Earnings Management In Firms Research Articles

The Impact of Board Internationalization on Real Earnings Management: Evidence From China

In this article, we examine the impact of board internationalization on real earnings management. Using the annual data of 2,899 Chinese listed non-financial firms with 16,638 firm-year observations over the period from 2008 to 2017 for empirical analysis, we find robust evidence that higher proportion of foreign directors on corporate boards reduces real earnings management. Results support the hypothesis that foreign directors increase boards’ effectiveness in monitoring the management and, consequently, lead to less earnings management by corporate executives. Our results are robust to alternative measures of board internationalization, instrumental variable analysis, and adding additional control variables. We further observe that foreign directors are more effective in reducing earnings management in firms with local directors with foreign experience and in Chinese provinces with developed institutional environment. Moreover, Chinese firms complement accrual and real activities–based earnings management, and board internationalization is effective in reducing both types of earnings management. Overall, our findings imply board internationalization improves the quality of reported earnings to outside shareholders.

Client Relationships, Analyst Coverage, and Earnings Management

SYNOPSIS Financial analysts have two important roles in the capital market. In addition to their informational role, which has been widely studied, they play an important monitoring role. Similar to their informational role, their monitoring role might be negatively affected when they face conflicts of interest. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we show that if analysts are under pressure (i.e., housed in a brokerage firm where specific mutual funds hold large positions in a company covered by the analyst), their role in lowering the firm earnings management activities is significantly compromised. We find that the closer the business relationship between the mutual fund and the brokerage firm, the greater the firm earnings management. Our findings caution investors and regulators to heed the impact of client pressure on analysts' roles in financial markets.

Does Transfer Pricing Moderate the Effect of Deferred Tax Assets and Deferred Tax Expenses on Accrual Earnings Management of Firms in Indonesia?

The purpose of this study is to analyze (a) the effect of deferred tax assets on accrual earnings management; (b) the effect of deferred tax expenses on accrual earnings management; (c) the role of transfer pricing as a moderator variable to strengthen the effect of deferred tax assets on accrual earnings management; and (d) the role of transfer pricing as a moderator variable to strengthen the effect of deferred tax expenses on accrual earnings management. The samples consist of 160 manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The study utilizes the financial statements from 2012 to 2018. This study presents that (a) deferred tax assets influence accrual earnings management; b) deferred tax expenses affect accrual earnings management; c) transfer pricing does not strengthen the effect of deferred tax assets on accrual earnings management; and d) transfer pricing does not strengthen the effect of deferred tax expenses on accrual earnings management. This study contributes to accounting studies, tax authorities and regulators, and accounting policy makers. Firstly, this research contributes to the development of accounting studies on the role of transfer pricing as a moderator of the effect of deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities on earnings management. Secondly, the results of this study can make a consideration for tax authorities and regulators in addressing company management actions to minimize the amount of tax paid by utilizing policies according to PSAK. It is worth considering how to sanction companies that deliberately reduce the amount of tax that should be paid. It is necessary to conduct tax investigation by the Directorate General of taxes on companies that are indicated to have practiced accrual earnings management with the aim of reducing the tax burden. Thirdly, accounting policy makers need to consider how management reduces the tax that should be paid through accounting policies that are allowed under PSAK and transfer pricing mechanism.

Option informativeness before earnings announcements and under real activity manipulation

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate whether single-name options trading prior to earnings announcements is more informative when there exist real activity manipulations.Design/methodology/approachUsing 5,419 earnings announcements during 2004–2018 made by 208 public US companies with relatively high options volumes ranked by the CBOE, the authors uncover two regularities using predictive regressions for stock return.FindingsFirst, the total options volume up to twenty days pre-announcement is significantly higher than that in other periods only for earnings management firms; moreover, after detailing options characteristics, the authors find these intensive pre-announcement trading to be concentrated in transactions of in-the-money call and long-term maturity put options. Second, an increase in the single-name call minus put options volume can positively predict the underlying stock’s next-day excess return much better in real earnings management firms, with a larger magnitude of effect in periods right before regular earnings announcement dates.Originality/valueThis paper makes a marginal and novel contribution by showing that real earnings management can serve as a proxy for the potential profit from informed trading in options as the return predictability of options volume becomes stronger for firms that have the manipulation motive and indeed perform manipulative actions.

