District Magnitude Research Articles

Party systems, electoral systems, and legislative fragmentation

Using electoral data from a nearly comprehensive set of the world’s electoral democracies (1992–2014), including 131 independent countries and one non-sovereign territory, this article develops an explanatory model of legislative fragmentation that incorporates electoral fragmentation, the territorial patterns of party support, district magnitude, specific electoral system effects, and the balance of personal and party vote components within the incentive structures generated by electoral rules. The analysis proves that there is a strong negative association between the territorial homogeneity of the vote and legislative fragmentation, and shows that those varieties of electoral rules that increase the salience of personal component in party-centred elections tend to enhance legislative fragmentation. Due to its statistical properties, the model allows for establishing the impact of each of the factors, as well as their relative weights, with a high degree of certainty.

Does district magnitude matter? The case of Taiwan

A sizable literature on electoral institutions argues that proportional electoral rules lead to higher voter turnout. However, recent work finds little evidence that the effect generalizes beyond western Europe and suggests that the theoretical arguments in the literature remain sparse, incomplete, and contradictory. I use a well-chosen data set to resolve the problem of omitted variable bias and Bayesian model averaging to address model uncertainty. I use Bayes factors to evaluate evidence both for and against the null hypotheses and find that the proportionality of electoral rules exerts no meaningful effect on turnout or any of the theoretical mechanisms I test.

Coordination failure and the politics of tribes: Jordanian elections under SNTV

We often question how electoral rules will impact elections around the world. I take up this important question in Jordan, which has the single non-transferable vote system. A paramount expectation from the larger literature is that district magnitude (M) will be a key determinant of the number of candidates with the number of candidates reduced to approximately M + 1. However, using district-level returns, I find that the effective number of candidates regularly departs from our theoretical expectations of M + 1 candidates. I further explore Jordan's unique case with an analysis of both district level characteristics and elite level sources of this coordination failure. On the one hand, even under authoritarian conditions, the relationship between the number of candidates and district magnitude is consistent with the larger literature. On the other hand, there is wide variation across districts, even among small magnitude ones, suggesting other factors at play that dampen the reductive effect of electoral institutions on the number of candidates. In particular, I argue it is the regime's strategic manipulation of the electoral rules that undermines strategic coordination and subverts the expected effects of both institutional and sociological factors on the number of electoral competitors. In addition, the tribal nature of Jordanian politics, and specifically the inability of tribal elites to limit entry, is a significant source of the large number of candidates.

The impact of the electoral system on the level of women's legislative representation in post-apartheid South Africa

In just two decades after the demise of apartheid in South Africa, women's legislative representation has grown in leaps and bounds rising from nearly nothing to over 40%, which is twice the world average of 20%. While this trend can be attributed to a number of factors, this paper casts a spotlight on the role of the electoral system structure vis-à-vis the changes in women's representation. The paper investigates how the proportional representation system and its associated features such as the use of closed lists, multimember constituencies and a large district magnitude have influenced increased women's electoral representation in post-apartheid South Africa. The paper further argues that while the electoral system has played an important role in the rise of women's representation, this explanation is hardly sufficient as statistics show that the rapid increase of female representatives is linked, among other factors, to the African National Congress 50/50 gender quota which has seen it contributing more than 75% of women representation in the National Assembly.

The international diffusion of electoral systems: The spread of mechanisms tempering proportional representation across Europe

AbstractThere is an assumption in much of the electoral engineering literature that domestic episodes of electoral system choice occur in a vacuum, isolated from international influences. Yet this assumption remains largely untested, despite the comparative focus of much of that literature. This article focuses on part of this gap by considering two electoral mechanisms that seek to limit party system fragmentation under proportional representation – low district magnitudes and high electoral thresholds – and shows that the mechanisms have spread across many European countries during the post‐1945 period. Analyses reveal that national legislators are more likely to adopt one of these electoral mechanisms when a large number of peer countries have made similar choices within the last two or three years. This effect is robust to various model specifications and to the inclusion of multiple controls. The article also offers some qualitative evidence from case studies and parliamentary debates.

Does increasing district magnitude increase the number of parties? Evidence from Spain, 1982–2011

• District-level results from Spain, which redistributes seats while holding districtboundaries constant, provide evidence that exogenous changes in district magnitude change electoral dynamics.

Assessing the Mechanical and Psychological Effects of District Magnitude

District magnitude is a central aspect of the institutional context in PR elections, and it influences parties’ and voters’ strategies. The incentives for strategic behaviour are stronger in smaller districts, as only large parties are likely to be viable. This article investigates how much the vote is affected by this characteristic of the electoral context, focusing on the 2005 and 2009 Portuguese elections. Portugal is one of the countries with the largest degree of variation in district magnitude and represents thus an ideal case for analysing district magnitude effects. Relying on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, this study shows a strong mechanical effect of district magnitude and a limited psychological effect.

