Diplomatic Influence Research Articles

Governing International Climate Change-Induced Migration in Southeast Asia

Many lands are getting uninhabitable because of anthropogenic global warming, either through the sea level rise and the severing of climate hazards or through desertification and land degradation. 250 million people may be displaced before 2050 and many will be coerced to find asylum abroad. Yet, no existing international legal regime offers an adequate protection to those displaced by environmental change. This paper argues that governing international climate change-induced migration requires to overcome three fundamental challenges: reconciling individual fundamental rights with state sovereignty, the complexity of the environmental inducement to migration with a somewhat simplified legal framework, and equity consideration with unequal diplomatic influence. Furthermore, it identifies alternatives narratives, actions and actors which could participate in the invention of a necessarily new governance model.

Governing International Climate Change-Induced Migration: The Chaos and the Dancing Star

Many authors have recently put forward that no international legal regime offers an sufficient protection to those displaced as a result of climate change, and that such a regime is needed. This paper argues that governing international climate change-induced migration requires to overcome three fundamental challenges: reconciling individual fundamental rights with state sovereignty, the complexity of the environmental inducement to migration with a somewhat simplified legal framework, and equity consideration with unequal diplomatic influence. Furthermore, it identifies alternatives narratives, actions and actors which could participate in the invention of a necessarily new governance model. Thus, it shows that expanding or replicating the Refugee Convention to 'environmental refugees' is not possible, nor desirable: new forms of international governance must be invented.

China restored: the Middle Kingdom looks to 2020 and beyond

Contrary to lurid forecasts in the West that China is on track to wrest global hegemony from the United States by 2025, China is in fact positioning itself to resume its historic role as the Kingdom-a senior mentor with benign aspirations for guiding Asia into the mid-21st century. In China Restored: The Middle Kingdom Looks to 2020 and Beyond, Eric C. Anderson challenges the widespread perception of China as a rising giant whose authoritarian program to supplant the United States as global hegemony poses a grave international threat. He weighs in against doomsday prophets such as Martin Jacques, who predicts that China's economy and diplomatic influence will equal those of the United States by 2025 and will eclipse them by a factor of two by 2050. Anderson, a player in Washington's China policy debates who enjoys deep access to Chinese intelligence sources, counters with a careful argument that Beijing's overriding aim is in fact to foster a stable global environment conducive to its economic development and regional hegemony based on legitimate political authority rather than coercion. Anderson points to three principal factors that will drive Chinese behavior over the next 10 years: the Chinese Communist Party's desire to be recognized as a responsible member of the international community; China's effort to equip, train, and maintain a modern military; and Beijing's campaign to sell her governance model-from economic development to serving a domestic constituency-as a direct competitor to Washington's version of liberal democracy. Asserting that Beijing is poised to serve as Washington's peer competitor, Anderson offers insights as to what can be expected from China in the future, including facilitating U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts and participating in international peacekeeping operations. Original materials include Chinese documents concerning Beijing's domestic, economic, and military policies 45 sidebars explain key words, concepts, and issues simply and clearly for the benefit of general readers A bibliography provides an extensive listing of contemporary materials concerning China's future intentions

An ANZAC1-Indo-Russian Alliance?

Since the implosion of the Soviet bloc, a ‘unipolar’ world has emerged around the USA, challenged by an Islamic bloc. The USA takes advantage of this Islamic opposition to vigorously pursue its world policies in the name of ‘the war on terrorism’ this being the guise by which President George H.W. Bush announced the intention of leading the United Nations into a ‘new world order’. Russia and China have attempted to confront this mono-polar post-Cold War situation by forming a pact between each other and bordering states, the Central Asia and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. This holds out the prospect of a Eurasian bloc to confront the world hegemony of the USA, which seeks to draw to it the European Union and return Europe to the subordinate role she played vis-é-vis the USA during the Cold War, pushed into coming under the US orbit by the fear of Warsaw Pact invasion. It is by no means clear that the USA has a long-range commitment to containing China, despite its anti-China lobby. There has for decades existed a pro-China lobby, including some of the USA’s leading political and business figures, one of whose public manifestations is the Trilateral Commission created by David Rockefeller. These ‘Trilateralists’, et al. see the creation of regional blocs as the prelude to a ‘new world order’, and one such bloc is envisaged as being that of an Asian economic community along similar lines to that of the European Union. The expanding economic, military and diplomatic influence of China and the recent emergence of India as a rival power in Asia have wide geopolitical implications that involve Russia. Between these powers and the possibility of military confrontation over water resources, the traditionally ‘Western’ societies of Australia and New Zealand have placed their futures in a China-dominated Asian bloc, in the belief that their export-driven economies can only thrive in such a vast market. This article proposes a radical new alliance away from a China-dominated Asia and towards an Indo-Russian orientation. The methodology, including points of difference, is inspired by Professor Alexander Dugin’s ‘Eurasian’ geopolitical paradigm.

