Dominant Regional Power Research Articles

Female Monastic Patronage in Medieval Georgia: Queen Tamar and Her Monastery in Tighva

Tighva Monastery was founded by Queen Consort Tamar, the daughter of David the Builder, a famous Georgian king who succeeded in uniting the country and making it a dominant regional power. According to the written sources, Tamar was married to Shah Manuchehr III, the Muslim ruler of Shirvan (modern Azerbaijan) around 1111, in order to “rule over Shirvan”. Tamar lived and reigned in the Muslim court for more than twenty years. Resulting from a need to secure a retirement home and final resting place, she initiated the construction of Tighva Monastery soon after her return to Georgia in the 1140s. As her husband Manuchehr died in 1160, it seems that Tamar left Shirvan still a married woman, for unknown reasons. Tamar cut ties with her family and spent the remainder of her life as a nun in Tighva. The Church of the Crucifixion in Tighva Monastery, which represents the main focus of this paper, gives a good example of how the place occupied by women during the Divine Liturgy not only indicated their social status, but also determined their visibility, demonstrating how architecture could be used to establish the limits of physical appearance of royal women in the twelfth century Georgian monastic space.

Uniparental Genetic Analyses Reveal Multi-Ethnic Background of Dunhuang Foyemiaowan Population (220–907 CE) With Typical Han Chinese Archaological Culture

The relationship between archeological culture and ethnicity is invariably complex. This is especially the case for periods of national division and rapid inter-ethnic exchange, such as China’s Sixteen Kingdoms (304–439 CE) and Northern and Southern Dynasties (420–589 CE). Going by tomb shape and grave goods, the Foyemiaowan cemetery at Dunhuang exhibits a typical third–tenth century Han style. Despite this, the ethnic makeup of the Foyemiaowan population has remained unclear. We therefore analyzed 485 Y-chromosomal SNPs and entire mitochondrial genomes of 34 Foyemiaowan samples. Our study yielded the following discoveries: (1) principal component analysis revealed that the Foyemiaowan population was closely clustered with Tibeto-Burman populations on the paternal side and close to Mongolic-speaking populations on the maternal side; (2) lineage comparisons at the individual level showed that the Foyemiaowan population consisted of primarily Tibeto-Burman and Han Chinese related lineages (Oα-M117, 25%;Oβ-F46, 18.75%), partially Altaic speaking North Eurasian lineages (N-F1206, 18.75%) and a slight admixture of southern East Asian lineages (O1b1a2-Page59, 6.25%; O1b1a1-PK4, 3.13%). Similarly, the maternal gene pool of Foyemiaowan contained northern East Asian (A, 4.17%; CZ, 16.67%; D, 20.83%; G, 4.17%; M9, 4.17%), southern East Asian (B, 12.51%; F, 20.83%) and western Eurasian (H, 4.17%; J, 4.17%) related lineages; (3) we discovered a relatively high genetic diversity among the Foyemiaowan population (0.891) in our ancient reference populations, indicating a complex history of population admixture. Archeological findings, stable isotope analysis and historical documents further corroborated our results. Although in this period China’s central government had relinquished control of the Hexi Corridor and regional non-Han regimes became the dominant regional power, Foyemiaowan’s inhabitants remained strongly influenced by Han culture.

INTERREGIONAL INTERACTION IN TERMINAL CLASSIC YUCATAN: RECENT OBSIDIAN AND CERAMIC DATA FROM VISTA ALEGRE, QUINTANA ROO, MEXICO

We use ceramic and obsidian data from the ancient Maya port site of Vista Alegre to discuss long-distance exchange during the Terminal Classic (c. AD 850–1100) period. This is a time often associated with increased international trade relations and the growth of Chichen Itza as a dominant regional power in the northern Maya lowlands. Critical to the increased volume of international trade were the merchants who transported goods along the coast of Yucatan in large trading canoes. By combining a macroscopic assessment of the ceramics with visual, XRF, and INAA analyses of the obsidian artifacts, we gain insight into the various socioeconomic forces at work moving goods around the Peninsula. Given the paucity of Terminal Classic settlement in the interior Yalahau region, Vista Alegre appears to be an isolated site during this period, approximately 40 km from the nearest coastal neighbor. This allows us to focus on coastal exchange as the sole means by which goods arrived at the site. Our preliminary data contribute to the growing literature on the role market economies played in the Maya area, and the increased opportunities this afforded coastal peoples as circum-peninsular trade became more common through time.

