Early Foreign Policy Research Articles

Introduction: Resistance and Survival – The Nuclear Era in the Pacific

ABSTRACT For many decades, historians, researchers, and participants have documented the history of the nuclear era in the Pacific Islands. They have highlighted the legacy of health and environmental impacts of 50 years of nuclear testing by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France between 1946 and 1996. Most official histories of Pacific nuclear testing present extensive technical detail of the development of nuclear weapons, evidence of inter-departmental rivalries, and vivid portraits of the scientists who built the Bomb. This state-sponsored literature, however, makes limited reference to the lived experience of the civilian and military personnel who staffed the test sites, or the Indigenous peoples whose land and waters were used for the testing programmes in Oceania. Despite a growing international literature on the health and environmental impacts of nuclear testing, the history of Pacific Islander resistance to the nuclear testing programmes is more fragmentary. In response, the authors in this special issue have foregrounded the agency of Indigenous activists, rather than the Western allies who campaigned alongside the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) movement. Their contributions add to a growing body of personal testimony by Indigenous nuclear survivors and resisters from around Oceania. This special issue includes a 1954 petition from Marshall Islanders to the UN Trusteeship Council, an example of the protests by Islanders that began in the 1950s, pre-dating the rise of the wider NFIP movement in the 1970s. Other articles highlight Fiji’s early foreign policy and the importance of the debate over nuclear testing in the formation of the South Pacific Forum; the importance of culture in Pacific anti-nuclear activism, through song, poetry, graphic design, and community theatre; the role of the regional NFIP movement in linking local struggles to the wider regional context, through pan-Pacific, Indigenous-led activism around self-determination; and connections between the NFIP movement and solidarity movements in the Global North.

President Barack Obama’s Policy Choices in NATO Rhetoric

This article uses Michael C. McGee’s concept of the ideograph to reflect Obama’s early foreign policy course regarding transatlantic relations. Specifically, the article draws on the ideograph “alliance” to demonstrate how the president redefined agents, acts, agencies, scenes, and purposes that fall within the rhetoric, thus informing how and why he changed US commitment to NATO. Analyzing Obama’s use of alliance serves to interpret his political choices as well as understand his ability to get the public to support them. By extension, a study of this nature offers a reading of the president’s perspective on US foreign policy and America’s global role.

전쟁의 파장, 정유재란과 동아시아 : 에도막부의 초기 대외정책을 중심으로

전쟁의 파장, 정유재란과 동아시아 : 에도막부의 초기 대외정책을 중심으로

Enlarging Yugoslavia: Tito's Quest for Expansion, 1945–1948

When Yugoslav strongman Josip Broz Tito secured power at the end of the Second World War, he had envisioned for himself a new Yugoslavia that would serve as the center of power for the Balkan Peninsula. First, he worked to ensure a Yugoslav presence in the Trieste region of Italy and southern Austria as a way to gain territory inhabited by Slovenes and Croats; meanwhile, his other foreign policy escapades sought to make Yugoslavia into a major European power. To that end, Yugoslav agents quickly worked to synchronize the Albanian socio-economic and political systems through their support of Albanian Partisans and only grew emboldened over time. As allies who proved themselves in the fight against fascism, Yugoslav policymakers felt able to act with impunity throughout the early post-Cold War period. The goal of this article is to highlight this early foreign policy by focusing on three case studies – Trieste, Carinthia, and Albania – as part of an effort to reinforce the established argument over Tito's quest for power in the early Cold War period.

Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, decolonization, and the Third World Order by Jeffrey James Byrne

