Discretionary Expenses Research Articles

Accretive Share Repurchases Versus Accrual/Real Earnings Management: Complements or Substitutes?

This paper seeks to address whether managers use accretive repurchases in conjunction with or to the exclusion of other earnings management tools. Prior literature has shown that managers use accretive repurchases to meet or beat analyst forecasts of earnings per share (EPS). However, whether such planned and aggressive repurchasing of common shares outstanding is used as a complement or substitute for traditional tools of earnings management remains unexplored. I find a complementary relationship between accretive repurchases and income-increasing discretionary accruals, a complementary relationship between accretive repurchases and abnormal discretionary expense cuts, and a substitutional relationship between accretive repurchases and abnormal operating cash flow reductions. In addition, I find that the likelihood to use income-increasing discretionary accruals in conjunction with accretive repurchases is significantly driven by the number and dollar amount of stock and stock options awarded to the firm’s CEO in the previous year. I also find that firms with a CFO who is co-opted by the firm’s CEO are more likely to use accretive repurchases than firms in which the CFO is not co-opted by the CEO. This suggests that a CEO likely influences the CFO to make capital allocation decisions that benefit the CEO, but may not be in the best long run interests of the firm. Finally, I find that transient investors strongly predict whether a firm uses accretive repurchases, suggesting that managers use this tool to avoid price pressures imposed by not hitting quarterly forecasts of EPS.

Audit quality and real earnings management: evidence from the UK manufacturing sector

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate whether audit quality is associated with real earnings management in the UK.Design/methodology/approachThe authors apply the panel fixed effects method that controls for heterogeneity across firms to investigate whether audit quality is related to real earnings management for a large sample of UK manufacturing companies for the period 2010–2013. The authors utilized three proxies to measure real earnings management and two proxies to measure audit quality.FindingsThe results provide evidence that audit fees are negatively related to abnormal operating cash flows. Conversely, audit fees are positively related to abnormal discretionary expenses. Besides, audit quality proxies show insignificant relationship with abnormal production costs and real earnings management index. Overall, the study finds partial evidence of significant relationship between audit quality and real earnings management.Research limitations/implicationsThese results are important subject to the adequacy of the indicators of real earnings management and audit quality. Like previous research works that mostly focus on upward earnings management, the authors do not address the question of whether and how firms take real actions to manage earnings downwards in certain contexts.Practical implicationsThe findings inform monitoring bodies that the imposition of higher levels of audit quality may result in unintended consequences. Therefore, monitoring bodies, such as audit committees, should consider the implication of imposing higher quality auditing, which may drive firms to potentially value-decreasing real earnings management practices. Managers should curtail real earnings management practices, especially abnormal operating cash flow, because attempt to use higher-quality auditors to mitigate such practice may destroy firm value. Also, managers’ employment may be threatened due to the potential deterioration of firm value caused by using higher-quality auditors to mitigate managers’ real earnings management practices. Moreover, shareholders are informed of the potential detrimental effects of imposing higher levels of audit quality which may lower the value of their investments.Originality/valueThe paper extends previous research on earnings management in several ways. First, while earlier studies usually use accruals methods to measure earnings management, the authors use the real earnings management approach as managers can switch from accruals to real earnings management when facing more scrutiny from auditors and/or more constrained regulations or standards that may limit their capability to use discretionary accruals. Second, this study reports new findings, as the authors find partial evidence of a significant relationship between audit quality and real earnings management. Third, it is one of the few studies to use a real earnings management index to measure earnings management and its link to audit quality.

Love or money: The effect of CEO divorce on firm risk and compensation

I find lower firm risk in the year of a CEO divorce. This lower volatility is consistent with a reduction in risk incentives, as CEOs pay large divorce settlements and are less able to diversify firm-specific risk from their portfolios. Divorce has a larger impact on firms with cash-poor CEOs who lack diversification. Cash flow and accruals have lower volatility in the year of divorce, which is likely due to smoother discretionary expenses. The sensitivity of compensation to both price and volatility is significantly higher after divorce, suggesting compensation incentives adjust to portfolio incentives, with total compensation increasing by over $2 million on average. I find no evidence the results relate to increased distraction or alternative explanations.