U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1990s and 2000s, and the Case of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia)

The foreign policy of the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations in the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) shows U.S. foreign policy under a rather positive light. With consistency and continuity, they were able to implement a multidimensional realistic foreign policy, the main manifestations of which allowed the U.S. to gain, in a few years, solid political, economic, military, and diplomatic leverages. Its vital interests were not at stake in the region and, from the early 1990s onwards, it has been in the position of a potent “challenger” that worked on consolidating its position in order to be influential and powerful when and if necessary. Although it did not become the sole dominant regional power, the U.S. succeeded, mostly in the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, in strongly geopolitically penetrating a region with which it previously had no contact and on which it had no major expertise.

Return of the dragon: rising China and regional security

Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security, by Denny Roy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013. viii + 279 pp. US$35.00/E24.00 (hardcover).In this book, Denny Roy attempts a comprehensive study of the effect of China as a great power on security and strategic issues. It is a very timely contribution to the discussion of Chinas rise. Roy attempts to dispel both the fear of an assertive China regaining its absolute dominance of its world and the illusion of a complacent China at ease with its continued economic growth and with accepting the current international system in which the US has a dominating influence over the Asia-Pacific region. Roy's key message is that, although it is almost universally accepted as a positive development, the rise of China will probably lead to a net reduction in security for most of the world. All the countries with which China has been in dispute are likely to face increased pressure from Beijing, and will either have to compromise or to be willing to pay a higher price to retain their freedom of action.In the first two chapters, Roy offers a sophisticated discussion of the historical and social factors that had have shaped China's self-image and world view. This discussion is intriguing, and explicitly illustrates the dragon's return, instead of merely China's rise: history matters in China's foreign policy. According to Roy, China's enduring confidence in its superiority, its fear of separatism and a sense of being historically a downtrodden nation have all contributed to shaping Chinese foreign policy, but two factors have been most significant. First, as a rising great power, China belongs to a class of actors on the international stage which has historically caused trouble. Second, China's unique worldview, shaped by its long history of being the dominant regional power, followed by a century of shame (bainian guochi ) from 1842 to 1949, has made its leaders take responsibility for bringing the country back to a position of hegemony in the region. Together with the fact that the Chinese Communist Party sees regime survival as paramount and is therefore willing to pander to radical Chinese public opinion, it becomes difficult for Chinese leaders to compromise on issues causing tension with China's neighbors.In the chapters that follow, Roy analyzes broader issues including military power, strategic containment, risks of conflict and regional security. To a large degree, he takes a zero-sum analysis and assumes that, for a great power to have more security, its neighboring great power(s) must be left with less. To support this argument, Roy presents several case studies. One is the struggle of containment and counter-containment between China and India, each seeking to limit the other's influence. Another example is Vietnam's acknowledgement of Chinese hegemony and its bending to, but not breaking before, Chinese power as the balance shifts in China's favor. …

