Early Modern Philosophy Research Articles

Absolute Time: Rifts in Early Modern British Metaphysics by Emily Thomas

Reviewed by: Absolute Time: Rifts in Early Modern British Metaphysics by Emily Thomas Edward Slowik Emily Thomas. Absolute Time: Rifts in Early Modern British Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xiv + 236. Cloth, $60.00. Emily Thomas’s book explores conceptions of space and time among various British early modern philosophers, with special emphasis placed on More, Barrow, Newton, Locke, and Clarke. One of the work’s strengths is its treatment of a number of neglected thinkers, such as John Jackson and Edmund Law, in addition to Clarke. Despite its title, the book treats issues in the metaphysics of space as much as it does time, and Thomas provides an engaging tour of a host of current debates in these fields. On the whole, Thomas’s book contains a number of productive discussions, and it could prove a catalyst for further investigations into early modern spatiotemporal metaphysics. Unfortunately, the book also advances many questionable interpretations of the historical texts, as well as a critical misapplication of the absolute/relational distinction, and these problems undermine many of the author’s principal arguments and conclusions. Only a brief analysis can be provided, however, and thus the following discussion will be limited to several of her key interpretations of spatial ontology. [End Page 557] Following Jasper Reid and Robert Pasnau, Thomas argues that Newton and Clarke accepted holenmerism, the (textually unsupported) view that God’s presence in space is “whole in every part” but not actually extended. Thomas’s own contribution strives to defend holenmerism in the context of Newton’s hypothesis (in De gravitatione) where bodies are envisioned as movable properties in God’s extension (which thus implies that bodily and God’s extension are identical, contra holenmerism). Thomas responds that “the structure of space depends on the bodies that can be created in it” (124), but there is no textual support given for this contention. Moreover, Newton specifically argues that bodily shapes are “not a new production of that figure with respect to space, but only a corporeal representation of it” (Philosophical Writings, Cambridge: 2004, 22), so bodies do not change space’s structure. More problematic is Thomas’s interpretation of Barrow and Locke, whom she classifies as modal relationists, the anti-absolutist view that space is merely the relation among bodies and possible bodies. Thomas references Gordon Belot’s work on modal relationism in her analysis (86, 125), but Belot is clear that modal relationism cannot admit the possibility of the world’s unison motion, since that scenario supports absolutism (Geometric Possibility, Oxford: 2011, 166). Barrow and Locke admit that possibility, however, with Locke concluding that if one can “frame in his mind, clearly and distinctly, the place of the universe, he will be able to tell us whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable inane of infinite space” (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II.xiii.10), and Barrow admits the same (Usefulness of Mathematical Learning, 1734, 172)—which Thomas acknowledges (87). Thomas claims the absolutist option is not endorsed in II.xiii.10 (146), but that misreads Locke’s discussion, and it also misses the point: a uniform motion of the universe is an impossible scenario under modal relationism, but Locke allows that possibility, although he admits that this possible motion is indeterminable given his brand of empiricism. The conflation of modal relationism and absolutism is also evident in her claim that Barrow’s account of time, which is normally interpreted as absolutist, does not require actual bodies (89). Indeed, given Thomas’s own classification, Barrow and Locke fit her “weak absolutism” category, the view that space depends on God but is independent of body (10). Locke contrasts a relationist interpretation of space with his God-based alternatives (Essay, II.xiii.27), and he openly endorses the latter: for instance, he states that we cannot understand “the boundless invariable oceans of duration and expansion, which comprehend in them all finite beings, and in their full extent belong only to the Deity” (II.xv.8)—crucially, Thomas never mentions this passage. Barrow, too, links space directly to God: “God can create other Worlds beyond this, . . . there will therefore be given some Space wherein they may be placed and...

