the other hand, prior issue competence associations may set certain expectations in voters’ minds. This lends to the idea that parties might be even more severely punished for poor performance when they own the issue. This contribution sets out to test these two propositions. Our results suggest that since voters expect the party to perform well, especially on the issue it owns, positive performance reaps no reward, while negative performance is more severely punished. There are, however, differences across parties, with the chancellor party in government held as the main actor responsible for positive or negative economic developments.

Economic Voting and Economic Inequality: U.S. Presidential Elections 1952–2012

Most economic models of election outcomes make two assumptions: voters look at the aggregate economy, and they compare the state of the economy with some fixed reference. We argue that the increase in economic inequality and slowing of overall growth suggest these assumptions should no longer hold. We propose a theory that allows voters to take into account the distribution of economic growth, and we reconsider different decision rules voters could use to evaluate the incumbent. Analyzing presidential elections from 1952 through 2012, we show that models using the economic performance of individual income quintiles are indistinguishable in overall fit from models using aggregate income to predict election results, but can produce different predictions given different distributions of growth. And we show that voters do not appear to explicitly compare economic performance of the incumbent with the out-party, suggesting they have reneged on their role as rational gods of vengeance.

Explaining the Erosion of Democracy: Can Economic Growth Hinder Democracy?

Economic growth has become one of the leitmotivs academicians and pundits ask once and again to assess democratic endurance over time. While large portion of the literature posits that economic growth is positive for democracy (eg. Przeworski et al. 2000), for other scholars it is a profoundly destabilizing force (eg. Olson 1963; Huntington 1968). This paper fills these contrasting views asking whether economic growth can undermine democratic competition. We hypothesize that the relation between economic growth and party competition is mediated by the strength of political institutions and free expression. Economic growth promotes incumbency advantage. Rulers can artificially extend this advantage by narrowing the space for negative coverage and dissident voices as long as they have political room for maneuvering. We leverage exogenously-driven growth in Latin America to test this argument. Over the past two decades, the region experienced accelerated growth as a result of a global commodity boom. Using data for 18 Latin American countries during this period, we show that faster economic growth led to significant increases in incumbency advantage in the legislature only where free speech was under attack. Our findings have important implications for literatures on democratization, natural resources, and economic voting.

Boom and bust: Economic voting in Ireland

The global economic crisis presents new challenges for economic voting models. While there is a consensus that economic voting exists, even the most ardent supporters agree that it is a variable force and can only explain a portion of voting behaviour. This article investigates the impact of positive and negative economic performance on voting patterns. The idea that voters are more likely to punish governments for poor economic performance, the grievance asymmetry hypothesis, has found some empirical support, but in their comprehensive review of the economic voting literature, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier concluded that the evidence of asymmetric economic voting was, at best, mixed. Ireland presents a clear test of the grievance asymmetric economic vote with recent elections taking place against backdrops of some of the highest economic growth rates in the world and then one of the most spectacular economic crashes. We demonstrate that economic shocks matter a great deal; Irish voters like their counterparts elsewhere in crisis hit states are unforgiving. Furthermore, the electoral change at the 2011 election in Ireland was extreme and challenges the consensus that economic voting is a small force.

Economic voting in Europe: Did the crisis matter?

Recent voting behavior literature is concerned with the consequences of the global financial and economic crisis. During 2008–2009, most European countries faced a considerable slowdown in economic growth and an increase in unemployment levels. Theoretically, this would lead us to expect strong economic effects on incumbent support. However, recent academic work suggests that diminishing clarity of responsibility makes it increasingly difficult for voters to attribute blame for economic outcomes, consequently making punitive voting less likely. Has the sanctioning-rewarding mechanism then changed over time? Was economic voting more or less pronounced during the crisis than it was prior to the economic downturn? Analyzing the European Election Studies (EES) data for 12 Western European countries in 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014, this paper finds support for neither proposition: there is very little abrupt change in economic effects over time. The statistical relationship between the economy and voting remained remarkably constant and was not subject to short-term fluctuations, even after the most dramatic economic recession in our lifetime. The stability of economic voting is particularly noteworthy considering that levels of voter dissatisfaction with national economic performance skyrocketed in 2009.

