Early Phenomenology Research Articles

The state of the question in early Heidegger studies

AbstractThis article surveys the state of the literature in English‐language scholarship on Heidegger's early work (1919–29). The survey falls into roughly two halves. The first is devoted to scholarship on Heidegger's intellectual development during the 1920s, focusing on four themes: Heidegger's relationship to Husserl; Heidegger's early phenomenology of religious life; Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle; and Heidegger's retrieval of Kant's First Critique. The second half focuses on work on the early Heidegger that has arisen out of the reception of his early thought into mainstream Anglophone philosophy. It examines Hubert Dreyfus's interpretation of Heidegger, the status of “das Man” and social normativity, Heidegger's concept of death, Heidegger's conception of authenticity, and truth (with a very brief overview of further topics).

I, You, and We: Beyond Individualism and Collectivism

ABSTRACT The contemporary debate on collective intentionality in analytic philosophy has lasted several decades, but questions concerning the nature of ‘we’ and the relation between the individual and the community are obviously far older. We can find a particularly rich discussion in early phenomenology. Indeed, while starting out with an interest in the individual mind, phenomenologists began their exploration of dyadic forms of interpersonal relations shortly before the start of World War I and were already deeply engaged in extensive analyses of collective forms of intentionality a few years later. A distinctive feature of the phenomenological contribution was its exploration of the relation between the first- and second-person singular and the first-person plural perspectives. How are I, you, and we intertwined? The aim of this paper is to present some core insights from this early debate.

From Tendencies and Drives to Affectivity and Ethics: Husserl and Scheler on the Mother–Child Relationship

The reassessment of intentionality as “tendency” or “drive,” already important when the intentionality at stake designates the directedness of lived experiences toward a particular object, might be even more crucial when the orientation toward others is concerned. How do drives and affects intermingle within our intersubjective life and fashion our relations to others? The present paper will address this question by focusing on a particular or even primary kind of intersubjectivity: the mother–child relationship, that received a particular, yet still insufficiently noticed attention in early phenomenology. Scheler and Husserl both analyse this relationship, indeed, in terms that imply drive intentionality as well as affective intentionality (that is, for what concerns the mother, maternal instinct and maternal love). In their view, this relation also has a crucial ethical significance, and may even be taken to be paradigmatic for ethical relationships as such. Accordingly, drive intentionality is understood as an instinctive orientation toward others, that love takes up and develops, thus providing an affective and even instinctive ground for ethical behaviour. All this imples the depart from an ethics grounded on the primacy and sufficiency of reason.

Elvesztette-e méltóságát a koncentrációs táborok muzulmánja? Giorgio Agamben méltóságról, puszta életről és immanenciáról

In our analysis we focus on the Agambenian concept of human dignity against the background of the Kantian moral tradition. Our goal is to explore the connection between dignity and biopolitics in Agamben’s thinking through his concept of bare life as an absolute immanence, in the Deleuzian sense of indeterminacy, indiscernibility, undecidabilty. As for the philosophical context we draw attention to the Sartrean conception of lived experience in The Family Idiot, in addition to the well-known Foucauldian and Deleuzian roots of Agamben’s philosophy, and the early phenomenology of consciousness in The Transcendence of the Ego (with a focus on the impersonal transcendental field and the pre-reflexive consciousness).

The (Personal) Experience of Values – Scheler and Hildebrand

Abstract There are several problems in conceiving of value experience in early phenomenology. What exactly does the experience of a value consist in? How are we to determine the morality of an action that is based on a value which is, as a reality in and of itself, imposed on us from without? How is the experience of values related to the person and in what way can an intuitive value response be reconciled with the application of acquired, personal value stances? In a joint reading of the early works of Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand, I propose a systematic solution to these various problems which revolve around the non-reflective self-awareness that a value experience entails: we cannot experience the real, material value quality without changing as persons. Rather than reflecting on an object, we experience the value as ourselves, dynamically reacting to it in the context of a given situation.

Absurdity as an inconsistently conducted reduction

The subject of the study is the connection between the absurd and phenomenology.The texts of representatives of the absurdist trend in literature and philosophy (Camus, Kafka, Musil), as well as the works of academic philosophers of the phenomenological direction (Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Fink) are considered. The commonality of phenomenological interpretations of reality for some texts of the absurdist genre is proved. As a hypothesis, the existence of an epistemological dimension of meaning in the works of the absurd is put forward, interpreted by the author as a reception of the views of phenomenologists, problematized in the inconsistent reduction of phenomena. The methodological basis was the general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, as well as the critical analysis of the text. The scientific novelty lies in the attempt to present phenomenology as a precursor of absurdism, connected with it through the sphere of axiology. The main contribution of the author is the actualization of the epistemological layer of such a multifaceted phenomenon as the absurd, namely, the elaboration of the hypothesis that in many works of absurdists, the metamorphoses of the characters' consciousness are in fact an inconsistent reduction consisting in explicit metamorphoses of the Ego, as well as violating subject-object relations but not actually bracketing the idea of the world. Many literary contemporaries of Husserl devote their thoughts to the problems of phenomenology to one degree or another, which makes the connection between absurd literature and the key theses of early phenomenology logical.