Reviewed by: Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, decolonization, and the Third World Order by Jeffrey James Byrne Carolyn Barnett Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, decolonization, and the Third World Order By Jeffrey James Byrne. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. When it gained independence from France in 1962, Algeria immediately faced a mass exodus of the pieds noirs, the European inhabitants of French Algeria. Soon afterward, it encountered an influx of outsiders referred to as pieds rouges ("red feet"), a hodge-podge of leftists, revolutionaries and other idealists from around the globe attracted to the "Mecca of Revolution," Algiers, a city full of radical possibilities. In Mecca of Revolution, Jeffrey James Byrne traces the emergence and evolution of Algerian nationalists' connection to broader Third World and revolutionary currents and how Algeria shaped the evolution of the international system from the early twentieth century to the mid-1960s. The book is organized into five chapters which proceed in roughly chronological order. "Method Men," encompassing the emergence of the nationalist movement to the mid-point of the war, emphasizes the Algerians' greater focus on the praxis of revolution than on ideology and their early links with the international community. "Our Friends Today" discusses how, largely due to the collapse of the insurgency inside Algeria, the FLN embraced aggressive diplomacy in the West and East and began building deeper links with Cuba and with African independence movements, reflecting an embrace of the transformative power of Third Worldism as a concept. "Real Existing Third Worldism" explores the ambiguities and tensions that arose domestically as Ben Bella sought to implement a "specifically Algerian" brand of socialism and to play various foreign benefactors against one another so that Algeria would not become beholden to any particular outside patron. This course of action began to stir domestic opposition from those who resented the increasingly global and cosmopolitan orientation of the leadership in Algiers. "The Allure of Globalism" argues that independent Algeria's early foreign policy demonstrated that "Third Worldist ideals could indeed provide the basis for a practical and consistent foreign policy" (223). The final chapter, "Mecca of Impatience and Anxiety," argues that former Algerian President Houari Boumedienne—who overthrew Ben Bella—and his "political clan" took advantage of growing tensions between the project of building a nation-state and Ben Bella's aggressive pursuit of an activist version of nonalignment to bring down the leader they saw as a threat to collective decision-making. Several themes run through Byrne's work. First, he argues that Algeria's actions and those of other Third World powers demonstrate that the increasing globalization of politics reinforced the primacy of the nation-state as the organizing unit of the international system. In order to act effectively within the international system, Byrne argues, Algerian and other postcolonial (or aspiring postcolonial) leaders had to strengthen their claims to national sovereignty. Second, Byrne shows how the composition of the "Third World" ideology and community were the subject of significant contestation. In particular, by 1965, actors were divided as to whether the Third World was to be defined "programmatically," as "a movement with an agenda that was open to any who shared its political and economic goals," or as "the expression of an innate identity… limited to non-Western regions or races" (282). Algeria's leaders were partial to programmatic definitions, which suited their interests and reflected their convictions. Third, Byrne underscores that a balance of pragmatic and principled motives drove Algerian foreign policy decision-making. Algeria sought to protect its territory from the ambitions of Moroccan and Tunisian leaders, and it saw little hope of steering the course of events in the Arab east, where revolutionary regimes under Nasser in Egypt and the Ba'ath Party in Syria and Iraq were already pursuing competing visions of Arab nationalism. In Africa, by contrast, Algeria proved itself a leader of anticolonial activism and postcolonial political organization, although its selective provision of arms and training to insurgent movements across the continent contributed, in time, to increasing polarization. Relations with Cuba and Yugoslavia were strong largely because of ideological affinities, but the former had also to be contained so as not to threaten Algeria's precarious relationship with the...

Après moi le déluge

After the 1992 election, President George H.W. Bush gave the new presidentelect, Bill Clinton, a surprise gift - significant participation in the United Nations intervention in Somalia. This decision haunted the Clinton administration, producing an early foreign policy catastrophe in October 1993 with the downing of American helicopters and the resulting battle of Mogadishu. These events constrained Clinton's foreign policies towards Rwanda and Bosnia and shaped perceptions of American resolve, including in the eyes of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.1President Barack Obama understands what he is getting himself into better than Clinton did, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been a central part ofthe 2008 campaign rather than a footnote. Still, while he has entered the oval office with his eyes wide open, Obama faces far greater challenges because ofthe commitments and mistakes made by President George W. Bush and his administration. At the moment, it appears that events on the ground in Iraq and Obama's promises are converging towards a reduced American presence. However, as I suggest below, this may be a fragile reed upon which to lean the future of American foreign policy. Afghanistan, as all are recognizing lately, is in trouble. Obama has promised to take advantage ofthe reductions ofthe US effort in Iraq to shift attention and resources to the US and NATO effort in Afghanistan. The other potential and ongoing interventions in the world were largely absent from the campaign, as Iraq and Afghanistan crowded out Kosovo, Darfur, and other hotspots. Indeed, the limited attention span of American leaders and media has important implications for Canada, as we shall see below.In this article, I first briefly discuss the legacy that Obama is inheriting, particularly the decisions made by Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and other key actors that will limit his options. Next, I review a variety of constraints that limit the power of any president but will be particularly challenging for the next one. I then address the promises made by Obama as he ran for president, considering which changes are most realistic both in terms of being implemented and being successful. I conclude by considering how this change in administrations in the US will affect Canada's own effort in Afghanistan and potential interventions in the future.NO BIGGER MESSIt is hard to imagine a president leaving office with a worse situation than George W Bush. The United States is not only engaged in two difficult wars and a deep economic crisis, but it has to deal with a key ally that is not only a nuclear weapons state but a failing one - Pakistan. The focus here will be on the two ongoing wars, although I will briefly consider Pakistan, Kosovo, and Darfur, as they are on the back burner of American foreign policy.Barack Obama frequently asserted during the campaign that the US dropped the ball in Afghanistan after it became distracted with Iraq. This is perhaps understating the mistakes made by the US in Afghanistan. While distraction was clearly part ofthe problem, as resources and attention became focused on Iraq, it was more than that. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was opposed to any kind of nation-building effort. He said that the US did not need to build a stable Afghanistan, but would merely have to return every once in a while to disrupt any buildup of terrorist infrastructure. While this might have been hyperbole, Rumsfeld actively opposed efforts in Afghanistan beyond counterinsurgency. When the US commander of operation Enduring Freedom, Lt. General B arno, began to engage in a counterinsurgency campaign, which involved more than hunting down al Qaeda, Rumsfeld reengaged and subjected B arno to strict oversight to make sure he did not overstep his bounds.2 As a result, the development of Afghan capacity was delayed. Only in 2005-06 did NATO spread out throughout the country to begin to assist the development of Afghan governance. …

