District Magnitude Research Articles

Assessing electoral coordination: A quasi-experimental design of changes in district magnitude over time

This paper examines the impact of district magnitude, defined as the number of representatives elected per district, on the number of political parties. Conventional wisdom, supported by cross-national and within-country studies, indicates a positive and curvilinear relationship between district magnitude and the number of parties, with diminishing returns in larger-magnitude districts. However, this relationship is complicated by the increasing regionalization of party systems and the distinct socio-economic compositions of districts correlated with district magnitude. To address these limitations and obtain an appropriate counterfactual, we employ a quasi-experimental design using data from Spain, where district magnitude changes by only one seat in some districts and elections. Our findings align with previous research, confirming that the number of electoral parties increases with district magnitude, particularly in low-magnitude districts.

Speech targeting and constituency representation in open-list electoral systems

This study investigates the localistic behavior of legislators elected under open-list proportional representation (OLPR), focusing on the impacts of district magnitude, intra-party competition, electorate size, and the presence of a national tier. We examine the Ecuadorian case, where institutional reformers implemented a national tier to offset the parochial tendencies of lower-tier provincial legislators yet retained OLPR for both tiers. Our study, which analyzes a 12-year dataset of congressional speeches, challenges the expectation that national-tier members are less localistic than their provincial counterparts and shows that electoral incentives drive legislators’ geographical focus. Contrary to conventional expectations, we find no evidence that increased intra-party competition is associated with more localistic behavior. However, there is consistent support for the hypothesis that smaller electoral constituencies amplify localistic behavior.

Electoral vulnerability and localism under two electoral regimes: the case of Chile

ABSTRACT This article seeks to test empirically to what extent localist behavior by legislators is influenced by electoral vulnerability in Chile, following a recent electoral reform. Our results show that such a relationship exists in the case of non-legislative speeches delivered in the Chamber of Deputies, but not in the case of personal meetings held by parliamentarians with constituents. Furthermore, we found that the relationship between electoral vulnerability and a focus on local issues depends on district magnitude. By examining pre- and post-reform periods, after district magnitude was increased while preserving proportional rules, we also show that incentives to cultivate personal votes are more nuanced under the reformed system.

Voting Local? Electoral Rules and Geographical Representation in Europe

ABSTRACT In comparison with the expanding body of literature on representation, the number of studies examining geographical aspects of it remains relatively limited. This relates primarily to comparative analyses, but also to the array of methodological tools used to measure localness. Our study seeks to address this gap by introducing a novel measurement based on Gallagher’s index of disproportionality. Drawing on contemporary data from 27 European countries, we envisioned an operationalisation of geographical representation which prevents the expected lack of representation of small municipalities to affect the index values, instead focusing on relative population sizes in correlation with the relative number of elected MPs. We introduce the data, and then proceed to establish which country-level determinants influence the Index of territorial disproportionality. The findings indicate that district magnitude and number, parliament size, and the difference between established and new democracies have a high impact on the proportionality of local representation. On the other hand, the opening of lists for more voters’ influence within the PR list system, implemented mainly through preferential voting, appears to have no impact, indicating that parties tend to nominate (and voters tend to elect) local candidates even when institutional incentives of the electoral system are low.

Application of the District Magnitude Principle in Determining Electoral Districts and Allocation of Seats (Study at the General Election Commission of Lampung Province)

Application of the District Magnitude Principle in Determining Electoral Districts and Allocation of Seats (Study at the General Election Commission of Lampung Province)

Centre party, district magnitude, and wage inequality in service economy

This paper aims to elucidate the variations in wage inequality within the service industry across different nations. Scholars have emphasised the pivotal role of policies designed to balance flexibility and job security in the service sector, crucial for fostering its growth while mitigating wage disparities. We argue that the balance between flexibility and security of service sector employment is most likely to emerge under centre party governments in high-magnitude electoral systems. Centre parties, owing to their political detachment from organised labour and industry, encounter fewer obstacles in representing the unorganised interests of service sector workers. Furthermore, high-district magnitude systems incentivise centre parties to build comprehensive coalitions that address the diverse concerns of service sector workers. Our empirical analysis, spanning 14 OECD countries from 1995 to 2007, demonstrates that service sector wage inequality diminishes as district magnitude and the cabinet share of centre parties increase.