Impact of joint-stock companies’ financial condition on real activities manipulation to manage earnings

The aim of the paper is both to determine whether joint-stock companies in poor financial condition undertake real activities manipulation to manage earnings, and to investigate the potential relationship between the scope of real activities manipulation and business fields in which these companies are operating. The database of the Notoria Serwis company and panel data models were used for the purpose of the study. In order to measure the scale of real earnings manipulation, the author adopted Roychowdhury’s methodology, focusing on the manipulation of sales, production costs and discretionary expenses. The study examined a sample of non-financial joint-stock companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in the period 1998–2016, and was based on 1493–1669 obser-vations. The results demonstrated that companies in poor financial condition undertake actions to manage earnings. Managers manipulate sales volumes and reduce levels of discretionary expenses. The intensity of those actions depends on the type of business activity of a given company.

Stock pledging and earnings management: an empirical analysis

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of agency risk implied in case of personal debt obtained by promoters through pledging of their stock on accrual and real earnings management practices.Design/methodology/approachIn this paper abnormal accruals, as suggested in Dechow et al. (1995), and the real earnings management proxies as indicated in Dechow et al. (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006) are used. OLS regression is run over 29,054 firm-years of Indian companies starting from the year 2008 to 2016. Then the occurrence of earnings management is tested in firms in year t where promoters pledge/release their holdings from the pledge in year t+1.FindingsThe findings suggest that earnings management increases in the prior year with an increase in the proportion of promoters’ stock pledge in the subsequent year. The authors find evidence for increased earnings management through accruals and also for real earnings management using abnormal cash flows and abnormal discretionary expenses. However, the authors do not find real earnings management using abnormal production cost as a measure.Practical implicationsThe paper has considerable implications on managerial behavior toward earnings management because of the flexibility managers have in applying accounting policies and authority in operating decisions under domestic GAAP, and IFRS and earnings are prone to management tactics, fostering agency risk when they relate to the welfare of decision makers.Originality/valueThis paper addresses the consequences of individual borrowing of promoters collateralized by their stake in the firm, which is a global phenomenon, on reporting quality.

Real Earnings Management in Family-Affiliated Firms: Empirical Evidence from Malaysia

Research aim: This paper examines the effects of size and complex structure of family-affiliated business groups on Real Earnings Management (REM) practices in Malaysian listed firms. Design/Methodology/Approach: Family-affiliated business groups listed on Bursa Malaysia during the years 2006 to 2015 filtered using specific criteria were selected as the sample. STATA software was used to analyse the panel data, and two different regression models were run for the empirical testing to examine the effects of size and group complexity. Research finding: It is evidenced that the size and complexity structure of family-affiliated business groups are positively associated with REM, measured by abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses, but negatively associated with abnormal production cost. Theoretical contribution/Originality: Since previous studies based on Malaysian public listed firms focus on Accruals Earnings Manipulation (AEM), this study broadens the scope by providing empirical evidence on the relationship between family-affiliated firms’ characteristics and REM. Practitioner/ Policy implication: Investors, auditors, analysts and practitioners should consider family-affiliated firms as a factor that significantly induces earnings manipulation. The result is also relevant for regulators in regulating takeover rules or tax policy to affiliated groups in order to create incentives for them to maintain a specific size or complexity structure, or otherwise, be penalised for exceeding the size or complexity characteristics. Research limitation/ Implication: The results from this study may apply to Asian countries with similarities in family ownership to that in Malaysia. The findings, however, may not apply to developed countries where family concentration and pyramidal structure are not significant. Keywords: Real Earnings Management, Family-Affiliated Firms, Emerging Market, Entrenchment Effect, Malaysia Type of article: Research paper JEL Classification: M41

Control-Enhancing Mechanisms and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence from Pakistan

Separation of ownership and control plays a significant role in determining the agency cost, and there are many consequences of this agency problem. The control-enhancing mechanisms enhance control of controlling shareholders who expropriate small shareholders. Controlling shareholders are different in different countries; majorly, family firms are controlling firms in Pakistani context. The use of control-enhancing mechanism is rampant in emerging economies, and even some developed countries, related research especially in Pakistan requires evidence. This study exhibits a pooled cross-sectional analysis of listed companies in Pakistan between 2005 and 2016. In this research, we have examined the influence of control-enhancing mechanisms on firms’ earnings management and which mechanism (pyramid control, multiple control chains, and cross-holding control) is significantly influencing the earnings management of firms. We have analyzed both types of earnings manipulation techniques (accrual and real earning management). Our results explicate that the pyramid control and multiple control chain mechanisms are significantly positively related to the accruals earning management and real earnings management, unveiling that firms with these controls manipulate earnings with discretionary accruals as well as with real activity manipulation. Real activity manipulation enhances firms to overproduce the inventory (decreasing the unit price) and to reduce the discretionary expenses (increasing the reported earnings).