Deciding on the Electoral System: Chile's Adoption of Proportional Representation in 1925

AbstractIn 1925 a new electoral system was introduced in Chile. This reform changed the electoral formula from a cumulative voting system to a proportional one (d'Hondt) and established new rules about district magnitude and form of voting. It has been argued that this reform was motivated by the emergence of new parties or the expansion of the electorate. This article offers an alternative explanation: in the case of Chile, the main reason for the electoral reform was the parties' need to solve problems of strategic coordination stemming from the characteristics of the Chilean cumulative voting system. In this context, the Chilean case shows that there are many routes to proportionality.

Voting correctly in lab elections with monetary incentives

Whether people make the right choice when they vote for a given candidate or party and what factors affect the capacity to vote correctly have been recurrent questions in the political science literature. This paper contributes to this debate by looking at how the complexity of the electoral context affects voters’ capacity to vote correctly. Correct voting is defined as a vote that maximizes one’s payoffs in lab elections with monetary incentives. We examine two aspects of the electoral context: district magnitude and the distribution of preferences within the electorate. The main finding is that the frequency of correct voting is much higher in single-member than in multi-member district elections. As soon as there is more than one single seat to be allocated, voters have more difficulty figuring out whether they should vote sincerely for their preferred party or opt strategically for another party in order to maximize their payoffs. By contrast, the distribution of preferences within the electorate has no significant effect.

Electoral Systems and Legislators’ Constituency Effort

In so far as legislators value re-election, electoral institutions are said to shape their strategic behavior. Yet, the empirical evidence linking legislators’ behavior to electoral institutions is weak at best. Previous studies, we argue, have either ignored or misspecified how legislators’ vulnerability to electoral defeat mediates the expected effect of electoral institutions. To test this argument, we develop and operationalize a new comparative measure of electoral vulnerability which we combine with new individual-level data on legislators’ constituency effort in 14 (mostly European) countries. Our data demonstrate that the effect of electoral institutions on constituency effort is different dependent on legislators’ electoral precariousness. In party-centered systems, district magnitude’s negative effect grows weaker among those most vulnerable. In candidate-centered systems, by contrast, district magnitude’s positive effect grows even stronger among those most vulnerable. The results suggest the need to revisit studies focusing exclusively on the impact of institutions on legislators’ constituency-oriented behavior.

Why Northern Ireland’s Institutions Need Stability

Northern Ireland’s consociational institutions were reviewed by a committee of its Assembly in 2012–13. The arguments of both critics and exponents of the arrangements are of general interest to scholars of comparative politics, power-sharing and constitutional design. The authors of this article review the debates and evidence on the d’Hondt rule of executive formation, political designation, the likely impact of changing district magnitudes for assembly elections, and existing patterns of opposition and accountability. They evaluate the scholarly, political and legal literature before commending the merits of maintaining the existing system, including the rules under which the system might be modified in future.

Do Politics in Europe Benefit from Politicising Corruption?

In this article, two unexplored trends in European electoral politics are highlighted. Using newly collected data the article tracks the politicisation of corruption in electoral campaigns from 1981 to 2011, an electoral strategy that has been increasing over time in most European countries. It then empirically tests two aspects of this campaign strategy. First, what are the factors that are systematically associated with a party’s decision to politicise corruption? Second, what are the electoral effects in terms of relative vote share for parties that politicise corruption? Using an original data-set that employs multi-level data (parties nested in countries) the results demonstrate first that politicisation of corruption occurs systematically more often among established parties from the main opposition, new parties and parties on the political right, and occurs as a function of country-level corruption, district magnitude and public party financing. Second, it is found that the main opposition and new parties that use such a campaign strategy make significant electoral gains relative to the previous election compared to parties that do not politicise corruption. Yet gains are offset in low-corruption countries. The findings demonstrate salient implications for research on party systems, corruption studies and democratic legitimacy, among other areas of investigation.

Partisan turnout bias and district magnitude

This article examines how the partisan turnout bias (i.e. turnout rate differences across districts that are linked to the partisan vote shares in those districts) changes over time in PR districted electoral systems. We argue that the bias after the founding election is the unintended consequence of parties and voters' strategic behaviors when they respond to the incentives provided by the electoral system. By looking at the case of Portugal, one of the countries with the largest variation in district magnitude, we find that the increasing asymmetry in turnout rates across districts makes the bias more severe as time goes by.

Local Districts, National Contexts, and the Number of Parties

To date, electoral systems are conceptualised as setting an ‘upper bound’ to, or defining a ‘carrying capacity’ for, the number of parties or lists, and their effect is assessed at the district level. This article adds to the empirical study of electoral systems by analysing a vast database of district-level electoral returns. The argument focuses on the demand and supply of viable electoral candidates, which are conditioned by the interplay of strategic entry (by the party rank and file) and strategic voting (by the electorate). Drawing on a database of almost 18,000 electoral districts taken from 15 West European countries, the empirical analysis yields a number of insights: most specifically, (1) district magnitude only becomes binding and effective when a higher social demand meets a lower carrying capacity of the electoral district; (2) the provision of upper tiers undermines the emergence of Duvergerian equilibria within the primary electoral districts.

