Abstract
This study investigates the localistic behavior of legislators elected under open-list proportional representation (OLPR), focusing on the impacts of district magnitude, intra-party competition, electorate size, and the presence of a national tier. We examine the Ecuadorian case, where institutional reformers implemented a national tier to offset the parochial tendencies of lower-tier provincial legislators yet retained OLPR for both tiers. Our study, which analyzes a 12-year dataset of congressional speeches, challenges the expectation that national-tier members are less localistic than their provincial counterparts and shows that electoral incentives drive legislators’ geographical focus. Contrary to conventional expectations, we find no evidence that increased intra-party competition is associated with more localistic behavior. However, there is consistent support for the hypothesis that smaller electoral constituencies amplify localistic behavior.
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