Порівняльний аналіз вчень Теофана Прокоповича й Ґеорґія Кониського про душу

The article compares selected chapters devoted the problems of mind (anima) from two philosophical courses by Georgii Konyskyi, taught at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in 1747-1749 and 1749-1751 academic years. As Konyskyi taught his first course using verbatim Teofan Prokopovych’s philosophical course of 1706-08 academic years, the article compares the doctrines on mind by these two Mohylian authors. It also shows the evolution of Konyskyi’s views. There are common elements between the philosophy of mind of Prokopovych and Konyskyi: their interpretations of Aristotle’s definition of the soul; the scholastic concept of the man as an integral mind-body entity; the problem of the unity and multiplicity of forms. It is shown that Prokopovych and Konsyskyi understood the three-level structure of a human soul in the same way as Francisco Suarez and Rodrigo de Arriaga. However, there are some differences between these two Mohylian professors. They interpreted differently sensitive and intellectual cognition. Prokopovych upholds the scholastic doctrine of species. Konyskyi, in his second course, abandons this doctrine and defends the doctrine of impressiones. They are developed by the phantasmata – not received from objects. The impressions are modifications of animal spirits by direct or indirect impact of objects on senses of a human being or any other animated being. In the doctrine on intellectual powers, Prokopovych upholds the scholastic distinction between active and passive intellect. Konyskyirejects this common for scholastic tradition distinction and considers that passive intellect can do full-scale intellectual activity. The influence of Early Modern philosophy, especially Cartesianism, was the reason why Konyskyi changed his position.

Thomas White on the Metaphysics of Transubstantiation

AbstractThis article explores a previously neglected manuscript essay in which Thomas White offers an account of the metaphysics underpinning transubstantiation. White’s views are of particular interest because his explanation employs a broadly mechanist framework, rather than the hylomorphism traditionally associated with Roman Catholic discussions of the Eucharist. The manuscript helps to shed light on a number of topics of importance to early modern philosophy including the reception of Descartes’s views, the relationship between theology and natural philosophy, and mechanist accounts of identity and individuation.

David Hume y la distinción entre filosofía especulativa y experimental

Frente a los reiterados cuestionamientos a la distinción entre empirismo y racionalismo para pensar la filosofía en el período moderno, han surgido nuevas distinciones como la de filosofía especulativa/experimental, que se proponen como más adecuadas para reflejar el quehacer de los filósofos de la Modernidad. Nos proponemos evaluar la validez de esta distinción respecto de la filosofía moral experimental del siglo XVIII y puntualmente de la propuesta de Hume. Mostraremos que si la distinción se entiende en términos excluyentes, resulta inapropiada porque el mismo Hume plantea que la especulación es aquello que define a la filosofía. Propone, además, una conciliación entre la práctica de la experimentación y la teorización antes que considerarlas como excluyentes. Finalmente, dejaremos en claro que aquello que condena como “falsa filosofía” no puede entenderse como sinónimo de filosofía especulativa

How contempt became a passion

ABSTRACTPhilosophers and psychologists have come to recognize contempt as a crucial concept for understanding moral and social life. Yet its conceptual history remains understudied. I argue that contempt underwent an important conceptual shift at the end of the 1640s with the publication of René Descartes’ Passions de l’âme. Prior to Descartes, early modern philosophers excluded contempt from their taxonomies of the passions, treating it instead as a form of indifference. To have contempt for something (death, illness, wealth) was to be free of passion in the face of it. Following Descartes’ intervention, however, philosophers increasingly included contempt among the passions, those unruly perturbations of the mind that could have benign or dangerous effects depending on how they were moderated. This was a change that harboured practical as well as philosophical implications. For what had once been an emblem of self-mastery was now itself a passion in need of regulation. The contempt displayed by aristocrats, in particular, now signified a dangerous lack of self-control rather than a cool display of superiority. I conclude by drawing out the affinities between this mid-seventeenth-century reconceptualization of contempt as a passion and the current attempt by philosophers to redeem contempt as a morally justifiable attitude.