Custos de Agência e Estrutura de Controle em Empresas Petrolíferas

Resumo Este estudo se propõe a analisar a influência da participação estatal no controle de empresas petrolíferas listadas em bolsas americanas sobre os seus custos de agência, levando em conta características destas companhias. Os resultados indicam que empresas com participação estatal tendem a apresentar maiores custos de agência que seus pares privados quando consideramos a eficiência no uso dos ativos. Utilizando um índice de gastos discricionários os coeficientes sugerem a mesma conclusão, embora não sejam estatisticamente significantes. Adicionalmente, o tamanho das companhias e o seu grau de alavancagem se mostraram fatores relevantes. JEL Code: L6, D23, G32.

Analysts’ reactions to firms’ real activities management

PurposeFirms’ real activities management (RAM) can have a more detrimental effect on firms’ future performance than accrual earnings management. This paper aims to examine whether analysts, who play an important role as information intermediaries, understand the negative effect of RAM on firms’ future performance and respond to it accordingly.Design/methodology/approachThe authors investigate whether analysts lower their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations of the firms with RAM. The authors measure RAM by examining firms’ abnormal decreases in discretionary expenses, abnormal increases in production and abnormal decreases in cash flow from operations following prior literature.FindingsThe authors find that after controlling for earnings surprises and other important firm characteristics, analysts lower their forecasts of future annual earnings and stock recommendations of the firms that show signs of RAM.Research limitations/implicationsFirst, as in other RAM studies, the results in this study are subject to measurement errors inherent in the estimation of RAM (i.e. abnormal production costs, abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expenditures). Second, we include only firm-year observations that barely make positive income in our samples following the previous study. This sample selection criterion helps increase the power of the test by examining the “suspect firms group,” which are more likely to engage in earnings management. However, one can challenge that our findings on the association between RAM and analysts’ reactions could be only case-specific and cannot be generalized.Practical implicationsThis study contributes to the literature on earnings management and especially on RAM. Specifically, none of the previous studies clearly examines whether analysts understand the negative impact of RAM on firms’ future performance and respond accordingly, although there are studies showing the negative association between RAM and firms’ future operating performance and studies showing the negative association between analysts following and RAM. Thus, filling the gap, this study provides a specific reason for the negative association between the analyst following and real earnings management presented in previous studies.Social implicationsThe findings will be of interest to regulators, who are concerned about the potential negative consequences in which tighter accounting standards can result. For example, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) theoretically demonstrate that tighter accounting standards can prompt more RAM instead of accounting earnings management. The study provides important evidence supporting that such suboptimal operating activities are closely watched by analysts and are potentially penalized by the market. If the market is able to detect RAM and allocate fewer resources to the firms that engage in it, then the concerns associated with the substitution effect between accrual-based earnings management and RAM can be diminished.Originality/valuePrior research suggests that tighter accounting regulations (e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) prompt more RAM than accounting earnings management. The study provides evidence supporting that such suboptimal operating activities are closely watched by analysts and are potentially penalized by the market.

Earnings Management and Fraudulent Financial Reporting

Objective – The objective of this research is to obtain empirical evidence about the effect of real earnings management that is proxied by abnormal Cash Flow from operating and discretionary expenses towards fraudulent financial reporting. Methodology/Technique – The objects in this research are companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (idx) between 2011 and 2015 comprised of companies that have engaged in fraudulent activities as well as those that have not, to enable a comparison to be made. The companies that have engaged in fraudulent financial reporting were obtained from a list issued by the Financial Services Authority (OJK), being the agency that oversees the capital market in Indonesia. The sampling is conducted using purposive sampling. Secondary data is used, and the hypotheses are testing using logistic regression analysis. Findings – The results of this research show that: (1) Real Earning Management proxied by Abnormal Cash Flow from operating activities (CFO) have a significant effect towards Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR), (2) Real Earning Management proxied by Abnormal Discretionary Expenses does not have an effect on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR) and (3) Real Earning Management that is proxied by Abnormal Cash Flow from operating (CFO) and Abnormal Discretionary Expenses have a simultaneous and significant effect on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR). Novelty – Based on these findings, this research provides insight to companies to enable them to give greater attention to abnormal cash flow from operating activities due to the effect this has on companies that are suspected of committing irregularities in its operational activities. This is important because fraudulent reporting can erode investor’s confidence and thereby reduce investment in the company. Type of Paper: Empirical. Keywords: Abnormal Cash Flow; Abnormal Discretionary Expenses; Financial Services Authority (OJK); Fraudulent Financial Reporting; Real Earning Management. Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Suryaningsih, R; Simonb F; 2019. Earnings Management and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, Acc. Fin. Review 4 (2): 50 – 55 https://doi.org/10.35609/afr.2019.4.2(3) JEL Classification: G40, G41, G49.

