Secret Egypt‐Israel peace initiatives prior to the Suez campaign

Abstract

The Suez Crisis of 1956, always a focus of historical interest, is being re-examined in the light of declassified documents British, American and Israeli as well as previously unavailable Egyptian sources.1 Among the important questions addressed by this research is whether in the years prior to Suez peace was possible between Egypt and Israel. In the past, this question gave rise to two schools of interpretation. The first, a majority opinion, held that opportunities for peace did exist but were undermined by Israel through its aggressive border policy and its refusal to make concessions. The minority school posited that the Arabs' rejection of the Jewish state precluded any settlement, and that peace overtures from Egypt were merely ploys to dissemble aggressive designs.2 These conclusions, like others regarding the Suez era, must now be judged according to new and extensive evidence on the secret efforts to achieve an Egypt-Israel peace. Such efforts underwent three distinct phases: February 1949 to June 1952; July 1952 to February 1955; March 1955 to October 1956. The phases witnessed a general rise in tensions between Egypt and Israel leading, ultimately, to war. But parallel to this overt escalation was another, covert, process of secret contacts, direct and indirect, designed to ameliorate Egypt-Israel relations, if not achieve a permanent settlement. These exchanges, it will be shown, did not decrease with the intensification of hostilitites, but rather expanded in proportion to it. Moreover, despite changes in international, regional and domestic politics, the Egyptian and the Israeli positions on peace remained consistent throughout the pre-Suez period.