Gertrud Kuznitzky and Edith Stein on (non)conceptual experience

AbstractThis article considers a largely overlooked phenomenological account of nonconceptual experience that turns on experience having a sense that is unique to intuition, and which can be invoked to explain how we come to view what we experience in objective terms without referring to ready‐made concepts. The two early phenomenologists Edith Stein and Gertrud Kuznitzky are discussed as having elaborated two distinct, yet related, versions of this intuitive sense. My discussion identifies two common assumptions of both philosophers: firstly, the idea that the objective character of intuition hinges on the structure of apprehension, which is found by investigating the regularities of the appearance of objects; secondly, the objective character of intuition presupposes a metaphysical notion of things having a sense in themselves. Importantly, both philosophers do not take this “sense in itself” to be a direct part of the contents of experience, showing objectivity to arise out of intuition instead.

Editor’s Introduction: Rediscovering Early Phenomenological Aesthetics

ABSTRACTRecent years have witnessed a surge of interest in the early phases of the phenomenological movement. However, early phenomenological aesthetics has so far received very little attention in the current “Renaissance” of early phenomenology, albeit that the early phenomenologists made significant contributions to aesthetics and even argued for a special affinity between aesthetics and phenomenology. They also took part in the exceptionally lively debates of early 20th-century German aesthetics, which in general has remained all too underappreciated in today’s research. This special issue of the Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology aims to kindle new interest in early phenomenological aesthetics and its wider intellectual contexts. In this introductory article, I will first provide a short overview of early phenomenology and then describe the main topics, proponents, and publications of early phenomenological aesthetics, setting them in the context of early 20th-century German aesthetics.

Art, Affectivity, and Aesthetic Value: Geiger on the Role of Emotions in Aesthetic Appreciation

ABSTRACTThis paper explores Moritz Geiger’s work on the role of emotions in aesthetic appreciation and shows its potential for contemporary research. Drawing on the main tenets of Geiger’s phenomenological aesthetics as an aesthetics of value, the paper begins by elaborating his model of aesthetic appreciation. I argue that, placed in the contemporary debate, his model is close to affective models which make affective states responsible for the apprehension of the aesthetic value of an artwork, though Geiger also makes important concessions to the intellectualist. Like proponents of the affective model, Geiger argues that a work’s aesthetic values are extracted by means of an affective state, more precisely, a “liking”. However, like the intellectualist, he considers that a focus on the emotions might interfere in the aesthetic appreciation of the artwork. Next, I reconstruct Geiger’s distinction between surface and depth effects in terms of a distinction between two types of emotional responses to artworks. It is argued that Geiger offers a powerful tool to distinguish those emotions that are intrinsically related to aesthetic values from those that are not and that this distinction can be useful to understand how different kinds of emotions contribute to aesthetic appreciation. I examine the historical sources of Geiger’s distinction in Theodor Lipps’s aesthetics and compare Geiger’s account with the works of other early phenomenologists. In the final part, I illustrate the place of Geiger’s model in the contemporary discussion by means of an example.

Phenomenology as an Abortive Science of Art: Two Contexts of Early Phenomenological Aesthetics (Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft and GAChN)

ABSTRACTThis article critically examines the usual characterisation of aesthetics as a fragmented, marginal or secondary field within phenomenology. The author argues in particular that phenomenological aesthetics was consciously and systematically articulated as an explicit programme in at least two distinct contexts of early phenomenology: the international project to establish a general science of art known as the Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, and the Soviet State Academy of Art Studies (GAChN). The article explores the impact of these institutions on the development of early phenomenological aesthetics, highlighting how that development was conditional on the idea of a general science of art. It suggests, in conclusion, that these two attempts to mobilise phenomenology as a science of art, while abortive, cast important light not only on early phenomenological aesthetics, but on phenomenology’s fundamental relation with aesthetics.

