Abstract
Abstract There are several problems in conceiving of value experience in early phenomenology. What exactly does the experience of a value consist in? How are we to determine the morality of an action that is based on a value which is, as a reality in and of itself, imposed on us from without? How is the experience of values related to the person and in what way can an intuitive value response be reconciled with the application of acquired, personal value stances? In a joint reading of the early works of Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand, I propose a systematic solution to these various problems which revolve around the non-reflective self-awareness that a value experience entails: we cannot experience the real, material value quality without changing as persons. Rather than reflecting on an object, we experience the value as ourselves, dynamically reacting to it in the context of a given situation.
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