Duties Of Justice Research Articles

Third Party Duty of Justice

Third Party Duty of Justice

Whose duty? Which reform?

ABSTRACT Lucia Rafanelli’s book opens up an important space for reflection on the ethics of ‘reform intervention’. Her purpose is both to demonstrate that the field of foreign influence and its modes is considerably more diverse than often appreciated and to propose a set of ethical guidelines for addressing it. The principles she proposes are cogent and well-supported. My reflections focus on two issues concerning the duty of reform intervention. The first topic that I address concerns the scope of the duty and the distinction between the duty of members to promote justice in their home society and the duty of non-members to reform intervention in foreign societies. The second issue concerns the topic of legitimacy in relation to the character of the duty of reform intervention and whether we are, as Rafanelli proposes, all bound by this duty if we accept a natural duty of justice.

Enforceable Duties: Cicero and Kant on the Legal Nature of Political Order

This article seeks to show the importance of Cicero for Kant by pointing out the systematic relationship between their respective views on ethics and law. Cicero was important to Kant because Cicero had already elaborated an imperative, “quasi-jural” conception of duty or obligation. Cicero had also already prefigured the distinction between ethical duties and duties of justice. The article does not establish any direct historical influence, but points out interesting systematic overlaps. The most important in the realm of ethics are a universal rationalism; a rule-based normative framework of duty; and skepticism about (Cicero), or rejection of (Kant), eudaimonism. In the realm of political theory, it is the centrality of law and of property that unites both thinkers; both reject voluntarism in thinking that consensus flows from the right external laws, not the other way around, and thus creates a juridical community; and lastly, both Cicero and Kant believe that transparence, or publicity, is a key ideal that might be presupposed by both the ethical and the juridical domain. The article thus shows that both Cicero and Kant separate ethics from law, but there are indications that neither has given up the aspiration to bridge the two realms on a higher plane. This reading of Kant yields both a more Ciceronian Kant and allows us to perceive Kantian aspects of Cicero.

Zipper arguments and duties regarding future generations

Most of us believe that it would be unjust to act with indifference about the plight of future generations. Zipper arguments in intergenerational justice aim to show that we have duties of justice regarding future generations, regardless of whether we have duties of justice to future generations. By doing so, such arguments circumvent the foundational challenges that come with theorising duties to remote future generations, which result from the non-existence, non-identity and non-contemporaneity of future generations. I argue that zipper arguments face several significant challenges. The ought-implies-can challenge points out that because prior generations determine what later generations can transfer, they determine how much they ought to transfer. In addition, both intentional and non-intentional non-compliance can break the chain of duties towards future generations on which zipper arguments rely. Some versions are surprisingly resilient especially in real-world circumstances. This paper does not show that zipper arguments inevitably fail, but all ways forward come at significant theoretical costs. Unless the challenges posed here are met (or shown as irrelevant), theorists of justice cannot side-track the foundational challenges that come with doing intergenerational justice.

PREPARING FOR THE NEXT PANDEMIC

AbstractMy aim in this essay is to argue for a better moral-conceptual framework and for institutional innovation in preparation for the next pandemic. My main conclusions are as follows. (1) The primary moral principle that should guide responses to the next pandemic is the duty to prevent and mitigate serious harms. (2) A proper understanding of the moral foundations and scope of the duty to prevent and mitigate serious harms requires rejecting both Extreme Nationalism and Extreme Cosmopolitanism. (3) A better response to the next pandemic requires transforming the moral landscape through institutional innovation by developing an international institution that can perfect indeterminate duties (i) by identifying duty-bearers, (ii) by specifying their duties to provide medical resources and other forms of aid, (iii) by allocating the specified duties to various public and private entities in such a way as to ensure effective coordination and that the costs of providing aid are fairly distributed, and (iv) by providing effective mechanisms for compliance with the specified duties. (4) Institutional innovation is morally required, regardless of whether the harm prevention and mitigation duties of the better-off are duties of justice or of beneficence, because without institutionalization, some duties of justice, including those requiring the prevention and mitigation of serious harms, suffer some of the same indeterminacies that are present in duties of beneficence.