Women and early modern Philosophy and Science

Women and early modern Philosophy and Science

Allegory and Religious Pluralism: Biblical Interpretation in the Eighteenth Century

AbstractThe Christian discourse of the literal and spiritual senses in the Bible was, in the long eighteenth century, no less tied to perceptions of Jewish interpretive abilities than it had been previously. However, rather than linking Jews with literalism, in many cases the early modern version of this discourse associated Jews with allegory. By touching upon three moments in the reception history of the Bible in the eighteenth century, this article exhibits the entanglement of religious identity and biblical allegory characteristic of this context. The English Newtonian, William Whiston, fervently resisted allegorical interpretations of the Bible in favor of scientific and literal explanations, and blamed Jewish manuscript corruption for any confusion of meaning. Johan Kemper was a convert whose recruitment to Uppsala University reveals an appetite on the part of university and governmental authorities for rabbinic and kabbalistic interpretive methods and their application to Christian texts. Finally, the German Jewish intellectual Moses Mendelssohn responded to challenges facing the Jewish community by combining traditional rabbinic approaches and early modern philosophy in defense of a multivocal reading of biblical texts. Furthermore, Mendelssohn’s insistence on the particularity of biblical symbols, that they are not universally accessible, informed his vision for religious pluralism. Each of these figures illuminates not only the thorny plight of biblical allegory in modernity, but also the ever-present barriers and passageways between Judaism and Christianity as they manifested during the European Enlightenment.

Three Infinities in Early Modern Philosophy

AbstractMany historical and philosophical studies treat infinity as an exclusively quantitative notion, whose proper domain of application is mathematics and physics. The main aim of this paper is to disentangle, by critically examining, three notions of infinity in the early modern period, and to argue that one—but only one—of them is quantitative. One of these non-quantitative notions concerns being or reality, while the other concerns a particular iterative property of an aggregate. These three notions will emerge through examination of three central figures in the period: Locke (for quantitative infinity), Descartes (ontic infinity), and Leibniz (iterative infinity).

The Cartesian Theory of Emotions and Early Modern Philosophy

In this paper, I am going to present the Cartesian theory of emotions. The founder of modernity initiated deep changes in the way we understand emotions: their origin and effect on the human being. It is his doctrine of emotions that provided the basis for most discussions on issues concerning emotions in the 17 th and 18 th centuries and becamea reference point for most theories of emotion created in modern times. I attempt, in particular, to make two claims. First, I argue that Descartes’ position on the nature of the emotions is best interpreted as something between the physiological theory and the cognitive theory of emotions. Second, I argue that to understand Descartes’ account of the genesis of emotions or passions we have to take into consideration four factors: a) physiological changes, e) evaluation of the object, c) behaviour response or action readiness, d) manifestation especially in our facial expression. All those factors are part and parcel of origin of each emotion.

Evolutionary models and the normative significance of stability

Many have expected that understanding the evolution of norms should, in some way, bear on our first-order normative outlook: How norms evolve should shape which norms we accept. But recent philosophy has not done much to shore up this expectation. Most existing discussions of evolution and norms either jump headlong into the is/ought gap or else target meta-ethical issues, such as the objectivity of norms. My aim in this paper is to sketch a different way in which evolutionary considerations can feed into normative thinking—focusing on stability. I will discuss two (related) forms of argument that utilize information about social stability drawn from evolutionary models, and employs it to assess claims in political philosophy. One such argument treats stability as feature of social states that may be taken into account alongside other features. The other uses stability as a constraint on the realization of social ideals, via a version of the ought-implies-can maxim. These forms of argument are not new; indeed they have a history going back at least to early modern philosophy. But their marriage with evolutionary information is relatively recent, has a significantly novel character, and has received little attention in recent moral and political philosophy.

Catholicity Without Leviathan: Stanley Hauerwas's Perspective on the Church as an Alternative Political Community

AbstractThe article brings into focus a series of political arguments of Stanley Hauerwas's “theological politics” and argues that these arguments are in stark contrast with the theoretical perspective of a political rule by a god-like Leviathan, an image inherited in modern and contemporary political culture from the early modern English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. The first section focuses on Hauerwas's arguments regarding the political potential of the term “Catholicity” to represent an alternative to the coercive politics reinforced by the post-Enlightenment nation state. The second section proposes a reflection on the way the Church's Catholicity may be expressed politically without falling into the temptation of involving the Leviathan to sort out the issues generated by its diversity. The concluding section illustrates how Hauerwas uses his approach of a universal unity of Christians “without Leviathan” in his exhortation addressed to American Christians to say “no” to Donald Trump's version of communal unity that is rather based on “total allegiance” to the United States and on “repressive politics”.