Rules, institutions and the economic vote: clarifying clarity of responsibility

Institutions are thought to matter for vote choice, and work on economic voting is exemplary in this regard. The strength of the economic vote varies considerably cross-nationally and this seems to emanate from differences in the clarity of responsibility. Still, this conceptual frame, dominant in the field, appears to have some cracks. First, almost all work presents analyses of the economic vote in smaller, split samples of low- and high-clarity contexts separately. Second, the literature appears rather dispersed when the conceptual and empirical indicators are examined. The article attempts to overcome these limitations by analysing a large pool of democratic elections with a series of objective indicators. It investigates these indicators separately, and as components within two cumulative indices (institutional rules and power patterns). The results indicate that, even though there are indications of differences in the strength of the economic vote in high- and low-clarity contexts respectively, institutional rules or power patterns fail to significantly deflect the overall electoral impact of economic growth.

State of the Field

AbstractAlthough scholars of West European politics have long debated whether the region's highly institutionalised party systems were becoming de‐aligned and electorally unstable, the political fallout from the post‐2008 financial crisis has lent a new sense of urgency to the debate. The threats posed to party systems by economic crises are hardly unique to Europe, however. The Latin American experience with the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s suggests that party system upheaval was not simply a function of retrospective economic voting during the period of crisis. It was also attributable to programmatically de‐aligning policy responses to crises – namely the ‘bait‐and‐switch’ imposition of austerity and adjustment measures by labour‐based, left‐leaning parties that were traditional champions of statist and redistributive policies. Such patterns of reform made it difficult for party systems to channel societal resistance to market orthodoxy in the post‐adjustment era, setting the stage for convulsive ‘reactive sequences’ when such resistance arose outside and against mainstream parties through varied forms of social and electoral protest, typically on the left flank. This article explores the political fallout from the European and Latin American economic crises from a comparative perspective, arguing that it is essential to think beyond the short‐term political dynamics of crisis management to consider the longer‐term institutional legacies and fragilities of the different political alignments forged around crisis‐induced policy reforms.

German Voters in Times of Crisis: The Impact of Perceptions and Economic Context on Electoral Behaviour

This paper analyses the connection between economic context, voters’ individual assessment of the economy, and party identification, taking the German national elections of 2009 as an example. Based on the results of multinomial and multilevel regression models, the article shows that partisanship moderates how the economy affects the vote. In cases of increasing unemployment in the constituency, voters are less likely to vote for the Social Democrats instead of the CDU and the opposition. This effect is particularly strong amongst voters who report that they identify with the Social Democrats. Regarding the effect of voters’ assessment of the national economy, the results are different. In this case, a better evaluation of the regional economy increases the probability to vote for right-wing parties – notably amongst voters without partisanship. These findings suggest that the moderating effect of partisanship on the economy’s impact on voting behaviour should not be overestimated. What is more, this analysis implies that research on economic voting should always account for both contextual factors and voters’ personal assessment of the economy, as these measures reveal different dimensions of economic voting.

Voting Behavior of the Youth in Turkey: What Drives Involvement in or Causes Alienation from Conventional Political Participation?

ABSTRACT The decline of conventional political participation of the youth is a serious concern in many countries worldwide. Studying the Turkish example, this paper aims to empirically analyze the determinants of youngsters’ (non)voting behavior. The analysis shows that lifestyle is the most important factor, reflecting the importance of the youth’s everyday practices on their conventional political participation. Besides, being female, having higher levels of education and residing in an urban area increase the probability of abstaining. Moreover, ‘economic voting’ exists for youngsters as they are found to be punishing the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) for economic prospects unpromising either individually or societally. For first-time voters, lifestyle and the 2013 Gezi protests are the main determinants of voting behavior. Furthermore, there is persistence in abstaining from voting as having abstained in the 2011 general elections increases the probability of abstaining again by 18 percent. The analysis of disillusioned youth demonstrates that Gezi protests have increased the probability of their conventional political participation; they can be associated either with a decline in their probability of voting for the AKP, or of being indecisive and/or abstaining. A factor change analysis, however, finds that the abstained and indecisive Kurdish youth’s preferences have shifted towards pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party post-Gezi.

