Doctrine Of Evil Research Articles

The Systematic Relation between the Notions of Predisposition to Good and Propensity to Evil

Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason has been a controversial text within Kant scholarship since its earliest reception. One of the main reasons for the critical reception relates to Kant’s theory of radical evil and the notion of propensity to evil connected therewith. It has become a commonplace in Kant literature to attribute these Kantian doctrines to a sort of late concession to Christian theology, as can be observed in the tenor of the reception by e.g. Goethe, Schiller and Michalson (1990), among others. Against this view, I aim to show in this article that the most striking and controversial claims contained in Kant’s doctrine of evil, namely the assumption of an intelligible deed, the universality of evil in humans as well as the inextirpability of the propensity to evil, can be accounted for by paying attention to the systematic relation between Kant’s notions of Anlage and Hang and the key trait distinguishing them, namely practical objectivity. By doing so, it shall become clear that Kant’s main contentious claims in Religion I can be sufficiently explained by systematic commitments of his own critical moral philosophy, thus rendering the references to Christian theology found in secondary literature superfluous.

'Eroi' davanti alla catastrofe. «3012» di Sebastiano Vassalli e alcune distopie italiane del XXI secolo

In the representation of the ‘hero’ who, in the contemporary Italian dystopian novels Pinocchio. 2112 by P. Dona, Something, out there by B. Arpaia, The doctrine of evil by A. Berselli and 3012. The year of the Prophet by S. Vassalli, is confronted with different types of catastrophes, reviving the topos of descensus ad inferos, there are several ways of combining the relationship between authentic and inauthentic, a fundamental element of the established figural repertoire of the dystopian genre. We focus in particular on the narratological mechanisms of the points of view by which the reader is confronted with the traditional pedagogical function of the dystopian apologue. Thus, we can see the originality of the structure of Vassalli’s 3012, a novel which – although in line with the author’s conception, which can be found in the comparison with the rest of his narrative production – proposes a figure of ‘funny’, within the forms of Menipp’s satire and parody.

Этика Фихте о радикальном зле

Fichte constructs the general part of his early ethics as a philosophy of concrete freedom in the shape of a history of moral self-consciousness, and in the course of this construction he discovers something what he, in Kantian stile, may call a “radical evil in human nature”, that is, a force of “inertness to reflection and to activity in accordance with such reflection” inherent to human nature. Schelling and some contemporary authors recognize in Fichte’s doctrine of evil a symptom of his return to the ethical naturalism of the Enlightenment. An anal­ysis of the dynamics of moral reflection in the I according to Fichte shows, however, that, exactly as the I itself is for Fichte essentially a duality, a subject-object, so is each particular position in the movement of the self-reflection of the I, on the one hand, conditioned by this spiritual inertness of human nature, but that same inertness is, on the other hand, a chain with which human free­dom retains itself, and therefore actually inexistent as a restraining force for a free I, conscious of his own ethical vocation, so that its dwelling within the limits of the customary (in the invariability of consciousness) is the subject’s own fault as “non-use of freedom”. The spiritual inertness, as an empirical con­dition of possibility of a bad choice, is nevertheless in Fichte a spiritual force of a specific kind, active even there where ethical choice in the strict sense of the term is not (yet) at issue. Schelling’s reproof must therefore be acknowledged as invalid, exactly because the history of self-consciousness is, in Fichte’s ethics, not so much an exposition of a real sequence, as a transcendental reflec­tion of grounds.

Defining Evil Away: Arendt's Forgiveness

AbstractArendt claims that evil is banal and its perpetrators merely shallow. Deliberate evil she takes to be extremely rare. However, nonrare examples of deliberate evil, whose aim is to spoil one's story, abound in everyday life. Arendt also makes forgiveness personal, not requiring repentance. This prompts a consideration of certain personal relations among philosophers. Heidegger's relation to Husserl shows a betrayal of teacher by student. His seductive and philosophic power over Arendt, a betrayal of student by teacher, should not be dismissed in terms of reductive Freudian notions. Faced with a real feminine predicament, Arendt made the wrong choices: in her exoneration of Heidegger, her report on the Eichmann trial, and her exculpatory doctrine of evil.

