Deciphering Iran: The Political Evolution of the Islamic Republic and U.s. Foreign Policy After September 11

Abstract

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration has pursued a robust and aggressive foreign policy. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have not only placed the Bush administration in conflict with longstanding U. S. allies and the majority of global public opinion, but it has also found itself in an awkward position vis-a-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran, the dominant regional power in Southwest Asia and nemesis of the United States following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Since the Revolution, U. S.-Iranian relations have been suspicious, hostile, and at times violent. From a historical perspective, it is increasingly evident that the unseating of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the U. S.’s close ally of more than three decades, was a watershed event with ramifications that continue to affect Iran, Southwest Asia, and the United States. Today, the pursuit of U. S. interests and the quest for regional stability—in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia—leads in numerous and overlapping paths squarely back to Iran. The Bush Doctrine is defined by an emphasis on the right of the United States to use preemptive force against terrorists and their state sponsors; it has at its core a moral worldview that starkly contrasts good versus evil, and it makes no distinction between those who carry out acts of terrorism and those who harbor terrorists.1 The consequences in U. S. foreign policy have included an aversion to nuance in favor of “moral clarity,” and President Bush’s message to the rest of the world that “either you are either with us, or you are with the terrorists.”2 In this context, it is no surprise that the Bush administration’s approach to Iran has shown little appreciation for the impact of its actions upon the competition for political power in Iran today between radical and modernist Islamists—two prominent factions within the ruling clergy that disagree profoundly on the role of Islam in society. The significance of the differences between radical and modernist Islamists is crucial due to the de facto compression of all political interaction in Iran after 1979 into the only remaining framework and discourse: Islamism, or the use of the religion of Islam as a basis for political mobilization. Political agendas and policymaking among the clerical elite in contemporary Iran are therefore shaped by factional differences rooted in Islamist ideology, which are of great relevance to U. S.Iranian relations. The radical Islamists are widely referred to in the West as “conservatives” because of their adherence to dogmatic Islamic extremism, and they maintain a hold on the Islamic Republic’s unelected but dominant centers of power. They also generally oppose normalized relations with the U. S. The modernist Islamists are widely referred to in the West as “reformists” due to their opposition to the monopoly on religious interpretation and political power claimed by the radicals. They favor greater democratization and the restoration of normal ties with the United States as part of a broader reversal of Iran’s post-1979 isolation. However, the factionalization of Islamists in Iran transcends this simplified explanation. A more comprehensive understanding of the evolution of Islamism in Iran—one that accounts for the roots of the radicals and modernists as well as subgroups within those factions—is warranted and will be offered in the following analysis. Despite clear indications that the continued political viability of the modernists benefits U. S. interests directly, the Bush administration’s hardline posture toward Iran since 2002 has helped to erode the ability of the modernists to argue for transparency and moderation in Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. Inflammatory U. S. actions in recent years, such as the notorious “axis of evil” accusation during Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address, have provided the radical Islamists with a pow -