Early Stoics Research Articles

POSIDONIUS ON VIRTUE AND THE GOOD

AbstractThis paper argues that despite recent tendencies to minimize the differences between Posidonius and the Early Stoics, there are some important aspects of Stoic ethics in which Posidonius deviated from the orthodox doctrine. According to two passages in Diogenes Laertius, Posidonius counted health and wealth among the goods and held that virtue alone is insufficient for happiness. While Kidd in his commentary dismissed this report as spurious, there are good reasons to take Diogenes’ remarks seriously. Through a careful analysis of the sources, in particular of Galen's De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, this article offers a new interpretation of Posidonius’ ethics. It sheds light on Posidonius’ theory of virtues and shows that Posidonius must have granted a special status to things like health and wealth even if he did not regard them as genuine goods.

WHAT SHOULD WOMEN DO? THE STOICS ON GENDER-ROLE DIVISION

The aim of this paper is to enquire if the Stoics consider certain social activities appropriate only for men or women, a much-debated question in the scholarship. Here it is argued that the Stoics are not committed to gendered divisions of tasks. This claim is pled through an analysis of the various testimonies and of the Stoic notion of appropriate activity (καθῆκον). This result leads to reconsider the Stoics’ stand within their cultural environment and will hopefully contribute to the debate on their thinking on womanhood. This study is thus structured: firstly, the notion of καθῆκον is presented; next, the evidence of the Stoic use of gender as a parameter in determining καθήκοντα is discussed; then, a reconstruction of the social role the early Stoics assigned to women in their planned constitutions is attempted; finally, the reflection of later Stoics on the role of women in actual societies is addressed.

Measuring the End: Heraclitus and Diogenes of Babylon on the Great Year and Ekpyrosis

Abstract This paper first examines surviving testimonies on the doctrine of the Great Year in Heraclitus and attempts to demonstrate the reliability of Aëtius’ version handed down by the mss., according to which the Great Year is equal to 18,000 solar years. On the basis of such evidence it is also possible to newly examine Diogenes of Babylon’s views about this topic. In the second part, the paper better defines the relationship between the Great Year and the theory of cosmic conflagration. It argues that in the sources at our disposal there are enough elements to credit Heraclitus with the doctrine of Ekpyrosis, although, in all probability, the philosopher never provided an in-depth description of it. Finally, the same problem is analysed in relation to Diogenes of Babylon. In the most mature phase of his career, this Stoic departed from the Ekpyrosis doctrine of the early Stoics and especially of his master Chrysippus. The paper formulates some hypotheses on the reasons for this choice (arguing that it most probably reflects an original attitude towards Heraclitus on Diogenes’ part) and highlights that it was hardly an isolated, ‘heterodox’ stance during the final phase of the early Stoa.

Концепция бога Эрота в философии Ранней Стои

Eros as power and desire has been traditionally considered by the Stoics within the doctrine of “things indifferent” (adiaphora). At the same time, the power of Eros and the factor of gender differences play a pivotal role not only in the Stoic cosmology but in the theory of education and in the social theory as well. The political philosophy of the early Stoics is also deeply rooted in the theory of Eros. The article is devoted to explaining of the concept of Eros the god and to identifying of how the early Stoic philosophy was influenced by similar conceptions of Plato’s philosophy and the doctrine of the Cynics.

The notion of καθῆκον in the Early Stoa and “moral duty.” Reflections on Jack Visnjic’s book “The Invention of Duty. Stoicism as Deontology.”

In this paper, I argue against Jack Visnjic’s claim (in his recent book “The Invention of Duty”) that the Stoic term καθῆκον conveys the idea of moral duty. First, I examine Visnjic’s explicit argumentation and find it inconclusive. Then, I provide additional objections based on the evidence which Visnjic, in my opinion, either underestimates or completely disregards. Basically, I believe that at least the early Stoics regarded καθήκοντα as morally neutral activities that can become both morally right and wrong depending on the agent’s motivation.

The Normativity of Law in Nature Revisited: Natural Law in Late Hellenistic Thought

In this paper I revisit nature as a source of normativity for law in the later Hellenistic period, that is beyond the opposition of law and nature in the early classical period, Plato’s and Aristotle’s naturalism, or the early Stoics’ conception of the common law. I will focus on the first century BCE, when the expression ‘natural law’ gained prominence, reconstructing its origins in the interaction between Hellenistic philosophers and the Roman elite, including jurists. I argue that for the jurists the Stoic doctrine of law in nature offered a theoretical underpinning for their unique practice of dispute resolution, whereas for the Stoics this Roman practice offered an unexpected opportunity to instrumentalise their conception of law.