John Frederick Phillips: Order from Disorder. Proclus’ Doctrine of Evil and Its Roots in Ancient Platonism.

John Frederick Phillips: Order from Disorder. Proclus’ Doctrine of Evil and Its Roots in Ancient Platonism. Leiden/Boston: Brill 2007. XI, 280 S. (Ancient Mediterranean and Medieval Texts and Contexts. Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition. 5.) 109 €.

Order from Disorder. Proclus' Doctrine of Evil and its Roots in Ancient Platonism

Order from Disorder. Proclus' Doctrine of Evil and its Roots in Ancient Platonism

On the alleged Vacuity of Kant's Concept of Evil

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in Kant’s doctrine of evil, arising from as diverse quarters as philosophy, psychoanalysis and the social sciences. This interest has contributed to the revival of the notion of evil, which had been displaced from the center of philosophical discussion in the 20th century. A common trait in the recent literature is that it takes the relevance of the use of the concept of for granted. Yet, before understanding what Kant really means by evil, it seems appropriate to ask first whether the notion of as such is necessary. For, given its religious background, this notion elicits expectations that may be incompatible with the secular concerns of moral philosophy. Such misgivings are aggravated by additional doubts about the concept’s explanatory function in the first place. The pertinence of reviving a concept so allegedly flawed cannot be taken at face value. Thus, the task I set for myself here is to show the necessity of the concept of as it lies at the core of Kant’s moral philosophy already in the Groundwork, far before he actually coins the notion of radical evil in the Religion. Whether this latter account is defensible or not, we will at least be sure that talk about an which is said to be is not in vain.

Evil and theodicy in the theology of Karl Barth

In the broad arena of Barth studies there has been surprisingly little done on Barth's view of evil. This book provides a comprehensive look at the peculiar ontology of evil within Barth's theological framework including the development of the concepts of evil in his early theology. It finds that Barth's most important treatment of evil is not found in his famous section on Das Nichtige, but rather in his Doctrine of God. The book's primary focus is on demonstrating that there are four dominant motifs that provide essential insight for proper understanding of his doctrine of evil. In analysing and critiquing these motifs this study provides the reader with a clearer understanding and appreciation of Barth's doctrine of evil. This book concludes with a construction of a Barthian theodicy, and drawing out implications for Christian preaching, counseling, and ethics.

Die mens as sondaar - Die beskouing van Karl Barth

Human being as sinner: The view of Karl Barth Karl Barth’s view on the doctrine of evil, as reflected in KD IV/1(S 60), can be regarded as a critical correction of the theology of revolution and theology of liberation as a deviation from reformed theology - in so far as evil is no longer situated in the heart of human being, but in social, economical and political structures. In this view, people themselves are separated from sin as a quantity within themselves, instead of a quality of themseKfes. Consequently the sins of others are always the greatest. In contrast to this view, Barth argues that evil is not something in human being, but that human being himself/herself is a sinner, radically, totally and universally. In this article the focus is on Barth’s view concerning the knowledge and the real essence of sin. In an ensuing article the question whom the sinner is will be addressed.

Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Evil

This essay will attempt to make some systematic clarity out of the thought of St. Augustine in reference to his conception of evil. The problem of evil is one which confronted St. Augustine at every point of his intellectual development; it is everywhere either to be openly seen or to be perceived lurking just beneath the surface of the question at issue. This assertion, however, needs some qualification as will become evident as the essay develops. The essay will attempt to show that the problem of evil for St. Augustine resolves itself into the problem of the will. This problem is, for Augustine, clearly at the base of man's moral dilemmas. The question of the will of God is at the root of the theological-philosophical doctrines of creation and natural order. The problem of the will comes to the fore as the metaphysical question par excellence; bound up with the question of the motivation of the will (or more particularly here, the question of the ‘cause’ of the defection of the human will) is the arch-problem of the introduction of a dynamic link into the movement from an unmoved Creator to a changing creation. An attempt will be made to point out the bearing of the more overtly theological questions of grace and predestination upon the questions of the will, evil and creation. Of a piece with these concepts is that of the Augustinian epistemology.