La agenda naturalista de las pasiones en la filosofía de la modernidad temprana

En este artículo trataremos de caracterizar las principales razones teóricas del cambio de perspectiva del escolasticismo a la filosofía de la modernidad temprana en lo concerniente al estudio de las facultades cognitivas y emotivas. Para lograr nuestro objetivo, sintetizaremos el contexto intelectual del estudio de las pasiones; después, distinguiremos dos grandes corrientes del pensamiento naturalista: en primer lugar, la tesis reduccionista que fue adoptada, entre otros, por Thomas Hobbes, Pierre Gassendi y René Descartes; en segundo lugar, el proyecto de establecer y describir la “dinámica de la vida mental” que fue desarrollado por Thomas Hobbes, John Locke y David Hume. Al dar cuenta de esto, esperamos también obtener una comprensión más clara sobre los cambios de perspectiva que fueron propuestos por algunos filósofos de la modernidad temprana, cuyas ideas avanzaron hacia la naturalización de la antropología filosófica.

The uses and abuses of mathematics in early modern philosophy: introduction

The uses and abuses of mathematics in early modern philosophy: introduction

Foreword

The aim of this volume is not to offer a comprehensive overview of the multifarious aspects of fiction and its implications for early modern philosophy, but to be an invitation, from the standpoint of the history of philosophy, to survey some of the fundamental problems of the field, using six case-studies written by some of the finest international scholars in their respective areas of Renaissance studies. Although perhaps not evident at a first reading, these six studies are linked by common concerns such as the theoretical relationship between (literary) history, rhetoric, poetics, and philosophy; the tensions between res, verba, and imago; and the concept of enargeia. They have been arranged according to the chronology of the corpus each one considers.

From matters of faith to matters of fact: the problem of priestcraft in early modern England

ABSTRACTThis article details philosophical responses to the problem posed by the existence, whether real or perceived, of priestcraft, a problem that boiled down to a fear that if the custodians of God’s tabernacle were corrupt, so too were the contents of the tabernacle. It first explores the attempts of Edward Herbert and Thomas Hobbes to guarantee the truth of revealed matters of faith in response to their perception of widespread priestcraft, arguing that, while each sought to undermine sacerdotal authority, they ultimately exempted matters of faith from the litmus test of reason. This resulted in a less-than-satisfactory solution to the problem. It turns next to Locke’s Essay (1690) and The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), exploring how empirical notions of evidence, fact, and probability, as framed in these works, enabled a radical re-evaluation of the grounds of Christian faith, which subsequently influenced the writings of John Toland, Anthony Collins, and Peter Annet between the 1690s and 1740s. These “Lockean free-thinkers,” it argues, were in fact closer to the position of the Essay and Reasonableness than to the deism of Edward Herbert in their efforts to tackle priestcraft. Concluding, this article proposes that the problem of priestcraft served as a catalyst for early modern British philosophers to increasingly narrow the grounds of faith, until faith was deemed legitimate only when grounded upon fact.

The reception of classical Latin literature in early modern philosophy: the case of Ovid and Spinoza

Abstract: Although the works of the authors of the Golden Age of Latin Literature play an important formative role for Early Modern philosophers, their influence in Early Modern thought is, nowadays, rarely studied. Trying to bring this topic to light once again and following the seminal works of Kajanto (1979), Proietti (1985) and Akkerman (1985), I will target Spinoza’s Latin sources in order to analyze their place in his philosophy. On those grounds, I will offer an overview of the problems of the reception of classical literature in Early Modernity and then dwell on the particular case of Ovid and Spinoza. The present paper will argue that although Spinoza’s references to Ovid fill a rhetorical purpose as suggested by the existing literature, these mentions have a prior philosophical motivation. That is, the references in the Ethics are not merely illustrative; instead, they indicate that Spinoza acknowledges Ovid’s beliefs about human experiences and deliberately elaborates on Ovid’s view to construct and defend his own theses. To this end, the paper will analyze some citations mapped by Proietti (1985) and add a new one in an attempt to enlarge the list of places and topics that merit further investigation. To conclude, I will point out how the references to Ovid are part of Spinoza’s own defense of the powers of imagination.

