Distribution Of Public Goods Research Articles

Spatial Cost of Living Indices and the Distribution of Public Goods

This paper develops cost of living (COL) indices that vary across space. While conventional indices adjust for differences in prices, the COL defined here also reflects access to public goods. This analysis relies on the structure of a residential sorting model to estimate the COL index for each of 226 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in 1990 and 2000 in the United States. Empirical results show significant differences in the COL across the spatial landscape. This paper focuses on the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality to demonstrate the distribution of public goods across the population. <i>(JEL Q51, Q56)</i>

Health as a Public Good

The purpose of the article is to present different conceptualizations of health as a public good. The author considers whether analytical tools and conceptual framework developed in the studies on the issue of public goods might be useful in order to analyze health. It was noted that health belongs to the special group of exceptional goods, since it carries the characteristics of both private and public good. It was emphasized that the distribution of public goods is a complex issue that requires an appropriate system of incentives as well as instruments in charge of its proper functioning. In the article it is argued that the widespread social anxiety and growing fear of further integration and globalization to a large extend results from the wrong management and unequal provision of global public goods.

Planning practices in Galicia: How communities compensate the lack of statutory planning using bottom up planning initiatives

Planning practices performed by non-governmental actors are often not considered as part the spatial planning domain. Spatial planning is generally associated with governmental activity: coordination that is aimed at a formal regulation of land uses and distribution of public goods. Nevertheless, the influence of other actors, like communities, is becoming increasingly important in planning studies. In this paper we argue that planning practices performed by local communities do deliver an important contribution to the improvement of local living circumstances. From the perspective of dialectics we explore how planning practices performed by communities and governments evolve and continuously shape and reshape the performance of spatial planning. These processes are studied qualitatively in rural Galicia, an Autonomous Region in North-Western Spain. Here we studied how two local communities developed and implemented their own plans for local public services and economic development. These two cases were studied in-depth through interviews with involved community members and field visits. Case study results show that a comprehensive recognition of dialectics is necessary to understand how a spatial organization is shaped. Without this understanding it is difficult to value the contribution of planning practices performed by communities to a better spatial organization.

The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Valuable Benchmark in the Regulation of Economic Relations

The principle of subsidiarity can be an effective tool for adjusting economic systems and establishing the social rule-of-law concept in public organisation. In considering the usability of the principle of subsidiarity, the following aspects thereof are discussed: the role in the development of the European social model; employment in determining limits for the powers of the public and private sectors; the application in the market and planned economy systems; and the social justice function in the development of a social welfare state. The principle of subsidiarity as an instrument for individuals’ interests, balancing and adjusting in the regulation of economic systems, helps to establish the relative sizes of public policy and the market, as subsidiarity can help ensure a more equitable distribution of public goods while guaranteeing the maintenance of the creative potency of operators and minimal satisfaction of vital needs of individuals unable to contribute to the production of goods. It amounts to a constitutional measure determining the balance of productive and protective state, thus ensuring the stability of the state organisation. In the concept of a social rule-of-law state, subsidiarity draws clear limits to the state’s powers, institutionally bringing together efforts of all members of the community to achieve welfare in the state.

From Political to Material Inequality: Race, Immigration, and Requests for Public Goods

Studies of political participation typically analyze voting, contentious collective action, or membership in voluntary associations. Few scholars investigate a more mundane—but highly consequential—form of neighborhood politics: requests for basic city services. We conceptualize city service requests as a direct, instrumental contact with local government that alters the geographical distribution of public goods. We hypothesize that rates of service requests vary with the ethnic and immigrant composition of neighborhoods, due to differences in these communities’ expectations of local government. We test this hypothesis using administrative data from the City of Boston. We find neighborhoods with high concentrations of first‐generation immigrants less likely to request services, relative to need. The concentration of African Americans, however, is associated with large increases in neighborhood service requests. We conclude with implications for the study of race, inequality, and political incorporation.

Erratum--Diversity and the Distribution of Public Goods in Sub-Saharan Africa

Erratum--Diversity and the Distribution of Public Goods in Sub-Saharan Africa

Land-use Controls, Fiscal Zoning, and the Local Provision of Education

Considerable prior analysis has gone into the study of zoning restrictions on locational choice and on fiscal burdens, but none addresses the level and distribution of public goods provided under fiscal zoning. Our analysis emphasizes the interplay between land-use restrictions and public good provision, focusing on schooling outcomes. We extend existing general equilibrium models of location and the provision of education so that fiscal zoning can be put into Tiebout choice. Some households create a fiscal burden, motivating the use of exclusionary land-use controls by local governments. We then analyze the market effects of different land-use controls (minimum lot size [MLS] zoning, local public finance with a head tax, and growth restrictions through fringe zoning) and demonstrate how household behavior directly affects the equilibrium outcomes and the provision of the local public good.