Toussaint's Clause: The Founding Fathers and the Haitian Revolution

In its formative years, America, birthplace of a revolution, wrestled with a volatile dilemma. John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and many other founding fathers clashed. What was to be the new republic's strategy toward a revolution roiling just off its shores? From 1790 to 1810, the disagreement reverberated far beyond Caribbean waters and American coastal ports. War between France and Britain, the great powers of the time, raged on the seas and in Europe. America watched aghast as its trading partner Haiti, a rich hothouse of sugar plantations and French colonial profit, exploded in a rebellion led by former slave Toussaint L'Ouverture. Toussaint's Clause: The Founding Fathers and the Haitian Revolution narrates the intricate history of one of America's early foreign policy balancing acts and one of the nation's defining moments. The supporters of Toussaint's rebellion against France at first engineered a bold policy of intervention in favor of the rebels. But Southern slaveholders, such as Jefferson, eyed the slave-general's rise and masterful leadership skills with extreme alarm and eventually obtained a reversal of the policy-even while taking advantage of the rebellion to make the fateful Louisiana purchase. Far from petty, the internal squabbles among America's founders resolved themselves in delicate maneuvers in foreign capitals and on the island. The stakes were mortally high-a misstep could have plunged the new, weak, and neutral republic into the great powers' global war. In Toussaint's Clause, former diplomat and ambassador Gordon S. Brown details the founding fathers' crisis over Haiti and their rancorous struggle, which very often cut to the core of what America meant by revolution and liberty. During a thirty-five-year Foreign Service career, Gordon S. Brown served mainly in the Middle East and North Africa including assignments as General Norman Schwarzkopf's political advisor in the first Gulf War and ambassador to Mauritania. Since his retirement, he has written Coalition, Coercion, and Compromise on the diplomacy of the first Gulf War and The Norman Conquest of Southern Italy and Sicily.

African Foreign Policies

* The Changing Context of African Foreign Policies Stephen Wright. * Angola: The Foreign Policy of a Decaying State Assis Malaquias. * The Flea on Nigerias Back: The Foreign Policy of Benin John R. Heilbrunn. * Exceptionality in External Affairs: Botswana in the African and Global Arenas James Zaffiro. * The Foreign Policies of Ethiopia and Eritrea Christopher Clapham. * Kenyan Foreign Policy Jona Rono. * Nigeria: Aspirations of Regional Power Stephen Wright and Julius Emeka Okolo. * Senegals Foreign Policy: Responding to Internal and International Pressures for Change Peter J. Schraeder. * The Early Foreign Policy of the Democratic South Africa Paul-Henri Bischoff and Roger Southall. * The Foreign Policy of Tanzania: From Cold War to PostCold War Maria Nzomo. * Zimbabwes Foreign Policy Solomon N. Nkiwane. * Regionalism and African Foreign Policies Olufemi A. Babarinde. * Conclusion: African Foreign Policies and the Next Millennium: Alternative Perspectives, Practices, and Possibilities Timothy M. Shaw and Julius E. Nyangoro.

Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search for National Identity

The geographic and historic setting Egypt responds to the West - Pan-Islam, Egyptian nationalism and Arabism Nasser and the rise of Arab nationalism in Egypt Sadat and his early foreign policy the October War and its aftermath oil diplomacy and Arab reconciliation eight players in search of a peace conference - the Geneva preparations of 1977 the road to Jerusalem Camp David and its consequences the making of a new Arab coalition foreign policy and the search for national identity Arab politics and the peace process.

Constantin von Neurath and German Policy at the London Economic Conference of 1933: Backgrounds to the Resignation of Alfred Hugenberg

Within five months after taking office, Hitler's government was confronted with three important developments in foreign policy: the Mussolini Pact (which, hopefully, might lead to the speedy conclusion of a disarmament agreement and an increased tempo in the campaign for the revision of the Versailles Treaty); the Vatican Concordat; and the World Economic Conference of June 1933. Both the Mussolini Pact and the Vatican Concordat have recently been studied in some detail. The World Economic Conference, on the other hand, has been largely ignored. Yet, analysis of German participation in the conference illuminates several puzzling questions concerning the early foreign policy of the Third Reich. Clashes within the German government over policy-making for this conference, both before and during the London meetings, contributed materially to Hitler's subsequent triumph over the conservative cabinet ministers, who, ideally, should have been able to restrain the National Socialists. A study of German participation in the conference provides the opportunity to examine two important questions: To what extent did the German Foreign Office, during Hitler's first months in office, shape and control Germany's foreign policy? And second, by what means did Hitler succeed in overcoming the conservative cabinet majority?