Thailand: The Erosion of a Balanced Foreign Policy

Abstract

TRADITIONALLY, Thailand has accommodated itself to superior power, bargaining compliance for protection and obligating the dominant state in the region to come to its defense. Thailand accepted Japanese occupation during World War II and even declared war on the allied powers, but manipulated an obliging helplessness that subsequently evoked U.S. protection against British demands for retribution. Indeed, this disarming quality of the Thais has proved particularly captivating as far as the Americans are concerned and somewhat frustrating for their Southeast Asian neighbors, whose anxieties can be aroused by what they regard as audacious inconstancy. Thailand allied itself firmly with the United States in the expectation of establishing a bond that could be directed against Vietnam, for many decades considered the traditional enemy. U.S. revision of priorities in Southeast Asia, however, prompted a crisis in Thai foreign policy as it was realized that Thailand would be compelled to protect itself from the undesirable consequences of Vietnamese reunification without the support of a clearly dominant regional power. The idea of diversified relations with the great powers was obviously an attempt to come to terms with post-Vietnam war realities in a situation in which no one actual or potential protector could claim undisputed regional primacy. Thailand's flexibility in foreign policy largely derived from its experience of dealing with powers that were able to maintain only a temporary presence in the region. The European colonial powers, the Japanese during World War II, and the United States during the Vietnam war introduced eras into the region's history that were relatively transient. Flexibility in foreign policy was of necessity a protective reaction to the