When Do Close Elections Matter for Higher Turnout? Gauging the Impact of the Interaction Between Electoral Competitiveness and District Magnitude

A conventional rational choice perspective assumes a positive relationship between close elections and higher turnout because of the increased probability that few votes might actually matter for the election outcome. However, this hypothesis should only hold in electoral districts where one or few candidates are elected. In contrast, close elections should have less of an impact in districts where many members are elected because these districts are characterized by a proportional translation of votes into seats. Testing the foregoing logic, this article evaluates the interactive influence between the closeness of an election and the district magnitude on turnout. The results of the multivariate regression analysis, which includes data for over 600 elections across the globe, support the idea that close elections boost electoral participation in districts with one or few elected members, but not in districts with many elected representatives.

The law of large districts: How district magnitude affects the quality of political representation

It is well established that individual parliamentary representatives are less likely to decide according to the preferences of their constituency when the number of representatives per district, i.e. district magnitude, increases. However, we propose that for majority decisions of district representatives the opposite holds due to the existence of a law of large numbers in political representation. The academic literature has so far focused on the behavior of individual politicians but disregarded systematic aggregation effects. We provide a theoretical discussion and offer empirical evidence for the validity of a law of large numbers in political representation: As district magnitude increases, the quality of political representation by the majority of representatives increases, too.

District magnitude and the personal vote

In spite of widespread interest in the effects of electoral institutions, research has largely missed, or misspecified, the ‘theoretical link’ tying legislators' behaviour to the rules' formal properties. District magnitude, in particular, can operate through the number of candidates running under the same party label and the number of votes required to win (re)election. Using data from the PARTIREP cross-national legislator survey in 15 European democracies, the article demonstrates that district magnitude is a proxy of different processes in closed-list and open-list systems. The findings contribute to a better understanding of how the mechanical effects of electoral institutions translate into incentives on the part of legislators to cultivate a personal reputation.

Lone fighters: Intraparty competition, interparty competition, and candidates' vote seeking efforts in open-ballot PR elections

In their seminal paper, Carey and Shugart (1995) argue that electoral rules predetermine whether election campaigns are predominantly characterized by competition between parties, or among candidates within parties. In particular, electoral systems that provide weak party control over ballot access, that allow voters to express a preference vote for individual candidates, and that select candidates on the basis of the votes they earn individually are supposed to offer strong incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote. In this paper, we investigate Carey and Shugart's original claims about the instrumental motivations of candidates in open-ballot proportional representation (PR) elections using survey data and election statistics from the 2007 Swiss National Council elections. As opposed to previous work, we develop and employ more direct and valid measures of intra- and interparty incentives to wage personal campaigns. Our empirical results suggest that the candidates' campaign focus and expenditures are closely linked to intraparty competition, but not interparty competition. Previously used proxies of intraparty competition, such as district magnitude or the number of candidates on a party list (or ratios thereof), turn out to be but remotely related to the candidates' campaign behavior.

Candidate centred campaigning in a party centred context: The case of Belgium

Candidates to the Belgian Chamber of Representatives vary considerably with regard to the extent to which they run personalized campaigns. However, very few candidates get elected on the basis of preference votes. In light of this weak link between preference voting and the actual allocation of mandates, this paper asks about why Belgian candidates run personalized campaigns at all. Our findings point to the impact of the following factors in this regard: district magnitude, party magnitude, electoral safety, and seniority with regard to party organizational offices. Furthermore, our findings also demonstrate considerable differences between Belgian parties with regard to the extent to which their candidates run personalized campaigns.

How Electoral Institutions Change the Influence of World Trade Integration on Trade Policies

World integration levels influence opportunity costs of maintaining restrictive national trade policies. In an integrated world, restrictive trade policies are more costly than in a context of low overall levels of world market integration. We argue that policy makers can be expected to react to these varying incentives to liberalize the trade regimes of their countries, yet do so not in a uniform fashion across countries. Rather, the responsiveness to changes in levels of world trade integration is conditional upon the electoral system the country in question employs. This is due to the fact that opportunity cost considerations increase in importance with a) the degree to which policy makers are isolated from the influence of protectionist interest groups; and b) the credibility with which losers of integration can be promised compensation. Both aspects weigh more strongly in countries that employ proportional representation as opposed to majority voting. We test this hypothesis using a model of conditional trade policy diffusion where world levels of integration are treated as diffusion influence that is interacted with a measure of the proportionality of a country’s electoral system. Empirical results support the hypothesis. Moreover, it is shown that it is district magnitude as a measure of proportionality rather than the higher number of parties associated with more proportional voting rules that drives the results.