Youth with clipped wings: Bridging the gap from youth recruitment to representation in candidate lists

This article assesses the extent to which party youth wings participate in candidate selection and the factors that explain their (lack of) success, focusing on the interplay of formal and informal mechanisms with institutional rules. The results indicate an iceberg-shaped political recruitment ladder, with a stark compression of youth wing representation in the visible steps of candidates and MPs. More youth wing candidates are included in party lists as district magnitude increases, and there is evidence of an apprenticeship effect, with most youth wing candidates who are reselected able to improve their list position. More importantly, informal mechanisms and negotiations between youth wings and the mother party leadership emerge as a central factor in the ability of youth wings to influence candidate lists.

More Options, but Less Willing to Cast a Valid Vote: Evidence From Electoral Reform in Chile

How do large-magnitude proportional systems affect invalid voting? We evaluate a Chilean electoral system reform that introduced proportionality. Voting is voluntary, and legislative and presidential elections are held concurrently. We compare the invalid votes between different types of elections before and after the reform using various difference-in-differences strategies. We find that invalid voting increased in legislative compared to presidential elections (pre-trends were parallel). The increase in invalid voting is greater in post-reform districts with higher magnitude and is not due to pre-reform district characteristics. The results of heterogeneity analyses and a survey experiment suggest the mechanism behind these findings is the cognitive burden associated with a longer ballot. This research highlights an understudied aspect of electoral systems: higher district magnitudes may be demobilizing in terms of valid voting for citizens who are more vulnerable to cognitive burden, even among those motivated enough to vote in the first-order election.

The ‘odd–even effect’: The link between the number of parties and district magnitude

AbstractIn electoral systems with districts that vary in magnitude, the number of seats to be filled in each district will be even or odd. We argue that such a variation has crucial political consequences, called the ‘odd–even effect’. In low‐magnitude districts, elections are more competitive when the district magnitude is odd than even; the incentives for coordination are thus stronger in the former scenario than in the latter. Employing quasi‐experimental data from 780 districts in Spain's lower house elections, we show that the number of parties is smaller in low‐magnitude districts with an odd number of seats than in low‐magnitude districts with an even number of seats. The elite‐ and voter‐level mechanisms driving the odd–even effect are examined using data on mobilisation efforts and wasted votes at the district level.

District Magnitude and Female Representation

En este trabajo argumentamos que el efecto global de la magnitud de distrito sobre la representación femenina es ambiguo, dado que la magnitud de distrito puede aumentar tanto (a) la magnitud partidaria—lo que promueve la elección de mujeres—como (b) el número de listas que obtienen escaños—que la dificulta, ya que las listas marginales suelen estar encabezadas por hombres. Para identificar el efecto de interés, explotamos el hecho de que la Cámara de Diputados argentina y la legislatura de la provincia de Buenos Aires eligen la mitad de sus miembros cada dos años, lo que hace que algunos distritos tengan magnitudes distintas en elecciones concurrentes y de medio término. Los resultados reflejan un efecto positivo pero débil de la magnitud de distrito sobre la representación femenina, que puede descomponerse en un efecto positivo impulsado por la magnitud de partido y uno negativo explicado por el número de listas que obtienen escaños. Un análisis adicional de siete países latinoamericanos arroja resultados similares.

How proportional are electoral systems? A universal measure of electoral rules

The proportionality principle of electoral systems plays an important role in multiple literatures, including comparative politics, political economy, and conflict studies. The single most important electoral system feature used to determine whether an electoral system might provide for proportional outcomes is district magnitude, i.e., the number of representatives that are elected from a given district. However, once we move beyond “simple” systems, measuring the institutional side of the equation becomes more complex. The legislative electoral systems of three out of five (61%) contemporary democracies rely on multiple institutional rules that affect the proportionality of their seat allocation, for example by combining different district magnitudes in multiple tiers, or delimiting the number of parties that can win seats through legal thresholds. There is no widely accepted measure of district magnitude for such cases. Relying on four simple axioms, this article extends the concept of district magnitude to all these complex electoral systems. We introduce the effective district magnitude, a new index that measures the proportionality of electoral systems based solely on institutional rules. It is applicable for all rules used in national parliamentary elections in democracies worldwide. This new, theory-based index improves the explanatory power of two crucial variables usually associated with district magnitude: vote-seat disproportionality and party system fragmentation.