Intentionalism and Deontology in the Early Stoic Ethics

In this paper, I demonstrate that the early Stoics adhered to a normative theory that may be called intentionalist: the moral significance of any action is not determined by its material content, but by the virtuous or vicious disposition of the agent’s soul and the intentions arising from this disposition. Since according to Stoics all people are divided into virtuous sages and vicious non-sages, all the actions of the former are morally right (κατορθώματα), whereas those of the latter are morally wrong (ἁμαρτήματα), even if they are materially identical. On the other hand, some statements in the Stoic fragments can rather be characterized as deontological: in this case, certain materially defined types of action (stealing, lying, adultery, etc.) seem to be presented as morally wrong in themselves. The paper’s central thesis is that such statements do not contradict the basic Stoic intentionalism but can be interpreted as consistent with it. Such an interpretation becomes possible under two conditions: firstly, if one takes into account how exactly the notions of κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα relate to the Stoic notions of appropriate and inappropriate action (καθῆκον and παρὰ τὸκαθῆκον), and, secondly, if one examines the Stoic position on the moral status of lying, which is very revealing in this respect.

The Stoic Provenance of the Notion ofProsochê

AbstractLate Stoics and, in particular, Epictetus made ample use of the notion of attention (prosochê), which they understood as the soul’s vigilant focus on sense impressions and on the Stoic principles. Attention, in their view, was meant to assist our self-examination and lead to ethical progress. It was thus regarded as a Stoic good and a constitutive part ofeudaimonia. Early Stoics did not seem to have invoked such a notion, whereas the Neoplatonists appropriated it into their psychology by postulating the soul’s attentive part, which they introduced to explain both perceptual and intellectual attention as well as self-awareness.

Psychological disease and action-guiding impressions in early Stoicism

ABSTRACT The early Stoics diagnose vicious agents with various psychological diseases, e.g. love of money and love of wine. Such diseases are characterized as false evaluative opinions that lead the agent to form emotional impulses for certain objects, e.g. money and wine. Scholars have therefore analyzed psychological diseases simply as dispositions for assent. This interpretation is incomplete, I argue, and should be augmented with the claim that psychological disease also affects what kind of action-guiding impressions are created prior to giving assent. This proposal respects the Stoic insistence that impression-formation, no less than assent, is an activity of reason. In so far as the wine-lover’s reason is corrupted in a different way from the money-lover’s, the two vicious agents will form different action-guiding impressions when faced with similar stimuli. Here I juxtapose the Stoic account of expertise, according to which experts form more precise action-guiding impressions compared to the amateur, in virtue of possessing a system of grasps (katalēpseis). So expertise enhances, whereas psychological disease degrades, the representational fidelity of the impressions that prefigure action. With these commitments, the Stoics can be seen to offer a nuanced and principled theory of cognitive penetration and to anticipate some recent proposals in epistemology and cognitive science.

THE REPRESENTATIONS ON THE CONTEMPLATIVE AND ACTIVE LIFE IN EARLY HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

It is established that the question of the preferred way of life was actualized in the early Hellenistic philosophy. For many philosophers, the contemplative and the active life were equivalent. This position was held by Demetrius of Phalerum, early Stoics, probably Xenocrates and Menedemus of Eretria. Dicaearchus preferred an active life. Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Epicurus preferred the contemplative life. Unlike Aristotle and Theophrastus, Epicurus viewed the contemplative life not as an end, but only as a means of achieving serenity. It was also found that the high value of active life in early Hellenistic philosophy was due to the preservation of the polis system and the formation of Hellenistic monarchies, which opened up wide opportunities for philosophers to participate in political activities. The desire for a contemplative life was associated with the crisis of the polis system.

Индивидуализм и коллективизм в греческой философии в период раннего эллинизма

It has been found that despite the spread of individualism in the philosophical teachings of early Hellenism, the collectivist component not only did not disappear, but also retained a strong position. Most philosophical teachings were characterized by the coexistence of both tendencies. This is clearly visible in Epicurus, the early Stoics, Anniceris, the Peripatetics and the Academicians. It has also been found that this feature of Greek philosophy was closely connected with the socio-historical development of Greece during the period of early Hellenism. The crisis of the polis system and the formation of Hellenistic monarchies contributed to the strengthening of individualism. The persistence of the tendency toward collectivism was a consequence of the viability of the polis system and the foundation of numerous Greek polities in Hellenistic monarchies.

