Intentionalism and Deontology in the Early Stoic Ethics

Abstract

In this paper, I demonstrate that the early Stoics adhered to a normative theory that may be called intentionalist: the moral significance of any action is not determined by its material content, but by the virtuous or vicious disposition of the agent’s soul and the intentions arising from this disposition. Since according to Stoics all people are divided into virtuous sages and vicious non-sages, all the actions of the former are morally right (κατορθώματα), whereas those of the latter are morally wrong (ἁμαρτήματα), even if they are materially identical. On the other hand, some statements in the Stoic fragments can rather be characterized as deontological: in this case, certain materially defined types of action (stealing, lying, adultery, etc.) seem to be presented as morally wrong in themselves. The paper’s central thesis is that such statements do not contradict the basic Stoic intentionalism but can be interpreted as consistent with it. Such an interpretation becomes possible under two conditions: firstly, if one takes into account how exactly the notions of κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα relate to the Stoic notions of appropriate and inappropriate action (καθῆκον and παρὰ τὸκαθῆκον), and, secondly, if one examines the Stoic position on the moral status of lying, which is very revealing in this respect.