“New Fighting Power!” Japan's Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security

Japanese leaders struggled for decades to overcome legal, political, and normative constraints on the expansion of the Self-Defense Forces so that Japan could field a robust military. Their progress was steady and significant, but slow. Now, having reframed the nature of the threat Japan faces and having borrowed creatively from the U.S. model, they have found new traction by empowering the Japan Coast Guard (JCG). Today's JCG has what its publicists, citing capabilities explicitly banned by Japan's constitution, call “New Fighting Power!” Remarkably, however, JCG modernization and expansion are being achieved without much objection from Japan's neighbors or from the domestic public. Although the JCG is not a “second navy,” it is already a fourth branch of the Japanese military. Tokyo is now able to project additional diplomatic influence as well as “fighting power.” Japan's “new fighting power” is thus greater than the sum of its military parts.

Limits of Diplomatic Influence: Brazil versus Britain and the United States, 1886–1894

AbstractThis article uses events in Brazil at the close of the nineteenth century as a case study to investigate how nations on the ‘periphery’ contested the efforts of the great powers to control their behaviour. The article concentrates on Brazil's diplomatic relations with Britain and the United States. It examines the failure of the foreign office to negotiate a commercial treaty to match the reciprocity arrangement concluded between Brazil and the United States in 1891. The set‐back is seen as a reflection of the limits of Britain's diplomatic influence and ability to halt the rising economic influence of the United States, but it also illustrates Brazil's success in pursuing an independent foreign economic policy. This is further illustrated by the Brazilian Naval Revolt (1893–4) during which the representatives of the foreign powers have been usually depicted as exercising a superior role in directing events. This article uses evidence from Brazilian diplomatic archives to argue that the most significant factor in determining the outcome of the revolt was the combination of firmness and skilful diplomacy shown by the Brazilian government of Floriano Peixoto rather than the activities of the foreign powers, including Britain and the United States.

Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia

This article explores two starkly contrasting analytic approaches to assessing the performance of U.S. security strategy in East Asia since 1991: a positivesum approach, emphasizing the danger of security dilemmas and spirals of tension, and a zero-sum approach, emphasizing power competition and the long-term dangers posed by China's rise. In the policy world, the differences between these apparently irreconcilable perspectives are not so clear. Certain policies—for example, maintaining a strong U.S.-Japan alliance—flow from either logic. Moreover, each approach sometimes counsels counterintuitive policy prescriptions that are generally associated with the other. Relatively assertive U.S. security postures apparently have furthered positive-sum regional goals by catalyzing China to adopt reassuring policies toward its neighbors as a hedge against potential U.S. encirclement. From a zero-sum perspective, the United States often competes more effectively for regional influence by cooperating with China than it would by seeking to contain China's economic growth and diplomatic influence.

Will Kashmir Stop India's Rise?

OVER THE past several years, India's economic growth, diplomatic influence, and overall prestige have increased sharply. The country's new international profile adds a fresh dimension to its ongoing clash with Pakistan over Kashmir. So far, the conflict has not hindered India's rise. But the prospects that the two sides will reach a settle ment on their own are dim. Although it is unlikely that the issue will frustrate India's am bitions to emerge as an Asian-and a global-power, periodic crises over the state will distract India's leaders, and tensions with Pakistan could spark yet another war. The United States can, and should, play a role in facilitating an end to the conflict by prodding both sides to reach an accord. Doing so will require that Wash ington change its stance toward both India and Pakistan, but the potential rewards-peace on the subcontinent and a solid strategic partnership between Washington and New Delhi-are well worth the effort. The dispute over Kashmir has dogged relations between India and Pakistan since the states were created by the partition of British India in 1947. The two countries have fought three wars (in 1947-48, 1965, and 1999) over the issue and related matters; twice (in 1ggo and 2001-2) they nearly resorted to the use of nuclear weapons.

Why Japan still matters

This article challenges the prevailing view that China is displacing Japan as Asia's leader and the pre-eminent power in Asia. On the contrary, it argues that in understanding the future of Northeast Asia and the broader Asia–Pacific, it would be a mistake to look only to a rising China and to relegate Japan to a diminishing position. China's rise does not automatically herald Japan's decline. Japan is an emerging, not a retreating power. The rise of China is both obscuring and accelerating the transformation in Japan's regional and global position. Japan is increasing its economic power, technological capabilities, military reach, soft power and diplomatic influence. Furthermore, the rise of China makes Japan strategically more important to the United States and to other countries in the Asia Pacific. Japan will become the main regional counterweight to China and an indispensable partner in America's strategy of balancing China.