Earnings management around founder CEO reappointments and successions in family firms

AbstractThis paper studies reappointment of a chief executive officer (CEO) and succession events in listed family firms with an incumbent family CEO. We explore whether family firms with a founder CEO are more likely to engage in earnings management preevent than other family firms. We find evidence of preevent upward earnings management for firms that reappoint their founder CEO but no for other family firms. These findings suggest that the costs and benefits from earnings management change around founder CEO reappointments in family firms. Investors, auditors, policymakers and regulators should be aware of the temptation of founder CEOs to inflate earnings preceding their reappointment.

U.S. Political Alignment and Corporate Fraud

I investigate whether U.S. political geography has an impact on convictions for corporate fraud. Prior research shows that the degree of alignment between state politicians and the President’s political party is positively correlated with measures of earnings management for firms that are headquartered in the state. Typically, a high degree of political alignment affects a firm’s information and enforcement environment due to increases in policy risk and more lenient oversight, which are conducive to earnings management. I posit that such an environment is also conducive to corporate fraud and test this hypothesis using annual data for 2003-2017. The analysis is conducted using pooled OLS and panel regressions. I find that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between corporate fraud conviction rates by state and a state-level measure of political alignment. This finding is robust to using alternative empirical specifications and ways of measuring fraud rates and political alignment.

Real Earnings Management, Manipulation Incentives and Accounting Conservatism:Evidence from China

ABSTRACT This study examines the effects of real earnings management on accounting conservatism, based on 2,121 A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2005 to 2017. The results indicate that real earnings management has a significant negative impact on listed firms’ accounting conservatism. The real earnings management based on loss avoidance, seasoned equity offerings (SEO), maintaining growth and reversing loss reduces accounting conservatism, while that based on earnings smoothing incentive improves accounting conservatism. Real earnings management of firms with poor corporate governance has a more significant impact on accounting conservatism than firms with good corporate governance. The findings also offer reference for further strengthening listed firms’ financial supervision, improving corporate governance structure, and promoting the healthy development of the securities market.

Earnings management to avoid earnings boosts

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to investigate whether earnings boosts before the year end trigger earnings management. It examines whether firms that substantially outperformed their last year earnings during the first three quarters push their earnings down to avoid reporting earnings boosts.Design/methodology/approachRegression analysis is used to compare earnings management of firms with earnings boosts and other firms.FindingsThe results indicate that firms outperforming their last year results by the end of the third quarter manipulate their earnings downwards by means of real activities manipulation, while they do not indicate income-decreasing accruals management. It is also found that consistent with the prominent shift from accruals management to real activities manipulation, accruals management is less costly which justifies why it is used for downward manipulation.Research limitations/implicationsThe results are limited to one single earnings benchmark i.e. last year earnings. Further research may individually or collectively examine other benchmarks including analysts' forecasts.Practical implicationsThe findings suggest that users should be more vigilant of firms exceeding their last year interim results, as they could be involved in downward earnings management.Originality/valueThis study documents earnings management in a new setting where earnings boosts before the year end trigger downward manipulation of real activities.

Pengaruh Komite Audit dan CEO Tenure Terhadap Kualitas Laporan Keuangan

This study investigates the effect of committee audit on the quality of financial statements with proxies of real earnings management, and CEO tenure involvement in real earnings management for firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The study uses a sample of 265 observation of publicly listed companies on the IDX for the fiscal year that ends on December 31, 2017 through 2019. The data analysis technique used is multiple linear regression analysis using eviews statistic. The result show that audit committee negatively affects real earnings management while CEO tenure positively affects real earnings management practices.

The monitoring role of the media: Evidence from earnings management

AbstractIn response to the recent debate on the media, this paper examines the effect of media coverage on firm earnings management. Even if prior studies (Dyck et al., 2010; Miller, 2006) have documented the media's role in detecting and deterring accounting fraud (or extreme earnings management), it is unclear ex ante whether the media amplifies or curbs less egregious earnings management. Our results show that media coverage is negatively associated with both accrual‐based and real earnings management, suggesting that the media serves as an external monitor that curbs managers’ opportunistic earnings management behaviors. Further analyses show that the effect of media coverage on earnings management is more pronounced when monitoring from auditors is weak and when the other information intermediaries are active. Overall, the findings suggest a monitoring role of the media in firm financial reporting practices.

