W ITHIN the scope of public debate, it is a commonplace that the Middle East is an area of frequently violent international conflict, where the level of violence is subject to sudden and considerable elevation. It is a second commonplace that the two superpowers-the United States and the Soviet Union-have significant, and sometimes divergent, interests and influence in the Middle East, substantial enough respectively to encourage and support their involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts. It is a third commonplace that, as major industrial states, both super-powers, and especially the United States, must be concerned with trends in an international energy market which is itself decisively affected by the volume and price of oil exported from the Middle East and North Africa. The historical prevalence of political and military conflict between and within Middle Eastern states hardly needs to be proved. The second commonplace is more questionable, however platitudinous it may appear. Soviet and United States interests in the Middle East are evident enough, even if they may frequently have been misunderstood. Influence is another matter. Despite the widespread advertisement over twenty years of their respective links with a list of ' client states ' in the region, neither super-power has been notably or consistently successful in manipulating Middle Eastern politics or Middle Eastern conflicts to its own advantage. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, they have shared, especially since 1967, the predicament of having responsibility without control.' The third of the commonplaces must also be open to question, on at least two grounds. First, it must be recalled that the United States and the Soviet Union, in addition to being two of the largest industrial economies, are also the two largest oil-producing states in the world; whatever their dependence, if any, on imported oil, they can never be so vulnerable to its supply or price as the industrial states of