International Politics of the Persian Gulf

The Persian Gulf region is home to the six members of the Gulf Cooperation
 Council (viz., Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia),
 Iran, and Iraq. Holding over 60 percent of the world’s oil and over 40 percent
 of its natural gas reserves, the Persian Gulf is central to the global economy.
 Yet a dominant regional power is lacking; beginning with the British in the
 late nineteenth century, foreign powers have consistently been meddling in
 the region. Significant economic, social, cultural, and political changes have
 transformed the region’s international relations since Britain’s withdrawal in
 the 1960s. The contributors to this volume, which provides a rich account of
 this transformation, focus on natural resources, the Iranian-Saudi competition,
 the interest of major external actors, and political reform.
 The volume’s main thrust is the centrality of both state and regime security
 in order to understand the region. The volume’s editor, Mehran Kamrava,
 notes that the international politics there is essentially that of security
 politics. He offers four reasons for this: (1) its central role in oil and natural
 gas production and, increasingly, global finance, (2) the competition between
 Iran and Saudi Arabia over regional leadership, (3) the long-standing
 American-Iranian conflict, and (4) the instability brought about by intermixing
 politics and religion.
 He identifies three poles of power that shape the region’s security dynamics:
 the American pole; the GCC pole, which is centered on Saudi military
 and Qatari-UAE financial power; and the Iranian pole, which relies both on
 military might and soft power. Since the Iranian revolution, the American and
 the GCC poles have built a resilient alliance that has been driven by both the
 United States’ growing direct involvement and the GCC’s failure to provide
 security to its members.
 The chapters, written by leading regional specialists, further elaborate on
 the region’s security dynamics. In Chapter 2, J. E. Petersen offers a useful typology
 of boundary formation. He discusses how the state-building process,
 historical claims, colonial imposition, and resource competition have shaped
 state boundaries. As these boundaries remain contested, Petersen details various
 ongoing problems. In Chapter 3, Fred H. Lawson refines the concepts “security
 dilemma” and “alliances dilemma” and uses them to explain the arms race in
 the Gulf since the first Gulf War. Middle East specialists and international relations
 scholars will find these chapters useful in conceptual refinement ...

Could Turkey Be a Dominant Regional Power: The Rise of Turkey as a Country of Middle-East and Europe

According to the common idea, 'the economic power determines the political power. By this general principle, when we look at the powerful states, we see that these states (countries) have, at the same time, the powerful political effect on the other actors. In this paper, some trade and economic data of Turkey are shown in order to localize its place in the World rankings. By this purpose, this paper argues the fact that Turkey which, being one of the countries belonging G-20, has tried since 1991 to play a big role in its bilateral relations in Caucasia, Central Asia and Middle East (CCAME). However, when the data of international business of Turkey and those of each one of the countries of Central Asia treated in the contents of research are studied, it is seen very clearly that the influence of Turkey in Central Asia is not very dominant or does not create a dominating effect over the economic plan in spite of the existence of the diplomatic effects, visa facilities and the visits based upon the cultural level and mutu-ally testified. Without any doubt, although nobody can deny the existence and the probability of the gradual growth of Turkey's relations inCCAME's countries, Turkey, whose face is turned mainly towards the occident and the large majority of trade made within the European countries,tries to be an influential actor in the determined areas. Naturally, in spite of the cel-ebration of Nawruz with the Turkic World,acting as a Muslim country in Middle East, and ac-cepting the norms of European Union as a European democratic and laicized country in Eu-rope, Turkey presents several identities and makes it a multi-colored actor who can be used in favor of Turkey's interests.

Emerging Security Architecture in the Indian Ocean Region: Policy Options for India

The Indian Ocean Region has become one of the major spotlights in international security in recent times. With the importance of SLOC which connects the Pacific and the Atlantic and the increasing appetite for energy resource for the booming Asian economy, security in the Indian Ocean is a matter of concern for all stakeholders. However, US military presence in Asia is going to decline in the coming period while China is emerging as a great power in Asia which could amount to creating creeping Chinese expansion in the waters of Asia. The lack of a dominant regional power in the IOR and the retreat of US from the region would lead to strategic uncertainty which will unfold competition for dominance by other powers. It is in this context that the most important priority for the regional countries is the IOR should be free from any sort of power rivalry and needs to ensure freedom of navigation and peace and stability in the region. In order for that to happen, India has to emerge as a credible power in the region and must take a leading role in establishing cooperative security framework in the region bringing all countries of the region on board for effective security architecture in the Indian Ocean region.

