Economic Theory Of Crime Research Articles

Inequality and Crime

This paper considers the relationship between inequality and crime using data from urban counties. The behavior of property and violent crime are quite different. Inequality has no effect on property crime but a strong and robust impact on violent crime, with an elasticity above 0.5. By contrast, poverty and police activity have significant effects on property crime, but little on violent crime. Property crime is well explained by the economic theory of crime, while violent crime is better explained by strain and social disorganization theories.

Violence, Organized Crime, and the Criminal Justice System in Colombia

One of the concerns of the economic theory of crime has been the effect of the justice system on criminal activities. Theorists have proposed that the probability of being caught and sanctioned is a factor affecting the decisions made by criminals [Erlich 1996]. It is assumed that these are variables over which the government has control. Criminologists are less unanimous as to the effectiveness of the justice system, but their theories also assume a certain degree of system autonomy. In each case, the effect that the existence of armed groups (including private armies and protection services, mafias, insurgent groups, and other forms of organized crime) may have on the performance of the judicial system has been, to date, unexplored terrain. This paper will argue, with reference to the Colombian case, that violence, and in particular that exercised by such groups, can become an obstacle to the adequate administration of criminal justice. Available evidence is presented on the effect of violence and the threats posed by armed groups on the different stages of criminal proceedings. Using municipal level information gathered in Colombia, this paper attempts to trace the impact of these groups, suggesting that the effect begins with changes in the availabihty and quality of information on homicides.

The Economic Theory of Crime and the Problems of a Society in Transition

The Economic Theory of Crime and the Problems of a Society in Transition

Estimating Deterrence Effects: A Public Choice Perspective on the Economics of Crime Literature

Following Becker's path-breaking theoretical work on the economics of crime, a large econometric literature has developed to test his implications [3]. This literature typically focuses on a supply of offenses in which per capita crimes are related to the probability and severity of punishment for that type of crime, the expected income from the criminal activity, returns from alternative legal activities, and other socio-economic factors. However, the economic theory of crime also implies that the supply of offenses is determined simultaneously with community's demand for enforcement services [24; 25]. Theoretically, the crime rate depends on police deterrence efforts, police deterrence efforts depend upon the level of police resources, and the level of police resources depends on the crime rate. As a result, the typical econometric model employees data on reported crimes (Index I crimes) and a simultaneous equation estimating technique with at least two, and generally three (or more) equations in which police deterrence efforts are proxied by the probability of arrest [14].1 A series of recent empirical studies of the economics of crime

An Economic Analysis of Recidivism among Drug Offenders

Following Becker [5], economists have modeled decisions to commit crimes as rational choices in reaction to incentives and constraints. In particular, potential criminals consider the probability of being caught and the severity of punishment in their decision calculus, as well as the opportunity cost of their time. But arguments are frequently made by police and other public officials which imply that drug users are different than the rational criminal of the economic model. Therefore, this study investigates factors affecting recidivism among Florida's drug offenders from the perspective provided by the economic theory of crime in order to see if drug offenders do react to incentives and constraints, and to explore the implications of alternative policies toward this large and growing segment of the criminal population. The relationship between drug use and non-drug crime may have very important policy implications. For example, Florida's prison population has increased dramatically in the past decade, growing from 19,681 at the end of the 1980-81 fiscal year to 38,059 by June 30, 1989, and a substantial portion of these increased admissions are for drug offenses. Drug offenses accounted for only 21.5 percent of Florida's prison admissions during the first half of FY86-87, but during the same period in FY89-90 drug offenses accounted for 36.6 percent of all admissions. New admissions to prison have forced a more rapid turnover of inmates through early release programs resulting in a declining proportion of sentences served. In January 1987 Florida's prisoners served an average of 52 percent of their sentence. By December 1989 this proportion had fallen to 33 percent, a 37 percent decline in two years. These trends are largely a result of an increasingly tough policy toward drug offenders. Similarly, police resources have been reallocated to focus on the control of drug offenses, thereby reducing the ability of police to deter non-drug crimes [3; 4]. This reallocation of resources has led to rising property crime rates. Therefore, the opportunity

An Interdisciplinary Study of Crime

A taped interview with a former street-gang leader in Chicago is interpreted as supporting the economic theory of crime. This theory predicts that participation in crime varies directly with net benefits and inversely with the attractiveness of legitimate occupations. The alternative sociological explanation—that crime is caused by deviant personality or exceptional environment— is ambiguous. Parts of that theory are open to more than one interpretation, while its prediction that individuals do not respond to punishments or incentives is deficient.

The Optimum Enforcement of Laws

All prescriptions of behavior for individuals require enforcement. Usually the obligation to behave in a prescribed way is entered into voluntarily by explicit or implicit contract. For example, I promise to teach certain classes with designated frequency and to discuss matters which I, and possibly others, believe are relevant to the course titles. By negotiation, and in the event of its failure, by legal action, I and my employer seek to enforce the contract of employment against large departures from the promised behavior. Performance of some kinds of behavior is difficult or impossible to enforce-such as promises to be creative, noble, or steadfast in crisis-and as a result such contractual promises are either not made or enforced only when there is an uncontroversially flagrant violation. The influence upon contract, and upon economic organization generally, of the costs of enforcing various kinds of contracts has received virtually no study by economists, despite its immense potential explanatory power. When the prescribed behavior is fixed unilaterally rather than by individual agreement, we have the regulation or law, and enforcement of these unilateral rules is the subject of the present essay. Departures of actual from prescribed behavior are crimes or violations, although one could wish for a less formidable description than "criminal" to describe many of the trifling offenses or the offenses against unjust laws. My primary purpose is to construct a theory of rational enforcement, a theory which owes much to Gary Becker's major article on the subject (1968). In the conclusion the problem of explanation, as distinguished from prescription, will be commented upon.