Проблема морального прогресса и стоический космополитизм

The article is devoted to showing the connection between the moral progress and the cos­mopolitanism of the Stoic. Since the early Stoics considered the right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) as one of the basic conditions for the unification of gods and humankind into a single com­munity (κοσμόπολις), anyone who intends to join to this community must develop his or her reason to the highest level. It means that the cosmopolitan must be morally perfect, which implies that he or she has successfully completed the process of moral progress. However, the concept of moral progress in Stoicism (especially in the early one) is prob­lematic because the Stoics denied a qualitative difference between vicious people and be­lieved that all bad deeds are equal. The author of the article tries to remove this contradic­tion by introducing a two-level structure of moral progress, in which the gradation of moral development and qualitative changes in the moral character of the subject are spaced. The cosmopolitanism of the Stoics and their ideas about moral progress are united not only by the concept of «right reason», but also by their doctrine of «oikeiôsis», which implies the development of natural inclinations to the highest principles of morality. Finally, the inter­dependence of moral progress and the cosmopolitanism is demonstrated by their evolution with the development of the Stoic school. This evolution is expressed in the fact that, on the one hand, the Stoics perfected the tools for moral development, which paved a clearer path to the cosmopolis, and on the other hand, they reduced the requirements for the citi­zens of the cosmopolis, which also led to the growth of the community of gods and people.

COSMOPOLITANISM AND PATRIOTISM IN EARLY HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY: SOCIO-HISTORICAL FACTOR

It is established that in Early Hellenistic philosophy the opposition between two tendencies – Patriotic and cosmopolitan increased. Patriotic values have retained their influence. The exponents of Patriotic ideas were Aristotle, Xenocrates, Anniceris, Menedemus, and partially the early stoics. At the same time, the positions of cosmopolitanism, which was represented in the philosophy of the cynics, the early Stoics, and Theodorus, also strengthened. It is also established that the formation of Hellenistic monarchies influenced the development of both tendencies. The rapprochement of the Greeks with the peoples of the East con-tributed to the spread of cosmopolitan ideas. And the Foundation of Greek cities in the Hellenistic States contributed to the preservation of Polis values, one of which was patriotism.

Intelligent Origins of European Globalism: Early Stoicism and Ciceron

The origin of socio-philosophical ideas about universal unity in the tradition of Stoicism and the writings of Cicero in the context of the cultural and historical conditions of the Roman intellectual reception of the ideas of cosmopolitanism of the early Stoics is considered. Performed the analysis of the continuity and development of the concept of “primary inclination” in the picture of the emergence of society and its structures developed by thinkers. The work uses the general scientific inductive method of ascending from the particular to the general, which allows a heuristic approach to the analysis of the intellectual practice of constructing a philosophical picture of the world of ancient authors. Authors used historical analysis of ideas, aimed at revealing the specific cultural context of their origin and development in space and time. The authors reveal the specifics of the stoic representation of the manifestations of the original, nature-like solidarity in the historical and philosophical discourse of ancient authors. The key provisions of the doctrine of the early Stoics and Cicero cosmopolis are analyzed. When considering the cultural and historical specificity of the indicated elements of the intellectual tradition, attention is drawn to the dependence of the Roman speaker views as a social philosopher on the political teachings of ancient authors. The article considers in a new way of he cultural and historical formation of ideas about universal unity in ancient anthropological discourse. The work is based on the analysis of the reception of the stoic idea of “primary inclination” in the writings of Cicero.

Cosmopolitanism and patriotism in greek philosophy during the early Hellenistic period

The article is devoted to the question of the correlation of cosmopolitanism and patriotism in the early Hellenistic philosophy. It is established that during this period in Greek philosophy the opposition between two tendencies – Patriotic and cosmopolitan increased. Patriotic values have retained their influence. The exponents of Patriotic ideas were Aristotle, Xenocrates, Anniceris, Menedemus, and partially the early stoics. At the same time, the positions of cosmopolitanism, which was represented in the philosophy of the cynics, the early Stoics, and Theodorus, also strengthened. It is also established that the formation of Hellenistic monarchies influenced the development of both tendencies. The rapprochement of the Greeks with the peoples of the East contributed to the spread of cosmopolitan ideas. And the Foundation of Greek cities in the Hellenistic States contributed to the preservation of Polis values, one of which was patriotism.

Антропологические аспекты имени собственного в логике ранних стоиков

Антропологические аспекты имени собственного в логике ранних стоиков

The Soul and Personal Identity in Early Stoicism: Two Theories?

AbstractThis paper is dedicated to exploring the alleged difference between Cleanthes’ and Chrysippus’ accounts of the post-mortal survival of the souls and the conceptions of personal identity that these accounts underpin. I argue that while Cleanthes conceptualised the personal identity as grounded in the rational soul, Chrysippus conceptualised it as the being an embodied rational soul. I also suggest that this difference between the two early Stoics might have been due to his metaphysical commitments arising from his response to the Growing Argument put forth by the Academics rather than the critique of his teacher.