Beneficence: the moral status of treatment through humanitarian actions

Crowdfunding for medical purposes, which involves the collection of funds from a large number of donors through a public appeal mainly through Internet platforms, is a growing phenomenon worldwide. Medical treatment is by far the most important purpose to which donors in Serbia dedicate their resources. This article focuses on the issue of moral behaviour in the context of medical crowdfunding. It analyses the beneficence principle from the perspective of core ethical theories - utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, and virtue ethics. It then discusses whether the support for treatment is in the realm of duty of charity or duty of justice. It is argued that health needs are morally important, and that society has an obligation to provide health care to guarantee equal opportunities. The appearance of the crowdfunding for medical treatments indicates the shortcomings of the health system, and that the collective duties of justice are not fulfilled. In the absence of a health system that meets the needs of all members of a society, medical crowdfunding can be seen as a potentially justifiable attempt to correct it, as it offers the opportunity for the fulfilment of individual obligations of beneficence. The article argues that it is necessary and morally desirable to act on two apparently opposing tracks - to donate money for medical treatments, while at the same time advocating for the health care system in which treatment will be a guaranteed right, and not a matter of fellow citizens? willingness to fulfil their moral obligation.

Nozick and the Natural Duty of Justice

Nozick and the Natural Duty of Justice

Political Obligation and the Need for Justice

AbstractThis paper examines the claim that justice is necessary for a moral obligation to obey the law. By reflecting on the meaning of obedience, it identifies one version of the claim that must be right and another that must be wrong. It then focuses on the argument for a moral obligation to obey the law that most obviously includes the claim: John Rawls’s argument from the natural duty of justice. More specifically, it focuses on the degree of justice that is needed for this duty to ground a moral obligation to obey the law.

Best Available Parent and Duties of Justice

I argue that the best available parent view, in its present formulation, struggles to accommodate for our very weighty duty not to perpetuate historical injustices. I offer an alternative view that reconciles this tension.

Content Independence and Political Obligation: Scope Limitations of Content-Independent Moral Reasons

Although understanding political obligations as content-independent is standard in the literature, this view cannot be defended. Central to this position is a single content-independent reason to obey virtually all laws because they are laws, as opposed to because of their particular contents. However, intuitively plausible and familiar this view may be, adequate foundational reasons are not to be had. My particular focus is “scope limitations” of content-independent moral reasons. Content-independent moral reasons commonly evoked can be seen to be unable to justify adequate ranges of laws. I demonstrate this problem in regard to what I view as the two strongest contemporary theories of political obligation, based on fair play and natural duties of justice. Accordingly, to preserve the content independence of political obligations, we must do so in a different way. The modified view I suggest combines different scope-limited content-independent reasons to justify an adequate range of laws.

Cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy

ABSTRACT I argue that agents can have duties to cooperate with one another if this increases their combined efficiency and/or efficacy in addressing ongoing collective moral problems. I call these duties cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy. I focus particularly on collective agents and how agents ought to reason and act in the face of global moral problems. After setting out my account, I argue that a subset of cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy of collective agents are duties of justice in virtue of the roles these agents have taken up.

Research bystanders, justice, and the state: Reframing the debate on third-party protections in health research.

Research participants are afforded protections to ensure their rights and welfare are not unduly jeopardized by research activities. Yet people who do not meet the criteria for research participant status may likewise be impacted by research activities, and ethicists argue that protections should be afforded these "research bystanders." The standard rationale for extending protections to research bystanders contends that they are sufficiently like research participants that the ethical principles governing health research ought to extend to them. In this article we argue that this analogical reasoning is mistaken. Salient moral differences mean that research ethics frameworks are not fit for purpose. We defend the research bystander category by articulating a novel foundation for this new class of stakeholder. Focusing on bystanders directly impacted by publicly funded health research, we argue that bystanders are sometimes owed protections-but neither because of their similarity to research participants nor because research ethics principles should extend to them. Instead, we reframe the issue as a question of justice. Building on the work of Douglas MacKay, we argue that bystanders to publicly funded health research are owed protections as citizens of liberal states to whom the state owes duties of justice. The state has duties to protect the interests of citizens and to conduct health research. When the means by which the state fulfils the latter duty comes into conflict with the means by which it fulfils the former, the state must ensure that those impacted, including research bystanders, are afforded protections.

