Direct Perception Approach Research Articles

On the Evolution of a Radical Concept: Affordances According to Gibson and Their Subsequent Use and Development

James J. Gibson, the founder of ecological psychology, introduced a radical empiricist approach to perception and action centered on direct perception in naturalistic environments that was counter to popular representational views of his time. This direct perception approach and the associated introduction of the affordance concept have been extremely influential in several fields of study. However, since its inception, the affordance concept has evolved in a manner such that it now deviates significantly from Gibson’s original intention. This review follows use of the affordance concept by four sets of influential experimental psychologists: Gibson, Donald Norman, Mike Tucker and Rob Ellis, and Daniel Bub and Michael Masson. Particular attention is paid to the manner in which they applied the concept and the contributions provided by each set of researchers. The primary goal of this review is to determine what cognitive psychologists can take away from developments within the field and what considerations should be taken into account when using the term affordance. Having a more thorough understanding of the factors that led to the concept of affordance and its recent reformulations will better equip cognitive psychologists and, by extension, human factors researchers to further advance the study of perception–action relations.

Mental concepts: theoretical, observational or dispositional approach?

In the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that dispositional approach is to some extent coherent with phenomenological account and that phenomenological concept of embodiment can improve this position.

Seeing emotions without mindreading them

According to direct perception approaches we directly see others’ emotions, and by seeing emotions we immediately ascribe them to others. Direct perception is explicitly presented as an alternative account of mindreading (the ability to recognize and attribute mental states to others), but it also contains an implicit thesis about the extent of the reach of perception. In this paper emotion perception is defended: siding with the direct perception approach I claim that we can simply see emotions and not just low level features of the facial and bodily displays, but contra the direct perception approach I argue that seeing emotions is not sufficient for recognizing emotions as mental states in order to ascribe them to others.

Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States

Philosophers and psychologists have often maintained that in order to attribute mental states to other people one must have a ‘theory of mind’. This theory facilitates our grasp of other people’s mental states. Debate has then focussed on the form this theory should take. Recently a new approach has been suggested, which I call the ‘Direct Perception approach to social cognition’. This approach maintains that we can directly perceive other people’s mental states. It opposes traditional views on two counts: by claiming that mental states are observable and by claiming that we can attribute them to others without the need for a theory of mind. This paper argues that there are two readings of the direct perception claims: a strong and a weak one. The Theory-theory is compatible with the weak version but not the strong one. The paper argues that the strong version of direct perception is untenable, drawing on evidence from the mirror neuron literature and arguments from the philosophy of science and perception to support this claim. It suggests that one traditional ‘theory of mind’ view, the ‘Theory-theory’ view, is compatible with the claim that mental states are observable, and concludes that direct perception views do not offer a viable alternative to theory of mind approaches to social cognition.

Are the dorsal/ventral pathways sufficiently distinct to resolve perceptual theory?

The author argues that the theory of a dorsal/ventral stream for visual processing can be used to reconcile the constructivist and direct perception theories. My commentary discusses neurophysiological and psychophysical studies that run counter to the view. In addition, the central issue of debate between the constructionist and direct perception approaches regarding what is visual information is discussed.

What are the contributions of the direct perception approach?

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Fundamentals of Language. Roman Jakobson , Morris Halle

Previous articleNext article No AccessNotes and ReviewsFundamentals of Language. Roman Jakobson , Morris Halle Noam ChomskyNoam Chomsky Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by International Journal of American Linguistics Volume 23, Number 3Jul., 1957 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/464414 Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 35Citations are reported from Crossref PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Charles Reiss, Veno Volenec Naturalism, Internalism, and Nativism: < What > The Legacy of The Sound Pattern of English < Should Be >, (Jun 2021): 96–108.https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119598732.ch6Yanying Cui, Yidong Wei Reduction: The Solution to Mind Representation?, Chinese Semiotic Studies 15, no.33 (Aug 2019): 303–315.https://doi.org/10.1515/css-2019-0019Andrea Scaiewicz, Michael Levitt The language of the protein universe, Current Opinion in Genetics & Development 35 (Dec 2015): 50–56.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gde.2015.08.010Morris Halle The Stress of English Words 1968–1998, Linguistic Inquiry 29, no.44 (Oct 1998): 539–568.https://doi.org/10.1162/002438998553879S. Ullman Against direct perception, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 373–381.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0000546XO. J. Braddick Direct perception: an opponent and a precursor of computational theories, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 381–382.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005471Bruce Bridgeman Direct perception and a call for primary perception, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 382–383.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005483Jonathan F. Doner, Joseph S. Lappin The function and process of perception, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 383–384.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005495William Epstein Direct perception or mediated perception: a comparison of rival viewpoints, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 384–385.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005501Stephen Grossberg Direct perception or adaptive resonance?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 385–386.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005513John W. Gyr Visual perception is underdetermined by stimulation, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 386–386.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005525Frederick Hayes-Roth Mediating the so-called immediate processes of perception, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 386–387.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005537Geoffrey E. Hinton Inferring the meaning of direct perception, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 387–388.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005549Gunnar Johansson, Claes von Hofsten, Gunnar Jansson Direct perception and perceptual processes, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 388–388.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005550Rebecca K. Jones, Anne D. Pick On the nature of information in behalf of direct perception, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 388–389.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005562Samuel Jay Keyser, Steven Pinker Direct vs. representational views of cognition: A parallel between vision and phonology, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 389–390.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005574J. J. Koenderink Why argue about direct perception?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 390–391.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005586Geoffrey R. Loftus, Elizabeth F. Loftus Visual perception: the shifting domain of discourse, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 391–392.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005598William M. Mace Perceptual activity and direct perception, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 392–393.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005604Alan K. Mackworth Are mediating representations the ghosts in the machine?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 393–394.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005616K. Prazdny How wrong is Gibson?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 394–395.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005628Sandra S. Prindle, Claudia Carello, M. T. Turvey Animal-environment mutuality and direct perception, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 395–397.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0000563XEdward S. Reed Information pickup is the activity of perceiving, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 397–398.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005641Irvin Rock Difficulties with a direct theory of perception, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 398–399.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005653Sverker Runeson There is more to psychological meaningfulness than computation and representation, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 399–400.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005665Robert Shaw, James Todd Abstract machine theory and direct perception, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 400–401.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005677Aaron Sloman What kind of indirect process is visual perception?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 401–404.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005689K. von Fieandt In defense of invariances and higher-order stimuli, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 404–405.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005690Walter B. Welmer Logical atomism and computation do not refute Gibson, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 405–405.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005707Wally Welker Percepts, intervening variables, and neural mechanisms, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 405–406.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005719Steven W. Zucker The computational/representational paradigm as normal science: further support, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 406–407.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005720Carl B. Zuckerman What are the contributions of the direct perception approach?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 407–408.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005732S. Ullman Perception, information, and computation, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no.33 (Feb 2010): 408–415.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005744W. Meyer-Eppler Akustische und optische Valenzklassen als Zeichenträger, (Jan 1969): 346–413.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-86901-3_9W. 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