Leveraging previously reported research to create a decision support tool for institutional facility maintenance

PurposeThe discretionary expense budget required to maintain public infrastructure has declined in recent years, even as public expectations and accountability for performance have increased. The purpose of this paper is to leverage previously reported research to create a decision support tool (DST) for prioritizing institutional facility maintenance.Design/methodology/approachA structured literature review was developed to identify critical aspects of facility maintenance shown to have a positive relationship with academic performance in K-12 schools within the USA. Analytical hierarchy process (AHP) serves as a framework for a multi-criteria DST based on the findings of the literature review. Finally, a targeted focus group of industry professionals was used to validate the usability of the resulting DST.FindingsThe framework for the DST developed for this study effectively represents the scale and scope of an institutional facility. Results of the study suggest that when evaluating multi-criteria work orders, the proposed visual AHP methodology can be used to generate usable DSTs to assist with the prioritization of work.Practical implicationsThis study provides a methodology for building a multi-criterion DST leveraging precedent research, using a visual AHP to assist facility management (FM) decision-makers in the prioritization of routine work orders.Originality/valueThe developed process indicates a practical approach to incorporating disparate research findings into a concise and useable manner to guide FM decision-makers, who have traditionally not been able to explicitly leverage this information to make evidence-based spending decisions.

Earnings Management in Firms with Data Security Breaches

ABSTRACT Anecdotal research suggests that management is concerned about how Data Security Breaches (DSBs) impact a firm's financial performance. We investigate: whether managers in DSB firms manipulate earnings through real earnings management (REM) and/or accrual-based earnings management (AEM); how breach type, disclosure delay, and external monitoring impact earnings management activities; and how earnings management activities influence a DSB firm's performance. Using a propensity score matched sample, results suggest that DSB firms are more likely to manipulate earnings via REM, but not AEM. Additionally, we find that DSB firms engage in REM through cutting discretionary expenses, decreasing discretionary cash spending, and reducing the cost of goods sold through overproduction. We find some evidence that firms are more likely to increase REM when DSBs involve financial information or when firms delay the DSB disclosure or have low analyst coverage. We provide evidence that REM activities lead to lower subsequent performance in DSB firms. Data Availability: The data used are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

Earnings Management, Benchmarks, and Market Valuation — A Perspective from the Hospitality Industry

Hospitality industry (hotels and restaurants) has developed into an important sector in the world economy. We hypothesize and test that hospitality managers behave differently in managing reported earnings to meet/marginally exceed earnings benchmarks. We find that hospitality managers do not apply as much gain on asset sales and/or discretionary accruals as managers in the other industries, but they tend to promote sales by offering deep discounts/lenient credit terms and reduce discretionary expenses to meet/ marginally exceed earnings benchmarks. The market rewards them with a significant premium. The results of this study have important implications for hospitality managers, practitioners, and regulators.

Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre- and post- engagement partner signature requirement periods in the United Kingdom

In order to address the concern about whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s recent requirement to disclose an EP’s name in the United States (US) may cause unwanted consequences such as an increase in real earnings management (EM), I investigate the effect of requiring an engagement partner (EP) to sign audit reports on real and accrual-based earnings management in the United Kingdom, a comparable test environment. I measure accrual-based earnings management as the signed abnormal discretionary accruals and real earnings management as abnormally low levels of operating cash flows and discretionary expenses, as well as abnormally excessive production. I do not find a significant change in the usage of accrual-based and/or real earnings management for firm-years suspected of beating/meeting the zero, last-year, or analyst forecast consensus earnings threshold from the pre- to post-signature period. The results are robust to alternative proxies for EM and the control sample approach. My results mitigate the concern that managers may resort to more economically costly real earnings management following the mandatory disclosure of an EP’s name in the US.