Has economic voting changed? A comparative analysis of Italy and other Southern European countries

ABSTRACTThe financial and debt crisis caused severe economic and political instability in Italy. Economic hardship led to an array of unpopular policy measures, giving rise to public dissatisfaction and civil unrest. These dramatic developments call for a re-assessment of the basic link between the economy and political support. This article uses the European Election Studies (EES) Voter study data from 2004, 2009 and 2014 to investigate patterns of economic voting. We assess the magnitude of economic effects in Italy in comparison with other Southern European countries that in recent years have witnessed similar economic and political turmoil. The results point to a strong impact of economic conditions on incumbent support in Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. However, retrospective voting weakened amid the crisis, with Italian voters in particular placing less blame for economic conditions on the national government than before. Importantly, we also find a considerable increase in prospective voting in Italy. Despite the nation’s past economic experience, voters were willing to reward Renzi’s government when they believed that its policies would bring economic improvement.

Does National Economic Performance Affect Voter Choice Equally Across Economic Class in Presidential Elections? Observations of New Hampshire 1972-2016

Study pertaining to the relationship between performance of the economy and voter behavior continues to be a pertinent question in political economy and electoral studies. Despite the presence of previous studies, there has been little focus to this point on the relationship between national economic performance and voter choice for disparate economic classes in a single state. This paper seeks to identify if performance of the United States’ national economy is uniformly influential on voter choice in presidential elections across disparate economic classes. Through the use of data collected from the New Hampshire Department of State on voting results in presidential elections between 1972 and 2016, as well as per capita income and population data obtained from the New Hampshire Employment Security Department, this paper analyzes calculated correlation coefficients, regression models, and electoral volatility measures for lowest-earning, median-earning, and highest-earning counties within the state of New Hampshire based on average per capita income. Findings reflect election-year performance of the national economy has an appreciable effect on voter choice in presidential elections across economic class, while four-year performance of the national economy has a trivial effect on voter choice. From these results, it is also revealed that access to economic data has no effect on voter behavior. The analysis of electoral volatility reveals a conceivably substantial relationship between economic class and the volatility of electoral outcomes. Further research relating to the value of election-year economic performance on voter behavior, as well as the relationship between economic class and electoral volatility, is also proposed.

Economia e instituições importam? Um estudo do comportamento eleitoral em países latino-americanos

Os estudos de comportamentos eleitorais contemporâneos, para além de entender a relevância de aspectos econômicos, têm incorporado em suas análises as variáveis de caráter institucional. De acordo com esse aporte teórico, é preciso atentar para o contexto político em que os eleitores estão inseridos. Partindo de tais preceitos, o presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a relevância de aspectos econômicos e institucionais no comportamento eleitoral de dezoito países latino-americanos entre 2008 e 2012. Assim, mensura-se em que medida as variáveis institucionais se mostram relevantes no vínculo que o eleitor estabelece entre desempenho de governo na economia e a avaliação dada ao governante. Os principais achados reforçam, em parte, a pertinência de variáveis institucionais no voto econômico.

How party nationalization conditions economic voting

In this article we analyze the conditioning effect of party nationalization, and in particular dynamic nationalization, on economic voting. While previous single-country and cross-national studies suggest a weak correlation between economic conditions and voting patterns, we argue that this relationship is conditioned by the degree to which parties are dynamically nationalized. Using both case study and large-n analysis, we show first that retrospective voting can be more nationalized than prospective voting. We then argue that national economic conditions cannot and do not relate to voting patterns, at least when weak dynamic nationalization is weak. The findings also call into question the well-known thesis about the clarity of responsibility as a conditional factor in explaining retrospective (economic) voting. There is imperfect correspondence between “clarity of responsibility” and dynamic party nationalization, but retrospective voting presumes that voters across the country respond in kind. This explains why the only evidence we find of a correlation of national economic indicators and voting is when there is high dynamic nationalization.