The impact of XBRL on real earnings management: unexpected consequences of the XBRL implementation in China

In this paper, we investigate whether there is a change of real earnings management for firms facing pressures of the new technology implementation of eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL). We find that real earnings management increases after the implementation of XBRL in China, especially under the dual regulation of XBRL policies from two regulators (China Securities Regulation Committee and Ministry of Finance). Given the long term detrimental effect of real earnings management on firm value, this could be unexpected consequences of XBRL technology in emerging market. Furthermore, state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises behave differently under the dual regulation of XBRL policies.

Does financial crisis impact earnings management? Evidence from Turkey

AbstractThis study attempts to display the impact of global financial crisis of 2008 on earnings management (EM) compare with the period before and after with the case of listed manufacturing firms in Borsa Istanbul for the period of 2007–2012. Furthermore, it deepens the EM literature by concentrating on an emerging economy. Discretionary accruals (DA) were computed using the modified Jones model as a measure of EM. Moreover, this study examines EM behavior by separating firms into firms with positive and negative DA. The results of this study registered a high level of EM in firms throughout the postcrisis period.

Earnings Management around Founder CEO Re-appointments and Successions in Family Firms

This paper studies CEO re-appointment and succession events in listed family firms with an incumbent family CEO in France, Germany and the UK over 2001-2016. The paper explores whether family firms with a founder CEO are more likely to engage in earnings management pre-event than other family firms and non-family firms. Compared to non-family firms, family firms practice less upward earnings management. Nevertheless, we find evidence of pre-event upward earnings management for firms that re-appoint their founder CEO, but no such earnings management for other family firms. Finally, we also show that the new CEOs in non-family firms engage in upward earnings management after their appointment.

Control-Enhancing Mechanisms and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence from Pakistan

Separation of ownership and control plays a significant role in determining the agency cost, and there are many consequences of this agency problem. The control-enhancing mechanisms enhance control of controlling shareholders who expropriate small shareholders. Controlling shareholders are different in different countries; majorly, family firms are controlling firms in Pakistani context. The use of control-enhancing mechanism is rampant in emerging economies, and even some developed countries, related research especially in Pakistan requires evidence. This study exhibits a pooled cross-sectional analysis of listed companies in Pakistan between 2005 and 2016. In this research, we have examined the influence of control-enhancing mechanisms on firms’ earnings management and which mechanism (pyramid control, multiple control chains, and cross-holding control) is significantly influencing the earnings management of firms. We have analyzed both types of earnings manipulation techniques (accrual and real earning management). Our results explicate that the pyramid control and multiple control chain mechanisms are significantly positively related to the accruals earning management and real earnings management, unveiling that firms with these controls manipulate earnings with discretionary accruals as well as with real activity manipulation. Real activity manipulation enhances firms to overproduce the inventory (decreasing the unit price) and to reduce the discretionary expenses (increasing the reported earnings).

The relationship between cash flow forecast and earnings management in firms

The vast area of managers' authority and their different activities and utilizing realization and adjustment principles and using estimation, and forecasting are among factors that affect earnings' quality. Methodology: The present research has three hypotheses. First hypothesis: by presenting cash flow forecast, earnings management will decrease through earnings' elements. Second hypothesis: by presenting cash flow forecast, real activities' earnings management will increase. Third hypothesis: by presenting cash flow forecast, expectations' management will increase towards target earnings. The time period for this research was 8 years (from early 2004 to late 2011). Firms investigated in this research were 115 firms. By analyzing the collected data, we dealt with studying and testing research hypotheses. Results: Results of analyses showed that on the whole the first and second research hypotheses were approved and the third research hypothesis was rejected. Based on findings in this research it can be suggested to investors in Tehran Stock Exchange to rely on firms the present their cash flows and it can be shown that the earnings presented show firms' real earnings. The investors and creditors should pay more attention to firms' cash flow because it is one of managers' control tools to reduce earnings management. The investors should consider the factors and real signs of real earnings management and pay attention to their effects on cash flows as an index of firm's performance when they are making decisions to invest in firms. Regarding that real earnings' management discovering is done by auditors with much difficulty, it is suggested that Iranian Official Accountants' assembly and auditing organization, as active agents in accounting field in the country, should inform firms under investigations about future outcomes of earnings management through manipulating real activities, by training their own auditors. Stock Exchange Organization should introduce those firms that tend towards real earnings management by an appropriate informing format to investors and potential investors and let them invest or refuse investment consciously and based on their own short-term and long-term goals in such companies. Conclusion: Obligating firms enlisted in Stock Exchange to present cash flow forecasts results in increasing information transparency and increasing qualitative levels of researches.