Human & Animal Cognition in Early Modern Philosophy & Medicine ed. by Stefanie Buchenau and Roberto Lo Presti

Human & Animal Cognition in Early Modern Philosophy & Medicine ed. by Stefanie Buchenau and Roberto Lo Presti

Towards Conceptualization of Morality in the Early Modern Philosophy

Towards Conceptualization of Morality in the Early Modern Philosophy

Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy ed. by Gyula Klima, and: Bero Magni de Ludosia, Questions on the Soul. A Medieval Swedish Philosopher on Life by Robert Andrews

Reviewed by: Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy ed. by Gyula Klima, and: Bero Magni de Ludosia, Questions on the Soul. A Medieval Swedish Philosopher on Life by Robert Andrews Oleg Bychkov (bio) Gyula Klima, ed., Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy. New York: Fordham University Press, 2015. Pp 359, $45. Robert Andrews, Bero Magni de Ludosia, Questions on the Soul. A Medieval Swedish Philosopher on Life. Stockholm: Sällskapet Runica et Mediaevalia, Stockholm University, 2016. Pp 397, 200 Swedish Krona Intentionality, mental representation, sensory perception and its reliability, sensory illusions, and the concomitant issue of epistemological skepticism are becoming an important cluster of related topics in research on medieval cognitive psychology. It is no wonder, because these topics are much more relevant to present-day discussions of cognition and sensory perception, as many of these issues remain unexplained to this date, and therefore any observations in these areas could still be of interest, while many other topics traditionally discussed in studies on medieval philosophy have only historical value and gradually fade into oblivion. Although the two publications included in this review are not exclusively, or not at all on Franciscan sources, both make important contributions to the discussion of a cluster of topics around the issue of intentionality, which was at the center of heated debates in Franciscan theological circles in the 1300's. The review will focus on sections dedicated to Franciscan authors, as well as on topics that are most pertinent to concerns of Franciscan authors in these areas. Gyula Klima, ed., Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy Among contributors to this collection of essays are many well known scholars. In addition to Klima's opening and closing general essays on the topic, essays are either on specific issues in medieval thought across several authors or periods (such as "concepts and meaning"; "singular thought"; "mental language"; "mental representation in animals and humans"; or "intersubjective sameness of mental concepts") or are dedicated to specific thinkers, from 1200's to the late Middle Ages: Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Buridan, and a high [End Page 359] number of Franciscan thinkers (John Duns Scotus, Peter Aureol, Walter Chatton, William Ockham, and Adam Wodeham). In the introduction, Klima reminds the reader that intentionality is "one of the few medieval philosophical contributions preserved in modern philosophical thought." Even though this opinion, he notes, may not be entirely accurate, still an examination of these medieval debates can "shed new light" on relationships between medieval and modern thought and on some "fundamental questions" in the contemporary philosophy of mind (1). Klima's verdict, after having summarized individual contributions, is that "the new conceptions of concepts emerging with the via moderna open up the late medieval possibility of 'Demon-skepticism,' paving the way to the epistemological predicaments of early modern philosophy, still affecting many contemporary approaches in the field." This is the primary reason why essays in this volume "are not only contributions to our better understanding of history, but also… of our contemporary problems in the field" (8). One must definitely agree with this assessment. A contrast between Aquinas and Duns Scotus is a common starting point in many accounts of medieval thought. In Giorgio Pini's "Two Models of Thinking: Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on Occur-rent Thoughts" the topic of intentionality is included as one of the questions (no. 3) as he examines the two models of occurrent thoughts: "what accounts for an act of thinking being about something?" (81). Aquinas's position is that acts of thinking are actions, while for Scotus they are mental qualities. Aquinas's model is too much of a stretch: e.g., he creates an "intermediate" state for an intelligible species in the intellect between active and potential states. Ultimately he ends up with a highly problematic position that acts of thinking cannot be about extramental objects, i.e., cannot be directly intentional, for they only involve intellectual species internal to the mind. While many critics of Aquinas did not object to viewing acts of thinking as actions (94), Scotus in his works (including the Reportatio I-A) develops an entirely new, sophisticated position on...

The Problem of Universals in Early Modern Philosophy ed. by Stefano Di Bella and Tad M. Schmaltz

The Problem of Universals in Early Modern Philosophy ed. by Stefano Di Bella and Tad M. Schmaltz