A Game Theory Application of the Rational Actor Model to the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008

The post-Soviet republics in general, and the Caucasus region in particular, have historically been and still remain within Russia’s sphere of interest. Since the collapse of the USSR, the former Soviet republics still feel a tangible in uence from their northern neighbor. Despite the fact that of cial Moscow policy has not changed much, few would have imagined that—in this new century of asymmetric threats—a dominant regional power would feel the need to conduct military campaigns in order to impose its own will in its immediate neighborhood. The generally accepted line of thinking would dictate that economic and social pressure would be suf cient. However, the clashes that took place in 2008 between Russia and Georgia tend to refute this claim, showing that direct military involvement may after all guarantee the implementation of the goals of powerful states, or at least maintain the status quo ante, even if they do not fully succeed. Some may see Russia’s coercive politics, namely the August 2008 war with Georgia, as an attempt to take its “rightful place” on the geostrategic stage, but the logical question would be if war was a necessary step, and to what extent the decision to go to war was rational for both sides of the con ict. It is beyond any doubt that Russia is a rising power, demonstrating to the Western democracies (and particularly to the United States) that the world is no longer unipolar. Russia’s every effort is directed at regaining political in uence over its neighbors and strengthening its position within the international arena. In sharp contrast to its condition during the 1990s, modern Russia is guided by a strong leader; it is under the sway of extremely coercive (but exible, when necessary) policies; and it is

Deciphering Iran: The Political Evolution of the Islamic Republic and U.s. Foreign Policy After September 11

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration has pursued a robust and aggressive foreign policy. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have not only placed the Bush administration in conflict with longstanding U. S. allies and the majority of global public opinion, but it has also found itself in an awkward position vis-a-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran, the dominant regional power in Southwest Asia and nemesis of the United States following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Since the Revolution, U. S.-Iranian relations have been suspicious, hostile, and at times violent. From a historical perspective, it is increasingly evident that the unseating of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the U. S.’s close ally of more than three decades, was a watershed event with ramifications that continue to affect Iran, Southwest Asia, and the United States. Today, the pursuit of U. S. interests and the quest for regional stability—in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia—leads in numerous and overlapping paths squarely back to Iran. The Bush Doctrine is defined by an emphasis on the right of the United States to use preemptive force against terrorists and their state sponsors; it has at its core a moral worldview that starkly contrasts good versus evil, and it makes no distinction between those who carry out acts of terrorism and those who harbor terrorists.1 The consequences in U. S. foreign policy have included an aversion to nuance in favor of “moral clarity,” and President Bush’s message to the rest of the world that “either you are either with us, or you are with the terrorists.”2 In this context, it is no surprise that the Bush administration’s approach to Iran has shown little appreciation for the impact of its actions upon the competition for political power in Iran today between radical and modernist Islamists—two prominent factions within the ruling clergy that disagree profoundly on the role of Islam in society. The significance of the differences between radical and modernist Islamists is crucial due to the de facto compression of all political interaction in Iran after 1979 into the only remaining framework and discourse: Islamism, or the use of the religion of Islam as a basis for political mobilization. Political agendas and policymaking among the clerical elite in contemporary Iran are therefore shaped by factional differences rooted in Islamist ideology, which are of great relevance to U. S.Iranian relations. The radical Islamists are widely referred to in the West as “conservatives” because of their adherence to dogmatic Islamic extremism, and they maintain a hold on the Islamic Republic’s unelected but dominant centers of power. They also generally oppose normalized relations with the U. S. The modernist Islamists are widely referred to in the West as “reformists” due to their opposition to the monopoly on religious interpretation and political power claimed by the radicals. They favor greater democratization and the restoration of normal ties with the United States as part of a broader reversal of Iran’s post-1979 isolation. However, the factionalization of Islamists in Iran transcends this simplified explanation. A more comprehensive understanding of the evolution of Islamism in Iran—one that accounts for the roots of the radicals and modernists as well as subgroups within those factions—is warranted and will be offered in the following analysis. Despite clear indications that the continued political viability of the modernists benefits U. S. interests directly, the Bush administration’s hardline posture toward Iran since 2002 has helped to erode the ability of the modernists to argue for transparency and moderation in Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. Inflammatory U. S. actions in recent years, such as the notorious “axis of evil” accusation during Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address, have provided the radical Islamists with a pow -