Truth of assertions in the ancient theory of action (Aristotle and early Stoics)

The subject of this research is the ancient theory of action in its Aristotelian and early-Stoic versions. The author examines the role of the truth of assertions of an actor in these theories, as well as draws parallel with the modern approaches to the philosophy of action. It is demonstrated that Aristotelian theory leans on the prerequisite that aspirations of a person originate in the irrational parts of soul, and thus reason carries out only a regulatory function in managing human actions. Stoic theory, in turn, suggests that reason exercises an initiating function. The research methodology contains historical method of reconstruction with reference to primary sources in the Ancient Greek language. The main conclusion of the conducted research lies in determination of the two paradigmatic traditions in description of the structure of action that is of high degree of rationalization, and as a result, difference in assessment of the meaning of truth of assertions of an actor for his successful activity. The novelty consists in drawing connection between the ancient theories of action and modern approaches in this field of knowledge.

Death and Immortality in Ancient Philosophy by A. G. Long

Reviewed by: Death and Immortality in Ancient Philosophy by A. G. Long Ryan Fowler A. G. Long. Death and Immortality in Ancient Philosophy. Key Themes in Ancient Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. vii, 232. $99.99. ISBN 978-1-107-08659-3. At least in the moments we consider them, the ideas we hold about death, what defines our personal identity (what makes us, us), and what happens to that identity post-mortem can affect how we live our lives; to that end, a study of ancient discussions of death and immortality has much to offer us. As Long puts it near the end of this work, “Ancient Greek and Roman philosophy of death is about what to do as well as the removal of fear” (205, my emphasis). Long’s book is straightforwardly structured: the first part focuses on Greek conceptions of immortality; the second part covers views of death in Greek and Roman philosophy, and includes a discussion of suicide. That order (immortality, then death) is meant to help the reader recognize moments when the language of immortality is used to describe the best human lives. In the first part of the book, Long discusses a less-recognized ancient debate: what it means to be immortal. This debate becomes especially relevant when, in the more recognized philosophical theories about “immortal” (sic) gods and the cosmos, philosophers also use immortality in discussions of human beings and human ethics (in particular, the ethical side of this debate comes into play in chapter 2, where Long discusses Plato’s writings about immortality and love). [End Page 107] His discussion hinges on a particular question: how can the gods be immortal if the cosmos comes to an end? Long’s handling of the problem of comprehending how the early Stoics could understand the gods to be revered as “immortal,” given their cosmology and resulting perishability (81–83), is particularly fruitful. In the second part of the book, Long pushes against the view of ancient writing as a battleground between dogmatic Epicureans insisting that death is the end of us and equally dogmatic partisans of the soul’s immortality. When discussing the writings of Epicurus and the Epicureans (for whom the soul relies on the body in two ways: for sensation, but also for physical integrity, 116), Long notes that Philodemus not only uses death as an end of the soul’s existence and awareness to mitigate our own fears, but also differentiates between the types of fear and anxiety introduced when we think about death; Philodemus does so in order to distinguish those fears/anxieties that deserve a place in the good life, and those that derive from attitudes that should be avoided throughout life (and not just when we think about death). Long makes two noteworthy points in the second part of the book: that Stoics and other non-Epicureans make use of the so-called Symmetry argument that compares non-existence before birth and after death; and that, when philosophers use that argument, it does not follow that they are committed to the soul’s destruction at death. For their part, early Stoics do not agree on the length of existence of the soul after death (153). For example, they may suppose that annihilation is one possible outcome, or they may use the Symmetry argument in order to engage in a view of identity, similar to the argument in the [pseudo-Platonic] Axiochus. Also in this discussion is Long’s helpful treatment of Seneca regarding his insistence both on the continuation of personal identity if souls persist after death and his agnosticism about such a post-mortem existence of the soul. Long’s discussions are, to my mind, models of philosophical interpretation that consider the specific, localized logic as well as the argumentation that frames the target text; at the same time, they take into consideration the larger context, issues of authorship, and the purpose regarding an argument’s placement within a text as a whole. As he writes, “Context matters” (191), and he follows his own precept in this book. Long’s interpretive attention—which delves into portions of arguments for which conclusions are often too easily...

Sócrates y Aristóteles en el examen estoico de la incontinencia

This paper briefly explores the connections among Socratic, Aristotelian and Stoic treatment of incontinence or weakness of the will. The core of the article is focused on the Stoic reception of Socratic ethics through Aristotle's mediation. The early Stoics took into account both certain components of Socratic ethics and Aristotle's account of action. Despite their intellectualism, the Stoics elaborate an argumentative strategy to demonstrate that it is possible to maintain that an agent is both able to make correct moral judgment and admit that such an agent is capable of acting against it.