Content Independence and Political Obligation: Scope Limitations of Content-Independent Moral Reasons

Abstract

Although understanding political obligations as content-independent is standard in the literature, this view cannot be defended. Central to this position is a single content-independent reason to obey virtually all laws because they are laws, as opposed to because of their particular contents. However, intuitively plausible and familiar this view may be, adequate foundational reasons are not to be had. My particular focus is “scope limitations” of content-independent moral reasons. Content-independent moral reasons commonly evoked can be seen to be unable to justify adequate ranges of laws. I demonstrate this problem in regard to what I view as the two strongest contemporary theories of political obligation, based on fair play and natural duties of justice. Accordingly, to preserve the content independence of political obligations, we must do so in a different way. The modified view I suggest combines different scope-limited content-independent reasons to justify an adequate range of laws.