Rethinking Spatial Inequalities in Development: The Primacy of Politics and Power Relations

This paper offers a political explanation to the problem of spatial inequality in developing countries, paying particular attention to the implications of patronage politics and inter-elite power relations for the spatial distribution of public goods. After showing that existing explanations of spatial inequality are at best partial, the paper argues that prospects for overcoming spatial inequalities in the clientelist-driven political environments of developing countries depend substantially on the ways in which elites from lagging regions are incorporated into ruling coalitions, and how such forms of incorporation shape their influence over resource allocation decisions and policy agenda more broadly. The paper also departs from much of the existing literature on spatial inequality by emphasizing the need to understand 'powerlessness' on the part of lagging regions as stemming not necessarily from their political exclusion from political decision making structures, but also from their incorporation into such structures on terms that potentially underpin their poverty. Based on this argument, the paper proposes a new framework for exploring the deeper and more structural underpinnings of spatial inequality in developing countries.

Fit and Feasible: Why Democratizing States Form, not Join, International Organizations1

Does democratization make states join existing international organizations (IOs)? Previous research suggests that democratization increases a state's propensity to join IOs capable of assisting in the distribution of public goods and establishing credibility for domestic reforms. We argue that this is not the case. Instead, recent democratization has a strong effect on a state's propensity to form new IOs. Since democratizing states face different governance problems than established democracies, existing IOs may not be a good “fit.” Additionally, established democracies might hesitate to allow democratizing states membership in the most lucrative existing IOs, thereby making immediate accession to such IOs not “feasible.” Quantitative analysis shows that democratization has a strong and consistently positive effect on the probability of forming a new IO, but not on the probability of joining an existing IO. The findings suggest that international cooperation theorists should begin to analyze forming new and joining existing IOs as alternative strategies that states can use to achieve their policy goals.

Diversity and the Distribution of Public Goods in Sub-Saharan Africa

Diversity is a key issue in the provision of critical publicly provided goods such as clean drinking water and education. To develop institutions that address this issue, it is critical that we understand the mechanisms through which diversity and public goods are related. A simple model of public good provision is developed to demonstrate that there are potentially measurable differences between existing theories, particularly in the distribution of the public good to minority groups. These differences are then illustrated with respect to the distribution of drinking water, electricity and education across 18 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. The results are consistent with ethnic diversity affecting the provision of all three public goods, but with the mechanism behind the effect varying depending on the nature of the public good. Copyright 2013 , Oxford University Press.

Morton's Fork: “Democracy” Versus Neopatrimonialism in Developing Countries

It is argued that conditions for social justice in developing countries are deficient under both state capitalism (“democracy”) and neopatrimonialism. Development assistance is similarly constrained, but it also has shortcomings in relation to “democracy” promotion. Political economy analyses can provide authentic insights into how poor people negotiate for public goods, but such interactions seem unlikely to yield sustainable social justice for most citizens. The assessment calls for a reconfiguration of power relations and a more egalitarian distribution of public goods within and between countries, which is what most people are predisposed to want and are entitled to expect and enjoy.

Success-driven distribution of public goods promotes cooperation but preserves defection

Established already in Biblical times, the Matthew effect refers to the fact that in societies the rich tend to get richer and the potent even more powerful. Here we investigate a game theoretical model describing the evolution of cooperation on structured populations where the distribution of public goods is driven by the reproductive success of individuals. Phase diagrams reveal that cooperation is promoted irrespective of the uncertainty by strategy adoptions and the type of interaction graph, yet the complete dominance of cooperators is elusive due to the spontaneous emergence of superpersistent defectors that owe their survival to extremely rare microscopic patterns. This indicates that success-driven mechanisms are crucial for effectively harvesting benefits from collective actions but that they may also account for the observed persistence of maladaptive behavior.

Participação política, efeitos e resultados em políticas públicas: notas crítico-analíticas

O artigo oferece uma discussão e um modelo de análise sobre as potenciais influências da categoria "participação política" na distribuição de bens e serviços públicos em municípios brasileiros. Mais especificamente, coteja associações entre grau de participação em nível local e qualidade da oferta de tais equipamentos em áreas específicas, notadamente, saneamento, saúde e assistência social. Para isso, em oito municípios brasileiros são levantados aspectos gerenciais cruciais que, sugere-se, são passíveis de influência por políticas de cunho participativo.