Economic Voting in Korean Elections : Evidence from Panel Data Analysis of the 2012 Korean Presidential Election

Economic Voting in Korean Elections : Evidence from Panel Data Analysis of the 2012 Korean Presidential Election

Patrimonial Economic Voting and Asset Value – New Evidence from Taxation Register Data

Recent research on economic voting has moved beyond the traditional reward–punishment hypothesis, according to which the economy is merely considered a valence issue. Instead, patrimonial economic voting research looks at voters as property owners within the economic system. These studies have relied on survey items that measure whether individuals own different kinds of property to test the patrimonial dimension. This study emphasizes the importance of a surprisingly neglected aspect: the value of assets. It uses official register data files from the Swedish Tax Agency on the value of individuals’ assets merged with survey data from the 2006 Swedish National Election Study. The study finds that the relationship between patrimony and voting behavior in Sweden is similar to that found in other countries, but only when it is tested in a similar way as in these studies – that is, only when it is coded as whether voters own different assets. This study brings three important contributions to the debate. First, it offers a new empirically based categorization of the dimensionality of asset ownership and shows that the previous distinction between low- and high-risk assets is insufficient. Secondly, it shows that merely having assets or not, which is what previous studies have measured, is not what primarily matters; the relevant factor is the value of the assets. And thirdly, it demonstrates that only the value of some kinds of assets matters (especially stocks and real estate properties), while other assets (savings in bonds and funds) do not affect voting behavior or political opinions.

Economic Voting Using Egotropic Evaluation as an Information Cue: How Absolute and Relative Income Affect Socio-Economic Evaluations and Retrospection

Economic Voting Using Egotropic Evaluation as an Information Cue: How Absolute and Relative Income Affect Socio-Economic Evaluations and Retrospection

Electoral Linkages in Federal Systems: Barometer Voting and Economic Voting in the German Länder

AbstractFederal systems create political competition at multiple territorial levels. While models of vertical bargaining conceptualise federal‐subnational relations as occurring between parties with exogenously defined interests, federalism also structures forms of interdependence between the federal and subnational levels. Political competition in multi‐level systems is marked by interdependence between the federal and subnational levels through barometer and second order voting effects. Findings of a more ‘autonomous’ form of political competition at the subnational level, through state‐level economic voting, are less common. This article examines Germany, a highly interdependent federation, to assess the extent to which voting in Land elections responds to Land level economic performance and whether political and institutional factors affect this. I find evidence that in Land level elections, voting for the federally incumbent party is responsive to federal economic performance. Alongside this, there is evidence of ‘uncoupled’ electoral behaviour at the Land level, with Land level economic voting. This is enhanced by single party government.

Re‐electing the Culprits of the Crisis? Elections in the Aftermath of a Recession

Theories of economic voting and electoral accountability suggest that voters punish incumbent governments for poor economic conditions. Incumbents are thus expected to suffer substantially during significant economic crisis but their successor in office will face the difficult task of reviving the economy. The economic crisis may, therefore, negatively affect government parties in subsequent elections even though the economic conditions may, to a large degree, have been inherited from the previous government. It is argued in this article that economic conditions play an important role in such circumstances as they place specific issues on the agenda, which structure the strategies available to the parties. Therefore, the article studies the 2013 Icelandic parliamentary election in which the incumbent government parties suffered a big loss despite having steered the country through an economic recovery. While perceptions of competence and past performance influenced party support, three specific issues thrust on the agenda by the economic crisis – mortgage relief, Icesave and European Union accession/negotiations – help explain why the centre‐right parties were successful in returning to the cabinet.

Economic performance and incumbents' support in Latin America

We analyze the impact of economic conditions and income shocks on the stability of incumbents' support in Latin America. A reduction in the incumbent's vote share from one election to another is a behavioral indicator of voter discontent with her performance, a crucial element of democratic accountability. In explaining the percentage change in incumbent vote, we emphasize the importance of income effects. In particular, we argue that negative economic conditions have deleterious consequences on the capacity of incumbents to sustain their electoral support. We test this hypothesis both at the aggregate and individual level using electoral and survey data. We find evidence that negative economic shocks erode support for incumbents at both levels of analysis, thus increasing our confidence on results showing the impact of pocketbook economic vote in the region.