(In)justice on Ice: Valieva and International Sport Governing Bodies’ Justice Duties Toward Underage Athletes

ABSTRACT After two years of discussions and revisions, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) published the 2021 World Anti-Doping Code on June 16, 2020. Among the most significant additions to this iteration of the Code was the inclusion of new categories of athletes subject to differential treatment by WADA, including the “protected person” category. In this paper, we examine the recent case of figure skater Kamila Valeryevna Valieva, the first athlete given differential treatment due to her being categorized as a “protected person.” We apply a relational justice framework to the case to provide a nuanced, descriptive analysis of the case generally, and the application of the “protected person” category in particular.We first describe details of the athlete, her performances and anti-doping rule violation, and the “protected person” category, to provide context. We then describe and analyze the relations between several institutional actors, principally WADA and the International Court for the Arbitration of Sport (CAS), the athlete and her team, and other figure skating athletes at the Beijing Winter Olympic Games. To do so, we use two concepts of justice, conservative and ideal, and their component parts, entitlement, desert, and need.Our description and analyses demonstrate that (1) WADA’s notions of justice are essentially conservative, while CAS acted toward more ideal notions, creating a fundamental disagreement in what was owed and to whom. We show (2) that CAS’ decision may have nonetheless caused harm to the athlete, raising questions about the efficacy and capability of the “protected person” category. Finally, (3) our analyses show the influence that notions of justice necessarily have these actors shape each other, thus change the sporting institutions and activities themselves.

Political Obligations of Refugees

AbstractIn the literature on refugees, scholars generally focus on obligations that states have toward refugees, but do not address obligations refugees themselves bear to their new countries. While this situation has been remedied to some extent in recent literature, scholars have not provided an adequate explanation why these obligations hold. We explore the moral basis of refugees’ obligations, with special attention to the need to extend traditional principles of political obligation to address it. We consider two categories of refugees. Obligations of “settled refugees,” who attempt to integrate into new societies, are largely encompassed by traditional Westphalian norms of state–citizen relationships and grounded in consent and fair play. Refugees in camps exist farther outside of the traditional Westphalian categories. Most notable for them are divided political obligations—stemming from the divided nature of camp governance—grounded mainly by principles of fair play and natural duties of justice.

Understanding obligations in the context of J. Rawls’s theory of justice

The article is devoted to the disclosure of the content of the category of obligations according to J. Rawls’s theory of justice. The author emphasizes that in general, the American philosopher divides them into natural duties and obligations. Both groups are requirements for individuals. Obligations include honesty and faithfulness, natural duties are divided into positive and negative. The positive duties include: maintaining justice; mutual assistance; mutual respect. While negative natural duties are: not to harm and not to cause trouble to the innocent.
 The thinker calls the fundamental natural duty the duty of justice, which is to obey and uphold the just institutions to which man is attached. The natural duty of justice binds citizens as a whole without requiring freewill actions. The principles of justice, according to J. Rawls, provide a way to distribute the rights and obligations of the main sociopolitical institutions and determine the proper distribution of wealth and forms of social cooperation. The final version of these principles provides the first and second rules of priority as a result of their definition. The first rule is the priority of freedom: fundamental freedoms can be restricted only in the name of general freedom. The second rule of priority is the priority of justice over efficiency and welfare.
 In addition, the American scholar focuses on outlining special aspects of obligations in the light of political theory, which include the issue of submission to unjust laws or policies, civil disobedience, rejection of beliefs.
 The author of the study concludes that, in general, the concept of obligations according to Rawls’s theory of justice is based on the desire to find the common good for all members of society, covers elements of social contract, and has the attribute of reciprocity.

Global sharing of COVID-19 therapies during a "New Normal".

This paper argues for global sharing of COVID‐19 treatments during the COVID‐19 pandemic and beyond based on principles of global solidarity. It starts by distinguishing two types of COVID‐19 treatments and models sharing strategies for each in small‐group scenarios, contrasting groups that are solidaristic with those composed of self‐interest maximizers to show the appeal of solidaristic reasoning. It then extends the analysis, arguing that a similar logic should apply within and between nations. To further elaborate global solidarity, the paper distinguishes morally voluntary, sliding‐scale, and mandatory versions. It argues for an all‐hands‐on‐deck approach and gives examples to illustrate. The paper concludes that during the COVID‐19 crisis, global solidarity is a core value, and global sharing of COVID‐19 treatments should be considered a duty of justice, not of charity.