Is India over-extended? When domestic disorder precludes regional intervention

Why did India not go to Sri Lanka's rescue in May 2000 when the island's leadership begged it to intervene to save nearly 40,000 soldiers who were close to being captured by the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)? India's disinclination to get involved, even as Pakistan, China and Israel provided arms to Sri Lanka, raises the question of whether the country is still committed to the Indira Doctrine (which operates as India's equivalent of the United States' Monroe Doctrine in South Asia). This paper agrees that India remains fully committed to being the dominant regional power and a significant global power. It also argues that India will not hesitate to protect its national security interests. However, this paper suggests that domestic pressures, especially those emanating from Kashmir and the country's northeast, may have left India militarily overextended, especially during the late 1990s, and thereby prevented the country from flexing its military capabilities in the region as it did in the 1980s. Such a scenario not only hampers India's ability to operate as an efficient and dependable regional begemon, but also may have adverse ramifications for South Asia's smaller states.

The Foreign Policy of Great-Power China

The Chinese Government insists that even as a great power, China will not attempt to establish hegemony or a sphere of influence in the region. Going beyond the stated intentions of the present leadership, this article evaluates the factors that might disincline China towards hegemony, including the unique characteristics of modern Chinese foreign policy, the likely reaction of other states to growing Chinese power, China's widespread poverty, its pre-modern track record as a benign hegemon, and the type of international system Beijing appears to favour. The conclusion is that the purported restraints to China rising to the position of dominant regional power are not convincing. Nevertheless, China can achieve this goal through avenues its neighbours will accept, without resorting to force or coercion.

Recommendations: Southern African Development Coordination Conference and African Security

The overwhelmingly dominant regional power of southern Africa, South Africa, attempts to contain the political, economic, and military interdependence of neighboring states, irrespective of ideological preference. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) founded in 1980, is the response of the other states in the region to South Africa’s ambitions to maintain regional hegemony. Its nine member state are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and an independent Namibia is expected to join. The specific objectives of SADCC, as stated in the 1980 Lusaka Declaration, are the reduction of economic dependence in general (not only on South Africa); the forging of links to create a genuinely meaningful and equitable system of regional integration; the mobilization of resources to support national, interstate, and regional policies; and concerted action to secure international cooperation for the purpose of economic liberation.

Thailand: The Erosion of a Balanced Foreign Policy

TRADITIONALLY, Thailand has accommodated itself to superior power, bargaining compliance for protection and obligating the dominant state in the region to come to its defense. Thailand accepted Japanese occupation during World War II and even declared war on the allied powers, but manipulated an obliging helplessness that subsequently evoked U.S. protection against British demands for retribution. Indeed, this disarming quality of the Thais has proved particularly captivating as far as the Americans are concerned and somewhat frustrating for their Southeast Asian neighbors, whose anxieties can be aroused by what they regard as audacious inconstancy. Thailand allied itself firmly with the United States in the expectation of establishing a bond that could be directed against Vietnam, for many decades considered the traditional enemy. U.S. revision of priorities in Southeast Asia, however, prompted a crisis in Thai foreign policy as it was realized that Thailand would be compelled to protect itself from the undesirable consequences of Vietnamese reunification without the support of a clearly dominant regional power. The idea of diversified relations with the great powers was obviously an attempt to come to terms with post-Vietnam war realities in a situation in which no one actual or potential protector could claim undisputed regional primacy. Thailand's flexibility in foreign policy largely derived from its experience of dealing with powers that were able to maintain only a temporary presence in the region. The European colonial powers, the Japanese during World War II, and the United States during the Vietnam war introduced eras into the region's history that were relatively transient. Flexibility in foreign policy was of necessity a protective reaction to the