Earnings Management in Firms with Data Security Breaches

ABSTRACT Anecdotal research suggests that management is concerned about how Data Security Breaches (DSBs) impact a firm's financial performance. We investigate: whether managers in DSB firms manipulate earnings through real earnings management (REM) and/or accrual-based earnings management (AEM); how breach type, disclosure delay, and external monitoring impact earnings management activities; and how earnings management activities influence a DSB firm's performance. Using a propensity score matched sample, results suggest that DSB firms are more likely to manipulate earnings via REM, but not AEM. Additionally, we find that DSB firms engage in REM through cutting discretionary expenses, decreasing discretionary cash spending, and reducing the cost of goods sold through overproduction. We find some evidence that firms are more likely to increase REM when DSBs involve financial information or when firms delay the DSB disclosure or have low analyst coverage. We provide evidence that REM activities lead to lower subsequent performance in DSB firms. Data Availability: The data used are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

Impact of firm-level uncertainty on earnings management and role of accounting conservatism

This study investigates whether accounting conservatism can reduce earnings management in the wake of uncertainty. It is hypothesized that conservative reporting during uncertainty can reduce earnings management and increase firm value. Using 5354 firm-year observations from 2005-2018 through Khan and watts model, we provide evidence that accounting conservatism is a way to put limits on earnings management for firms facing uncertainty. We find a statistically significant impact of conservative reporting on firm value during an uncertainty. Uncertainty at the firm level is measured by applying prospector and defender business strategy. To measure earnings management Modified Jones model and Dechow and Dichev approach models applied. Our results provide insights into conservative accounting and have critical and practical implications for investors, researchers and standard setters. After addressing endogeneity and applying GMM estimator, our results remain confirmed.

Employee turnover likelihood and earnings management: evidence from the inevitable disclosure doctrine

We present evidence that managers consider employee turnover likelihood in their accounting choices. Our tests exploit U.S. state courts’ staggered recognition of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD), which reduces employees’ ability to switch employers. We find a significant decrease in upward earnings management for firms headquartered in states that recognize the IDD, relative to firms headquartered elsewhere. The effect of the IDD is stronger for firms relying more on human capital and for firms whose employees have higher ex-ante turnover likelihood, confirming the employee retention channel. Overall, our results support the view that retaining employees is an important motive for corporate earnings management.

MANAJEMEN LABA PADA PERUSAHAAN YANG MELANGGAR PERJANJIAN UTANG

This research aims to give empirical evidence concerning earnings management in firms violating debt covenant and to test whether earnings management in those firms are larger than that in control firms. Research population is manufacturing company listed at Bursa Efek Indonesia. The sample includes 17 firms violating debt covenant and 22 firms complying debt covenant as control firms. The sampling method is purposive sampling. Method of statistics used is t-test. The statistic test of first hypothesis shows that mean of discretionary accruals at a year before violation is significantly larger than that at the year debt covenant violation. This result supports debt covenant hypothesis. But, mean difference at the year of violation and at a year after violation does not provide the support for the hypothesis. The statistic test of second hypothesis shows that mean of discretionary accruals of firms violating debt covenant at a year before and at the year violation of debt covenant is significantly larger than that of control firms. Thus, we can conclude that violation of debt covenant motivate management to perform earnings management.

Brokerage fee, ownership expropriation and earnings management of Malaysian property companies

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate whether real estate companies manipulate their earnings through the brokerage fee across ownership expropriation or not.Design/methodology/approachThis study considers Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange listed real estate firms to investigate how the brokerage fee in the real estate industry might affect the earnings management of firms across its ownership expropriation. Using annual report data, the authors investigate the associations over a panel for the period 2008−2012. Robust panel regression is used to divulge the probability values with reference by probit regression.FindingsOverall, the results show that high brokerage fees would drive more events of earnings management and that, generally, the ownership concentration among Malaysian real estate firms significantly affects the earnings management of the firms.Practical implicationsThis study shows that firm profitability and brokerage fees enhance the probability of firm’s earnings management. A low brokerage fee would reflect low revenue to the company. Therefore, management would opt to manipulate earnings in order to overstate earnings, which garners more interest from investors.Originality/valueReal estate values in Malaysia have climbed steadily over the years due to a combination of reasons giving companies a higher brokerage fee. Earnings management has become a big issue for property investors. The study demonstrates the relationship between earnings management and brokerage fee across ownership expropriation which can be considered by shareholders in their own strategic planning and investors in their own investing.