Author's Response:The Asia-Pacific Kaleidoscope Continues to Shift T.J. Pempel (bio) I want to express my sincere thanks to Asia Policy for providing the venue for this collective assessment of A Region of Regimes: Prosperity and Plunder in the Asia-Pacific. I am especially indebted to the five reviewers for their thoughtful reflections on the book. Nothing is more rewarding to an author who has finished a major book project than to have respected colleagues engage in a thoughtful and appreciative critique of its core arguments. Beyond the usual highlighting of the book's merits and flaws, each reviewer draws attention to different facets of its key contentions. Most go on to suggest valuable extensions of its logic, plus ways in which it points to new research targets and future real-world problems. Although it is tempting to underscore the reviewers' favorable comments, I would prefer to use this limited space to respond to several of the challenges they raise, the extensions they suggest, and the implications for evolving regional uncertainties. Let me begin by addressing two key criticisms. First, though gentle in his wording and appreciative of the "big" picture the book attempts, Thomas Pepinsky questions my provocative grouping of the Philippines with Myanmar and North Korea as rapacious regimes. His data on GDP per capita, tertiary education, and trade certainly suggest more economic differences than similarities among the three regimes. I would raise two counterpoints. First, I focused almost exclusively on the Marcos era (1965–86), when a host of similarities such as official corruption, widespread repression, and anti-industrialization radiated closer resonance. Second, external forces in all three regimes provided powerful underpinnings for rapacious repression while mitigating against industrial development. In North Korea and Myanmar, foreign sanctions, self-chosen isolation, and extensive reliance on foreign profiteering from raw materials and agricultural riches were key elements keeping narrow and repressive elites in power while simultaneously obstructing industrialization. Likewise, the United States was a fulsome supporter of the Marcos dictatorship; moreover, in an ironic twist, U.S. support for land reform and industrial upgrades that had been so critical to industrial development within Japan, [End Page 194] South Korea, and Taiwan gained no traction in the Philippines. Rather, the U.S. government defended entrenched U.S.-run sugar magnates and landed elites in the country, both powerful veto players against land reform and serious industrial improvement. Pepinsky's data also points to something not discussed in his review but that the book treated as pivotal in its distinction between the developmental and the ersatz developmental regimes—tertiary education. It is high and rises continually in the developmental regimes, while it lags demonstrably in the ersatz developmental regimes, creating a long-term obstacle against those regimes capturing a substantial portion of GDP gains. Mary Alice Haddad raises a second criticism worthy of discussion. Although she acknowledges that different mixes of regimes play a powerful role in the dynamics and shaping of the regional order, she rightly notes that my treatment of the Asian region devotes little attention to subnational linkages. As a corrective, she foregrounds the ways in which micro-level multilateral projects often span different regime types and serve as powerful spurs to cross-border cooperation and mutual learning. As such, they add vibrant threads to the regional tapestry. While I accept her point, the argument in the book's concluding chapter analyzes how shifting balances and interactions among the national regimes examined in earlier chapters were critical drivers of the most visible alterations in the regional order. Though one can, of course, debate the significance of state-level vs. local-level webs of cooperation, as Gilbert Rozman found to his disappointment in his 2004 study Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism, nationalism, competition for power, and bilateral national government distrust in many instances upended even the most diligent efforts at cross-border cooperation by city mayors or NGOs.1 Several reviews suggest tantalizing ways to extend the logic of the book. Pepinsky sees it as calling for more macro-structural studies of political economy. I share his predisposition. Such macro-structural analyses hold the greatest potential not only to expand our theoretical understanding of East Asia...
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