When do elections help autocrats? The plight of Palestinians under SNTV in Jordan

Autocrats are often accused of manipulating electoral rules to favour pro-regime groups at the expense of the opposition. They select electoral systems, gerrymander districts, and engage in electoral fraud to ensure that elections do not challenge their rule. We investigate the extent to which incumbent rulers engage in such tactics by focusing on the case of Jordan. In particular we examine whether the Jordanian regime has ‘tweaked’ the single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) so that it systematically favours ethnic Jordanian tribes of nomadic descent, who form the bedrock of support for the monarchy and against ethnic Palestinian tribes, who are more supportive of opposition parties. SNTV is also notorious for causing coordination problems for parties – or tribes in this case – that offer candidates. Using data from municipal elections, we find that the regime does indeed advantage nomadic residents. Municipalities with a significant presence of these residents were assigned a greater number of council seats per unit of population and lower district magnitudes, facilitating electoral coordination. Nomadic tribes also performed better with regard to voter coordination but not in nominating the optimal number of candidates. eOur findings demonstrate that clean elections in authoritarian countries if done “right” can perpetuate and bolster regime favourites while simultaneously disenfranchising their challengers.

Offer money, they will accept: linkages between authoritarian tendencies and clientelist targeting in Africa

ABSTRACT Understanding clientelist practices is one of the core issues to unravel to ensure the proper functioning of electoral institutions. This article focuses on the decision of patrons/brokers on who to target, introducing a new norm into the picture – authoritarianism. Building on the theories of norm-based compliance, I argued that authoritarian individuals should be more frequently targeted, as they should be more likely to comply with brokers demands without external monitoring. I posit that this is true because authoritarian individuals should be more willing to submit to the will and demands of authorities (brokers), and because they are likely to evaluate clientelism as morally acceptable and a legitimate electoral strategy. Furthermore, the rate of authoritarian targeting should be higher in institutional settings that limit the overall reach of clientelism. Utilizing Afrobarometer (2011-2013) data for 34 countries, through multilevel regression modelling I show that authoritarian individuals do have a higher chance of being targeted with the strength of this association increasing as the district magnitude rises. This article opens a new avenue of research that introduces individual level authoritarianism into the literature on clientelist targeting and complements the norm-based compliance approach with a focus on a new and potentially influential norm.

The psychological partisan effect of electoral systems: How ideology correlates with strategic voting

Districted proportional systems give an edge to right-wing parties that are more popular in rural areas where district magnitude is small and large parties are mechanically advantaged. In this paper, we explore the role played by voters in this bias by looking at how ideology correlates with strategic voting. We analyze survey data from 44 elections in Western Europe and find that left-wing voters are more likely to support a party that is not viable ( p < 0.01), but once in this position they seem less likely to desert this party for one that is viable ( p < 0.1). Further, we find that this pattern is likely driven by the intensity of partisan preferences as left-wing voters are on average more attached to their favorite party and thus more reluctant to desert it ( p < 0.01). Our study thus demonstrates that the psychological effect of districted proportional systems amplifies the mechanical one in advanced industrial democracies.

Are leftist or rightist voters better substantively represented? The effects of variance in district magnitude on party-voter ideological congruence

How does the variation in district magnitude in districted proportional representation systems affect congruence between a voter and their party of choice? I argue that voters in large-magnitude districts will have higher levels of party-voter congruence than voters in small-magnitude districts, due to stronger strategic incentives and reduced party options in small-magnitude districts. Furthermore, I argue that this relationship will be stronger among leftist voters compared to rightist voters, due to the concentration of rightist voters in rural, small-magnitude districts and leftist voters in urban, high-magnitude districts. These expectations are tested using data that from 45 elections in 12 districted proportional representation systems included in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). The results support the expectation that party-voter ideological congruence will be higher for voters in larger electoral districts, and lower for voters located within smaller districts. Leftist voters do appear to suffer a congruence penalty in smaller districts, whereas the congruence of rightist voters is less affected by district magnitude. An examination of the mechanisms behind this finding suggests that leftist-voters in small-magnitude districts are faced with a smaller and more right-leaning set of party options.