Global sharing of COVID-19 vaccines: A duty of justice, not charity.

Global scarcity of COVID-19 vaccines raises ethical questions about their fair allocation between nations. Section I introduces the question and proposes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share globally scarce COVID-19 vaccines. Section II distinguishes justice from charity and argues that beneficiaries of unjust structures incur duties of justice when they are systematically advantaged at others expense. Section III gives a case-based argument describing three upstream structural injustices that systematically advantaged wealthy countries and disadvantaged poorer countries, contributing to global disparities of COVID-19 vaccines. Section IV examines more closely the duties of justice owed, including a duty to relinquish holdings, restitute victims, and restore relationships. Section V concludes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share COVID-19 vaccines with poor nations and to restore relationships damaged by injustice. All nations should take steps to transform unjust structures.

Climate Change Injustice

Many climate change ethicists argue wealthy nations have duties of justice to combat climate change. However, Posner and Weisbach disagree because there is a poor fit between the principles of justice and the problem of climate change. I argue in this paper that Posner and Weisbach’s argument relies on what Judith Shklar calls “the normal model of justice,” the view that injustice results when principles are violated. Applying Shklar’s critique of normal justice, I argue that Posner and Weisbach’s argument limits injustice to include complaints that match rules and principles, shielding the unjust from responsibility and assuming falsely that judgments about injustice can be made from a singular perspective. Drawing on Shklar, this paper develops an account of climate change as a complement to mainstream climate ethicists. On this account, injustice results from indifference and the voices of those impacted by climate change and climate change policy have priority.

Responsibility and the Duty of Rescue

ABSTRACTWhat difference might it make to the duty of rescue if the victim is responsible for needing to be rescued? Having distinguished the natural duty of rescue owed as a result of a chance encounter from the artificial duties of rescue that may be created by agreement among participants in high‐risk activities, I examine three ways in which the victim's responsibility might lessen the stringency of the duty: by lowering the cost threshold above which rescue ceases to be a duty; by lessening the force of the duty when it competes with other duties of justice; and by making the duty unenforceable by third parties. I then consider different forms the victim's responsibility may take: simple negligence, deliberate risk taking, and engaging in wrongful behaviour. There are only two circumstances in which the duty of rescue is entirely eliminated as a duty: when by virtue of repeated risk taking, the victim unfairly imposes excessive costs on his rescuer, and when rescuing the victim would allow him to continue threatening harm to others. In other cases, however, responsibility considerations should qualify the natural duty of rescue: rescue should not be a responsibility‐free zone.

Beneficence, Non-Identity, and Responsibility: How Identity-Affecting Interventions in Nature can Generate Secondary Moral Duties

In chapter 3 of Wild Animal Ethics Johannsen argues for a collective obligation based on beneficence to intervene in nature in order to reduce the suffering of wild animals. In the same chapter he claims that the non-identity problem is merely a “theoretical puzzle” (p.32) which doesn’t affect our reasons for intervention. In this paper I argue that the non-identity problem affects both the strength and the nature of our reasons to intervene. By intervening in nature on a large scale we change which animals come into existence. In doing so, we enable harmful animals to inflict harms on other animals, and we put other animals in harm’s way. The harms that these animals will inflict and endure are foreseeable. Furthermore, since non-human animals aren’t moral agents, harmful animals cannot be morally responsible for their harmful actions. I argue therefore that by causing animals to exist, knowing that they will inflict and suffer harms, we become morally responsible for those harms. By engaging in identity-affecting actions then we take on secondary moral duties towards the animals we have thereby caused to exist, and these secondary moral duties may be extremely demanding, even more so than the initial costs of intervention. Finally, these duties are duties of justice rather than duties of beneficence, and as such are more stringent than purely beneficence-based moral reasons. Furthermore, this conclusion flows naturally from several plausible principles which Johannsen explicitly endorses.