Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and Their Relation to Ethics

Abstract

This chapter introduces the various ancient Stoic theories of freedom. It investigates how, from the early Stoics via Epictetus to the Stoics of the late second century, freedom and responsibility are connected with ethics. In this context, the most important conceptual distinction is between what depends on us (eph’hēmin) and freedom (eleutheria). In Stoic philosophy the eph’hēmin is always associated with human action and intention and is located within Stoic psychology. For every human being, there are things that depend on them. Freedom, by contrast, is a notion contrasted with slavery, originating in political theory, and from there it enters Stoic ethics. For the Stoics, freedom is a character disposition—a virtue—and can be manifested only in sages. The confusion of these two quite distinct concepts and their roles in Stoic philosophy has wreaked much havoc in twentieth-century scholarship (which the essay untangles and invalidates in the process).