Government-Linked Investment Companies and Real Earnings Management: Malaysian Evidence

This study examines the association between government-linked investment companies’ (GLICs’) shareholdings and real earnings management activities in Malaysia. Consistent with prior research, this study uses three proxies to measure real earnings management; abnormal cash flow from operations (RCFO), abnormal production costs (RPC), and abnormal discretionary expenses (RDE). This study segregates GLICs’ shareholdings into two categories; Federal Government Pension Investment Funds (FGPIF) and other GLICs (OFGLIC). Using a sample of 213 firm-year observations of Malaysian government-linked companies from 2010 to 2015, this study finds that FGPIF is a more effective monitoring mechanism than OFGLIC in limiting real earnings management. The findings also show that there is a significant and negative relationship between Employee Provident Fund (EPF), Khazanah Nasional Berhad (Khazanah), Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) and RCFO and RPC. The evidence suggests that these three are the most effective government institutional investors in promoting corporate governance, which in turn limit real earning management activities in Malaysia. In general, the findings support the incentive alignment hypothesis, which argues that companies with government intervention are normally better governed.

PENGARUH INFORMASI LABA TERHADAP REAKSI PASAR DENGAN MANAJEMEN LABA RIIL DAN MANAJEMEN LABA AKRUAL SEBAGAI VARIABEL MODERASI

This study aims to investigate the effect of earnings information on market reaction with accrual and real earnings management as the moderating variables. The sample of this study is manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012-2015. Samples are collected by purposive sampling and resulted in 58 companies as the final sample. Data were analyzed using Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) for testing hypothesis with significance level 5%. The statistical tool used is SPSS 22. The results of this study shown that market reacts positively significant toward earnings management and real earnings management in aggregate weaken the effect of earnings information toward market reaction. Real earnings management through discretionary expenses strengthen the effect of earnings information toward market reaction. Meanwhile, real earnings management through sales manipulation and overproduction, and accrual earnings management do not moderate the effect of earnings information toward market reaction.

The effect of real earnings management on the persistence and informativeness of earnings

Abstract: This study investigates the effect of real earnings management on two important aspects of earnings quality: earnings persistence and its informativeness about future cash flows. I focus on real earnings management through the abnormal reduction in discretionary expenditures and investigate how this type of real earnings management affects earnings quality. Examining a large sample over a period of four decades, I find that the extent of real earnings management is negatively related to earnings persistence, and this effect is achieved largely through the negative effect of real earnings management on cash flows rather than on accruals. The less persistent current earnings as a result of real earnings management exhibit a weakened ability to predict future cash flows, suggesting a decreased informativeness of current earnings about future cash flows. Moreover, I find that the negative effect of the abnormal reduction in discretionary expenses on earnings persistence and its association with future cash flows from operations is more pronounced in the post-SOX period. Overall, the results suggest that real earnings management through the abnormal reduction in discretionary expenses is associated with deteriorated earnings quality.

Competition And Real Activities Manipulation

We enrich the research on income manipulation by establishing a link among companies’ price-setting control and the extent of real activities management. Examining three types of real activities management, the results reveal an interesting asymmetry in how companies employ income manipulation based on their pricing strength. We discover that companies with weaker price-setting clout employ larger manipulation of sales and production costs as a tool to manage income, while firms with more dominant pricing power prefer managing discretionary expenses.

The Impact of Managerial Ability on the Relation between Real Earnings Management and Future Firm’s Performance: Applied Study

This study aims to investigate the managerial ability of executives’ managers’ role on mitigating the negative impact of real earnings management on future firm’s performance. The researcher operationalizes managerial ability by using a measure developed by Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012). This measure captures managers’ ability to efficiently convert firm resources into sales revenue relative to their industry peers. In other words, higher-ability managers are more likely to generate more sales revenue for a given set of resources compared to lower-ability managers. The researcher follows Roychowdhury (2006) and Kothari et al. (2016) to calculate abnormal sales, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses. To capture the total effects of three REM methods an aggregate REM that is a proxy for real earnings activities was used. Following Gunny (2010) and Huang & Sun (2017) future performance proxies are ROA and operating cash flows to total assets (CFO) for the next three years each year. Using a panel sample of 605 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2015. The study concluded that there is a positive significant relationship between the managerial ability of managers and earnings management through manipulating of real operational activities.

Accrual and real earnings management in both state-owned and privately-owned Egyptian companies

This study aims to explore the difference between the level of both types of earnings management; Accrual Earnings Management (AEM) and Real Activity Earnings Management (REM)) between state and privately owned Egyptian companies. Using a sample of non-financial state and privately owned companies over the period from 2010 to 2017, with 1030 firm–year observations. The results reveal that there are no significant differences in the level of both AEM and REM using the two proxies; sales manipulation and discretionary expenses; between state and privately owned firms. This result could be attributed to the Egyptian government’s attempt to eliminate the differences between state-owned and private owned companies, especially in recent years.