“Quite Artificial, Awkward, and Unnecessarily Neologistic”: Early Phenomenology and Psychology Arguing About the Fundamentals of Aesthetics

ABSTRACTAs phenomenology rose to prominence at the beginning of the 20th century, several aestheticians tried to establish the Husserlian method of “phenomenological reduction” in the field of aesthetics. These ventures were met with resistance from psychological aesthetics, which was the predominant form of aesthetics in the German-speaking world at the time. This paper examines, first, practical attempts to apply the method of “phenomenological reduction” in aesthetics. Using Waldemar Conrad and Moritz Geiger as examples, I try to trace what aestheticians actually did when they applied this method in their investigations. Secondly, I reconstruct the four central objections with which psychological aesthetics reacted to such attempts. I have identified four central counterarguments in the work of Johannes Volkelt and Oswald Külpe, who were among the most eminent critics of phenomenological aesthetics: the transcendental argument, the susceptibility-to-errors argument, the constructivism argument, and the non-normativity argument. Finally, I also discuss the refusal of psychological aesthetics to acknowledge that a genuine phenomenological method even existed and the consequences of this refusal.

Phenomenology as Philosophy of Revelation

In this article I offer an interpretation of the fundamental problem of phenomenology in terms of a philosophy of revelation proposing in this way the renewal of the last important development of Western philosophy both in terms of its metaphysical aspiration and scientific relevance. After the general introduction, I outline the philosophical problem of revelation. I show how this philosophy influenced early phenomenology. I explain the underlying subject matter in the history of phenomenology, i.e. the notion of disclosure. I also outline what I term “apocalyptic phenomenology” in order to focus on the understanding of revelation. In this part I offer details of the notion of newness and the appropriate method applied here. Finally, I summarize the scientific relevance of my approach in the context of logic, methodology, disciplinarity with a special emphasis on the study of religion.

THE PHENOMENON OF MUSICAL IDENTIFICATION. A VIEW FROM HEIDEGGER’S EARLY PHENOMENOLOGY

The starting point of the following article are statements by various prominent musical performers of the 20th century who have testified to the life-experience of musical identification, i.e. the experience of unity and oneness with music. The purpose of the article is to explore the phenomenological implications of this experience on the basis of Martin Heidegger’s early phenomenological work. The article compares Heidegger’s early view of phenomenal givenness with that of Edmund Husserl. While Husserl sees phenomenal givenness as constituted by (transcendental) consciousness, Heidegger finds primary givenness in the resonance (Mitschwingen) between the I and its lifeworld. I argue that in Heidegger’s early phenomenology it is not the subject, but rather the relatio between I and world, which “constitutes” givenness. This viewpoint allows for the exploration of musical identification as a life-experience. Musical identification suspends the difference between subject and object. In musical identification, it is the relation between “I” and music, which is constitutive of both. Thus, music cannot be adequately grasped in phenomenological terms if it is regarded simply as an object, which is the premise of more traditional phenomenological approaches to music such as Roman Ingarden’s and Mikel Dufrenne’s. Ingarden and Dufrenne both position music at a distance from the subject, as something to be explored in its objective characteristics, without presupposing the constitutive relation between them. Contrary to them, Hans-Heinrich Eggebrecht, Günther Anders and Ilya Yonchev all recognize that the subject-object divide is insufficient for the exploration of musical experience. However, while Eggebrecht ultimately remains within the subject-object-dichotomy, Anders and Yonchev both develop the idea of musical Mitsein, or Being-with-music, which dispenses with the subject-object premise altogether and interprets musical life-experience as a mode of Being within which the sense of the I and musical sense coincide.

Theodor Lipps’ vier Arten der Nachahmung und Revision einiger prominenter Kritiken

Theodor Lipps’ doctrine of empathy (Einfühlung) is enjoying renewed relevance today for two reasons. On the one hand, it offers heuristic potential in researching the functionality of mirror neurons. On the other hand, as many of the early phenomenologists gained their conceptions of empathy by examining Lipps’ related works, the presently widespread interest in empathy necessitates a re‑reading of Lipps in phenomenological circles. The critiques that phenomenology launches against Lipps, however, often remain bound to the established cliché interpretations of Lipps. This article counters such shortsighted readings by differentiating four kinds of imitation in Lipps. The supposed persuasiveness of such critiques, as will be shown, is lost in light of this differentiation.

W. Płotka, P. Eldridge, Early phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe

W. Płotka, P. Eldridge, Early phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe

Introduction

As a descriptive philosophy, it might seem that the ethical nowhere has its place in phenomenology. And yet, phenomenology is every-where shot through with normative concerns. This section includes articles from the 2018 conference Toward a Phenomenological Ethics, where two themes emerged regarding the elusive place of the ethical in phenomenology: first, research demonstrates that early phenomenology was indeed oriented by the ethical; second, Critical Phenomenology examines ethical questions in terms of intersubjectivity and oppression. In this introduction, I suggest that the place of the ethical in phenomenology implies a certain paradoxical logic of expression, and I consider the relationship between expression and encroachment. This points to a double responsibility for the cultivation of our own virtual and the virtual that we collectively sustain. I conclude with a brief re􀏔lection on how these ideas might help us to rethink our responsibilities in the age of COVID-19.

