Abstract
This chapter takes Kant’s understanding of our finitude and imperfection as a central theme by examining the main feature of Kant’s philosophical anthropology, namely, Kant’s account of what he calls “unsocial sociability” or “the propensity to radical evil in human nature,” which are but two ways to describe our dependency and moral imperfection. First, I examine what Kant has to say about the “unsocial sociability” of human beings. I then turn to Kant’s treatment of radical evil in human nature in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, since that is a work in which Kant more precisely explains the ways in which human nature possesses the animal tendency to easy living and happiness. Next I look closely at Kant’s treatment of the inclinations in the Groundwork and their relation to what he calls “moral worth,” since critics of Kant often wrongly take this text to commit Kant to a wholesale rejection of sensible/sensuous nature as the cause of moral evil and the obstacle standing in the way of our acting genuinely morally. After providing a correct understanding of the relevant parts of the Groundwork, I then turn to Kant’s account of affects and passions, two particular species of emotion and desire. I conclude the chapter by considering Kant’s view of happiness, which he identifies as the natural end of human beings.
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