What shall we become now without the barbarians? Those people were a solution, weren't they? C. Gavafy, Waiting for the Barbarians The last decades of the twentieth century were marked by a dramatic change led by the development of globalization, the enhancement of transnational flows, and the end of bipolarity. The construction of the European Union, the emergence of new economic agreements such as NAFTA, the deterritorialization of markets, physical borders, and identities, the increase of migration flows, the construction of the Schengen area, (1) and the fragmentation of major states (e.g., the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) have raised questions about many old assumptions, including those made about Westphalian state sovereignty and identity. These phenomena significantly affected the forms and the meanings of borders, individual and collective identities, and the sense and nature of state sovereignty and authority. In the meantime, these changes have recast the domestic order, challenged traditional structures, modified social arrangements, transformed the forces of integration and fragmentation, and accelerated the dynamics of inclu sion and exclusion. In consequence, Western societies are witnessing the emergence of many existential and conceptual anxieties and fears about their identity, security, and well-being. As Martin Heisler asserts, (2) migration is at the focal point of the interrelated dynamics of identity, borders, and orders. By its transnational character, its dynamic, and its impact on people and institutions at all levels, migration is perceived as posing a serious challenge to the long-standing paradigms of certainty and order. One of the prominent features of Western societies in the post-bipolar era has been therefore the production of a discourse of fear and proliferation of dangers with reference to the scenarios of chaos, disorder, and clash of civilizations. It is easily noticeable in the public sphere that the fear is mainly about the different, the alien, the undocumented migrant, the refugee, the Muslim, the non-European, the Hispanic. These different expressions converge on the figure of the migrant, which appears as the anchoring point of securitarian policies and fierce public debates that gained momentum in the 1990s. Because of the widespread publicization of preventive and repressive immigration policies, a politics of fear was generally considered as being developed specifically in the European context and not in the United States, which was presented as being more tolerant and open to migration. But the production of similar discourses and the adoption of securitarian policies in the United States as well, made it difficult to argue the singularity of Europe. Indeed, although with differences in social and economic contexts as well as in immigration and integration policies, both the EU countries and the United States have been marked, since the 1980s, by a reversal of the image of migrants and asylum seekers in the public space. In both cases, migrants, who were welcomed after World War II as a useful labor force, are now presented in political discourses as criminals, troublemakers, economic and social defrauders, terrorists, drug traffickers, unassimilable persons, and so forth. They are demonized as being increasi ngly associated with organized crime. They are accused of taking jobs away from nationals, taking advantage of social services, and harming the identity of host countries. Introduced in public debates as a political hot-button topic, migration is thus transformed into a threat not only to the state but also to the security and the identity of the host society. What is important to stress here is that through such a presentation, the migration issue, which was not at the origin inherently securitarian, became one involving new actors and leading to stricter public policies and to new surveillance and control devices. …
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