B eijing's strategy of national reunification with Taiwan has been a mixture of military coercion and inducement. Coercive strategy relies primarily upon the use or the threat of use of force. It could take the form of military actions aiming at the conquest of Taiwan, or military brinkmanship using military force in an exemplary and demonstrative manner. In contrast, inducement appeals to cross-strait political negotiations and economic and cultural exchanges to bind Taiwan's hands from seeking independence and to build goodwill and momentum for eventual national reunification. And yet, military coercion and inducement are two sides of the same coin, coercive logic is embedded in Beijing's inducements, which can thus be termed peaceful offence. Beijing has placed priority on either coercion or inducement at different times according to changes in China's domestic politics and Beijing's perception of the international environment and Taiwan's internal politics. This oscillation sustains an inherent and dangerous dynamic that could drive cross-strait relations into a vicious cycle of peace and coercion if Beijing and Taipei cannot negotiate and stabilize the relationship across the Taiwan Strait.