Politisation et hiérarchies coloniales : Amérindiens et Noirs-marrons à St-Paul (Guyane française, 1946-2000)

How did the Amerindian and Maroon populations of a French Guyanese administrative district appropriate democratic institutions – in particular, electoral institutions – from the 1960s through the late 1990s ? Voter participation and the development of partisan loyalties first took place thanks to mediators in contact with these populations via Catholic patronage (ecclesiastic personnel, charitable organization volunteers) and, subsequently, the patronage-based distribution of public goods (village “captains”, electoral agents, locally elected representatives). Over the course of the 1980s, associational participation – whether in the Amerindian movement or in local maroon associations – allowed alternative spaces of politicization founded on the defense of group identity and group interest to be constructed. This new activist generation challenged the established Creole elites but remains marginalized in institutional political space, in particular due to social hierarchies inherited from the colonial period and reproduced after the territory was granted the status of an administrative departement. ■

Poverty, Inequality and the Challenges of Pro-Poor Governance in Bangladesh

Weak governance as a result of clientelist practice is often considered as the single-most important factor behind the growing inequality and persistent poverty in Bangladesh. Using a rights-based approach (RBA), this article examines regional disparity, central–local relations and the scope for peoples’ participation under the existing rules and practices. It also sheds light on the cultural aspects of governance constituted of trust, social solidarity and institutional connectivity using an empirical data set generated from a census of six villages in Bangladesh backed by a triangulation of the qualitative and quantitative research tools. It has demonstrated that the rising inter- and intra-regional inequality is an outcome of inequitable distribution of public goods and services confirming the clientelist syndrome of the government. Further, excessive control by the national government impedes innovation and efficient delivery of services by the local bodies, which ultimately hampers pro-poor growth. One of the most important findings of this study is the emergence of the school as the most trusted institution in the village. On the basis of the study, it can also be argued that social capital does not always lead to a positive-sum outcome, rather it can be turned to a zero-sum game depending on the socio-cultural contexts and other factors such as the overall level of literacy of the villagers, strong networks both within and outside the village among other factors.

Topical Issues on the Legal Regulation of the Public Enterprise in Slovenia

When national authorities decide what activities will be needed to provide public goods and to what extent, they must also make a decision on the modes of allocation and distribution of public goods (which are the objects of public service provision) among users. In the practice of the EU Member States, a variety of diverse public service provision systems can be found. They vary between the public sector and the market, and they include numerous and highly diverse organisational forms of public service provision. A public enterprise is one of them. In the Slovenian legal regulation, a variety of problems arise due to the deficiencies in the existing public enterprise organisation. These problems mostly result from some public enterprise status issues regulated under private law. The biggest problem of statutory regulation of the public enterprise status in Slovenia is certainly the absence of a special organisational model of the public enterprise.&#x0D; &#x0D; KEYWORDS: • public services • public enterprise • legal framework • Slovenia

Civil Society and Good Governance in Bangladesh

Many of the recent ideas and concepts of ‘good governance’ and ‘civil society’ in Bangladesh have been generated by the international aid agencies and their ‘good governance’ policy agenda in the 1990s, but there are also local meanings to the terms derived from the independence struggle and the construction of a Bangladeshi state. This article aims to obtain a clearer analytical understanding of the processes and institutions of civil society in Bangladesh that can develop workable strategy to improve governance for helping the poor and moving beyond the patron–client relationships on which they have depended historically. It also focuses attention and debate on those aspects of civil society which can enhance the quality of governance and democracy by overcoming the western top-down approach; and can strengthen the role of civil society organisations to further enhance their impact on better governance for fair distribution of public goods and ensuring social justice for the poor.

Electronic Markets for the Allocation, Financing and Distribution of Public Goods

Abstract Recent research on the usage of electronic markets in digital government has mostly focused on the government's executive branch. This paper discusses several conceptual concerns that obstruct the broader application of electronic market mechanisms to the legislative branch of the government instead. A systematic examination of these concerns shows that most of them are tractable, although further research is necessary to handle some of the complexities involved. We also show how electronic markets can be used not only to improve public decision‐making within the parameters of existing political tradition but also to facilitate progressive changes in the organization of democratic governments.

Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions, and Genocides

Political scientists and economists have exhaustively examined the nexus between economic inequality and political conflict (EI-PC nexus) in aggregated civil wars. This article revisits the nexus and its related theories, empirically and parsimoniously testing the effects of inequality on disaggregated intrastate conflicts. The results buttress the notion that traditionally deprived identity groups are more likely to engage in conflict under more economically equal conditions, while class or revolutionary wars fall under the conditions of greater economic inequality and war. Of the three types of conflicts tested - ethnic conflicts, revolutions, and genocides - economic inequality seems to have the most ambiguous bearing on genocides. Support follows for recent findings that political and social equalities are of greater importance in mitigating ethnic violence and that greed factors might exacerbate violence in all civil conflicts, including genocides. The theoretical argument proposes that the context within which intrastate violence takes place affects the requisite level of relative resources needed for the escalation of violence between groups. The results have policy implications for ethnically divided states that are in the process of equalizing their income differential, but neglect the substantial inclusion of all groups within the political process and the distribution of public goods. The social contracts between the governors and the governed then require careful crafting for a peaceful coexistence of diverse identity groups.

THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC GOODS

The paper examines the complex ways in which public goods are regulated. The provision and distribution of public goods is deeply affected by the degree of excludability of those goods and the regulatory context of that excludability. Using a decentered conception of regulation, the paper shows through various examples how state and non-state actors regulate each other’s capacities to provide, access, and distribute public goods. The paper includes a discussion of the regulation of knowledge by the rules of intellectual property.