Этика Фихте о радикальном зле

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Fichte constructs the general part of his early ethics as a philosophy of concrete freedom in the shape of a history of moral self-consciousness, and in the course of this construction he discovers something what he, in Kantian stile, may call a “radical evil in human nature”, that is, a force of “inertness to reflection and to activity in accordance with such reflection” inherent to human nature. Schelling and some contemporary authors recognize in Fichte’s doctrine of evil a symptom of his return to the ethical naturalism of the Enlightenment. An anal­ysis of the dynamics of moral reflection in the I according to Fichte shows, however, that, exactly as the I itself is for Fichte essentially a duality, a subject-object, so is each particular position in the movement of the self-reflection of the I, on the one hand, conditioned by this spiritual inertness of human nature, but that same inertness is, on the other hand, a chain with which human free­dom retains itself, and therefore actually inexistent as a restraining force for a free I, conscious of his own ethical vocation, so that its dwelling within the limits of the customary (in the invariability of consciousness) is the subject’s own fault as “non-use of freedom”. The spiritual inertness, as an empirical con­dition of possibility of a bad choice, is nevertheless in Fichte a spiritual force of a specific kind, active even there where ethical choice in the strict sense of the term is not (yet) at issue. Schelling’s reproof must therefore be acknowledged as invalid, exactly because the history of self-consciousness is, in Fichte’s ethics, not so much an exposition of a real sequence, as a transcendental reflec­tion of grounds.