WITOLD PŁOTKA, PATRICK ELDRIDGE (EDS.) EARLY PHENOMENOLOGY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. MAIN FIGURES, IDEAS, AND PROBLEMS. Contributions to Phenomenology. Vol. 113 Springer, 2020 ISBN 978-3-030-39622-0

The collective volume Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe: Main Figures, Ideas, and Problems, edited by Witold Płotka and Patrick Eldridge, enriches the ongoing and highly topical research of the history of phenomenology with the thematization of a specific period and localization of phenomenology. The authors of eleven chapters explore the emergence of phenomenology in local traditions outside the Germanophone area, its appropriation and development, describing the unique forms it acquired in individual environments. The book clarifies the characteristics of the early wave of phenomenology and provides a list of Central and Eastern European phenomenologists who participated in it. On the one hand, the volume is a contribution to historiography, enriching the study of the history of phenomenology thematically and thus contributing to the development of phenomenology itself; on the other hand, it introduces its own set of philosophical problems. These concern methodology and the issue of the Central and Eastern European identity, which is examined through the prism of the development of local traditions of phenomenology. When exploring the latter it is useful to introduce the concept of the marginocentric. This concept, which originated in comparative literature, facilitates an understanding of the unique cultural configuration of a concrete tradition in its communication with internal and external environments.

Edith Stein’s Example: Putting Empathy into Praxis

This article examines how Edith Stein’s philosophical theory of empathy informs not only her scholarly discourse, but also the decision to dedicate her life to others. It first explicates the primary tenets of her theory, situating them within the context of early phenomenology as inspired by Edmund Husserl’s writings. It then chronologically charts those personal events that best display her efforts to put into praxis its principles. From being a volunteer nurse aiding the wounded during World War I to comforting those being sent to the concentration camps during Hitler’s regime, she continually privileges an empathetic awareness to understand those factors affecting the other’s state of mind and instill a sense of dignity that betters his or her person. The interlacing of these experiences underpins her conversion from Judaism to Christianity as well as a deep-seated desire to forge a meaningful connection with others. A concerted attentiveness to another’s beliefs and needs, whether they are intellectual, emotional, or spiritual, depicts the kind of affection that she exemplified on a daily basis. Keywords: Edith Stein, Phenomenology, Empathy, Holocaust DOI: 10.7176/JPCR/50-05 Publication date: September 30th 2020

Phenomenology and the stratification of reality

AbstractPhenomenologists have no taste for desert landscapes. The early phenomenologists—Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Roman Ingarden—adopt stratified views of reality on which spiritual objects like artifacts and persons are distinct from their underlying matter. Call this view “pluralism.” After describing Scheler, Ingarden, and Husserl's pluralism about goods, literary artworks, and images, respectively, I reconstruct a phenomenological case for pluralism from Husserl's work and defend it against an objection. The phenomenological method reveals a special subset of objects' essential properties: modes of givenness. On Husserl's view, there are necessary correlations between types of objects and the types of intentional acts through which they are given. Spiritual objects, unlike their matter, can only be given in acts belonging to the “personalistic attitude,” which has a motivational and expressive structure. My broader claim is that Husserl's phenomenology is a sophisticated metametaphysical view about the methodology of first‐order metaphysical inquiry.

A MODERNIST MYSTIC: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSENCE AND POETIC METHOD IN GERDA WALTHER (1897–1977)*

AbstractThis article presents the work of the neglected philosopher and mystic Gerda Walther (1897–1977) as a work of modernist philosophy. It offers an analysis of Walther's two most important texts, Ein Beitrag zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften (1922) and Zur Phänomenologie der Mystik (1923), written during Walther's involvement in the Freiburg and Munich circles of early phenomenologists. Analysis of these texts reveals a compelling, non‐discursive philosophical methodology in which mystical essences unfold as social and historical realities, rather than some ideal standing behind or beyond materiality. Walther offers a pragmatic and poetic vision of language that is inadequate in a representational sense, yet still capable of guiding us to philosophical redemption. In quoting the poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke, she displays a complex interrelation between poetic and philosophical language in her work. This article argues for a significant re‐orientation of emerging scholarship on Walther, with a focus on her language and textual strategies. It positions her work in terms of recent developments in scholarship around the connections between phenomenology and modernist literature.