Truth of assertions in the ancient theory of action (Aristotle and early Stoics)

Abstract

The subject of this research is the ancient theory of action in its Aristotelian and early-Stoic versions. The author examines the role of the truth of assertions of an actor in these theories, as well as draws parallel with the modern approaches to the philosophy of action. It is demonstrated that Aristotelian theory leans on the prerequisite that aspirations of a person originate in the irrational parts of soul, and thus reason carries out only a regulatory function in managing human actions. Stoic theory, in turn, suggests that reason exercises an initiating function. The research methodology contains historical method of reconstruction with reference to primary sources in the Ancient Greek language. The main conclusion of the conducted research lies in determination of the two paradigmatic traditions in description of the structure of action that is of high degree of rationalization, and as a result, difference in assessment of the meaning of truth of assertions of an actor for his successful activity. The novelty consists in drawing connection between the ancient theories of action and modern approaches in this field of knowledge.