Length of candidate lists and political careers: Quasi-experimental evidence from Brazil

This paper provides causal estimates of the effects of increases in the size of candidate lists on the political careers of newcomers to the political arena. We explore an exogenous discontinuity in district magnitude that allows parties to expand their candidate lists in the Brazilian open-list local elections and find that the additional candidacies are allocated to weaker candidates, mainly newcomers, who end up occupying a significant share of the additional seats. We also find that the electoral experience provided by the additional candidacies increases the number of newcomers elected in their second attempt.

The Role of District Magnitude in When Women Represent Women

AbstractLegislators are likely to substantively represent groups to which they belong or with which they have some particular affinity. However, there are electoral systems that diminish this tendency and systems that promote it. More precisely, as district magnitude increases, representatives will be freer to focus on issues that are not decisive of vote choice for most voters. In this letter, we use a case of electoral reform and the nature of the post-reform chamber (Chile's Chamber of Deputies) to test whether increasing district magnitude makes it more likely that women will focus on women's issues. A series of tests on multiple sets of observations show robust results for the conclusion that as the number of candidates elected in a district increases, elected women become more likely to pursue women's issues.

Do (strong) gender quotas make a difference? Multiple candidacies as a party gatekeeping strategy in Italy

Gender quotas are generally regarded as the foremost measure for the promotion of gender equality in politics. While quotas and their impact vary across countries, a strong quota system is defined as including blocked electoral lists, large district magnitude, strong non-compliance sanctions, and rank-order rules like gender alternation in the candidate lists. Yet, also in the presence of strong quota rules, parties might attempt strategies aimed at mitigating their gender-balancing effect. By taking Italy as a case study, in this article we investigate whether and how parties competing in the 2018 elections were able to adapt their gender gatekeeping strategy to the new quota law. Our finding suggests that Italian parties relied on another characteristic of the electoral system—namely, the possibility of multiple candidacies—to successfully hinder women candidates' chances of election. Accordingly, we highlight that a wider set of electoral system characteristics should be taken into account in the design of a (strong) quota law.

The effect of campaign spending, district magnitude and incumbency when electoral rules create districts with old and new voters: the case of Chile in 2017

The impact of campaign spending, generally greater for challengers than for incumbents, is conditioned by electoral rules and incumbency—normally seen as a dichotomous condition. But when an electoral reform changes the composition of districts, a legislator is an incumbent only in the section of the new district. In Chile, the 60 open-list proportional representation 2-member districts used until 2013 were combined to create 28 open-list PR districts for the 2017 election, thus making some legislators enjoy a higher degree of incumbency. With data from 1430 candidates in the 2013 and 2017 legislative elections, we report a nonlinear positive effect of campaign spending on electoral success in all district magnitudes. Campaign spending has a higher impact as the number of open seats increases and a stronger effect for incumbents whose old districts comprise a larger share of the new districts. Campaign spending matters differently for challengers and incumbents given the moderating effect of district magnitude, the number of open seats and the percentage of incumbency.

Electoral System and Party Survival: The Case of Indonesian Democracy 1999-2019

Studies on party survival strongly emphasize the internal dynamics of political parties and their ability to adapt to retain voter support. This article contends that changes in electoral systems and laws, classified as an external factors, also have a significant impact. As a result of these changes, new political parties cannot register to run for office. These changes have also made small political parties with little support unable to survive in parliament. Two significant findings emerge from this case study of Indonesia’s five election cycles. First, changes in Indonesia’s electoral systems and laws have been heavily influenced by the desire of major political parties to strengthen their positions in the political arena. They raised the parliamentary threshold using their legislative authority to make it more difficult for minor political parties to send representatives to parliament. Second, critical variables in electoral systems and laws such as district magnitude, seat conversion formula, and parliamentary threshold do not independently impact party survival. As a result, at least two variables must be combined, namely district magnitude and parliamentary threshold.