French Interests in the Levant and Their Impact on French Immigrant Policy in West Africa

Prior to the Second World War, the French government had been highhanded in its administration of the Levantine Mandates and severe in the treatment of Levantine immigrants in its West African colonies. This imperious behaviour would change abruptly in 1944. As part of their effort to rebuild French power, General Charles de Gaulle and the Comité Français de la Liberation Nationak (CFLN) sought to maintain France's longstanding position of diplomatic and cultural influence in the Levant, even after promising Lebanese and Syrian independence. With this in mind, French authorities grew more sensitive to the immigrant connection between Damascus and Dakar. In particular, the CFLN began to understand that complaints by Levantine immigrants in Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) regarding their treatment by colonial officials had immediate repercussions on the French ‘mission’ in Syria and Lebanon. As a result, in the last year of the war – and at the direct instigation of the CFLN's representative in the Levant – sweeping policy changes were instituted to mitigate the treatment of Levantine immigrants in West Africa in order to restore France's prestige and position in the Middle East.

New Challenges to Japan's Aid: An Analysis of Aid Policy-Making

I N THE LAST DECADE, Japan has emerged as the largest aid donor in the world. Recently, though,Japan's foreign aid has reached a turning point in the face of domestic and international challenges. The political and economic conditions affecting Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) have been rapidly changing, forcingJapanese decision makers to reexamine their existing aid programs. Meeting these challenges, however, has been difficult as the Japanese aid administration is fragmented and involves intense competition and bargaining among various policy-making units. Contrary to the popular Western notion ofJapan as a monolithic entity, Japanese aid policy-making groups exhibit diverse views and opinions as they perceiveJapan's ODA from their own sectarian interests. Therefore, to analyze howJapanese aid leaders have viewed and dealt with these emerging challenges necessitates careful scrutiny of the interests, goals, and policies of a variety of Japanese aid organizations and groups. Circumstances surrounding Japan's ODA to Vietnam and Cambodia typify the international and domestic challenges tojapanese aid. The reduced U.S. presence in Indochina has leftJapan with a major opening for achieving economic and diplomatic influence in the region. Japan resumed full-scale aid to Vietnam in 1992, well before the U.S. had lifted its own embargo on that country. Tokyo also sent Self-Defense Forces to Cambodia in 1992-93 to take part in peace-keeping operations of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), representing the first deployment of Japanese forces overseas since World War II. Japanese aid and involvement in Indochina can be seen as an opening shot in defining a new Japanese role in the post-cold war world. This has brought about conflict, at times sharp, among various policy-making leaders in Japan about the role that Tokyo's aid to Indochina can and ought to play. While Japan is devoting substantial aid resources to the region,' exactly how and for what purposes aid policies should be carried out is a focus of contention.

Ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention

International agreements prohibiting chemical weapons began in the 17th century, when the Germans and French agreed to prohibit poison bullets. New chemical toxins and new ways to deliver them have kept treaties to ban such weapons of mass destruction on the diplomatic and security agendas of large and small nations ever since. Although chemical weapons are among the most deadly military devices (the World War I battles in which they were used caused 8% of the deaths), never have they achieved eventual victory, and the Geneva Protocol of the 1920s sought to ban their use. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the latest and best attempt at ridding the world of chemical weapons by targeting both their possession and the means to produce them. Only if the major powers agree to participate and to enforce its provisions without hesitation will the CWC increase the national security of all states by reducing the threat from chemical warfare. An excellent overview of the main issues can be seen at the World Wide Web site of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ( ), along with a list of countries that have become signatory parties to the CWC. The CWC has now been signed by the leaders of 161 nations and will become effective on 29 April 1997. Under the Reagan and Bush administrations, the United States was instrumental in negotiating this agreement, and George Bush signed it in 1991. However, as of this writing, the U.S. Senate has still not ratified that signing. Unless that step is taken, the United States will find itself in the company of states that intend to ignore the convention, such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Nonparticipation has diplomatic, economic, and scientific consequences. Nonratification does not give us a seat at the table with our allies, almost all of whom have ratified, and provides an excuse to other nonmember countries to remain outside. Only ratifying nations may join the Executive Council (which will prepare for implementation of the provisions of the treaty) or the Technical Secretariat (which will, among other functions, provide inspectors for suspected stockpiles or production sites and monitor the destruction of existing stocks). Failure to ratify the CWC will constrain some aspects of chemical trade with international partners who are member states. The consequences of these restrictions will affect chemicals required in research throughout the scientific community, as well as major domestic industries in agriculture, textiles, pharmaceuticals, and transportation. The CWC will not alter U.S. policy on chemical weapons: The United States has already begun destroying its aging stockpile of chemical agents and expects to complete the process by 2004; no new chemical weapons are planned. Nevertheless, U.S. ratification has been stalled in the Senate for more than 2 years. Politics aside, the CWC has been opposed by groups who believe that compliance with its provisions will be unverifiable (small amounts of highly toxic chemicals or their precursors could be undetectable) and unenforceable (all penalties for violations would require approval by the Security Council of the United Nations). However, the need for improved means of remote sampling and for enhanced sensitivity in chemical identification and detection would surely benefit from U.S. expertise and instrumentation development in these fields. Opponents of the CWC also fear that any international inspection of chemical facilities could result in theft of proprietary processes that now give U.S. chemical manufacturers their edge. No group would have more to fear from this pillage than the U.S. chemical industry, yet the Chemical Manufacturers Association, along with the American Chemical Society, have been strong proponents of the CWC. In February 1997, the AAAS Board urged every member of the Senate to ratify the CWC. The Senate should consider stipulations that will make the CWC effective not only for U.S. security but for world security. Not only must the U.S. Senate vote for ratification without further delay, the United States must use its diplomatic influence to persuade other present nonsignatories—especially Russia, China, and Iran—to ratify the CWC as responsible members of the global community. Science urges its U.S. readers to make their feelings known to the Senate and asks its international readers to support the CWC locally.

Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S.-Pakistani Relationship

Arms transfer is a multidimensional process involving complex sets of relationships, interests, and outcomes. Political or diplomatic influence is one of the many motives behind arms transfers from supplier states to developing countries. During the Cold War era, arms supply was perceived by both the United States and the USSR as an important tool for creating dependencies, patron-client ties, and alliance relationships. The superpowers behaved under a generally held, though not yet fully tested belief that the supply of arms served as a major instrument for international influence, often benefiting the strategic and political interests of the supplier. This article attempts to test the linkage between arms and influence by looking at the record of the U.S. arms transfer relationship with Pakistan during 1979-91. Two central questions are: did the U.S. succeed in building a patron-client relationship with Pakistan and to what extent did the arms supply provide the U.S. with tangible influence on outcomes in specific issue areas such as nuclear nonproliferation?

Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S.-Pakistani Relationship

Arms transfer is a multidimensional process involving complex sets of relationships ,interests, and outcomes. Political or diplomatic influence is one of the many motives behind arms transfers from supplier states to developing countries. During the Cold War era, arms supply was perceived by both the United States and the USSR as an important tool for creating dependencies ,patron-client ties, and alliance relationships.The super powers behaved under a generally held, though not yet fully tested belief that the supply of arms served as a major instrument for international influence, often benefiting the strategic and political interests of the supplier. This article attempts to test the linkage between arms and influence by looking at the record of the U.S. arms transfer relationship with Pakistan during 1979-91. Two central questions are: did the U.S. succeed in building a patron-client relationship with Pakistan and to what extent did the arms supply provide the U.S. with tangible influence on outcomes in specific issue areas such as nuclear non proliferation?

Portents of empire in Britain's Ottoman extraterritorial jurisdiction

The occupation of Egypt in 1882 is a bench-mark in the history of British hegemony in the Middle East.1 Its consequences point to the transition from the exercise of diplomatic influence and discrete instances of military intervention in the early and mid-Victorian years, to the sustained military and political intrusions in the Eastern Mediterranean of later periods. Confronted with persistent symptoms of instability in the East, the 'official mind' of Victorian England came to believe in the necessity of anchoring Britain's various interests around the strategic approaches to the Suez Canal and the route to India.2 By the end of the 1880s the change had become a fait accompli. A British administration in Cairo, under the special authority of a Consul-General representing the Foreign Office, had entrenched itself to oversee the government of the previously autonomous Ottoman province of Egypt. Portents, however, of the reasoning that would induce the British to cross this administrative Rubicon may be seen at work, earlier in the nineteenth century, in the 'professional mind' of Victorian jurists who encouraged the Foreign Office to formalize and entrench Britain's extraterritorial administration of justice in the ill-defined and mutable conditions of the Ottoman Empire. By 1860 the British Ambassador to the Ottoman Porte in Istanbul observed that the Embassy over which he presided was no ordinary one, 'but in reality an administration under different departments.'3 The branch of his 'administration' that most clearly threatened to intrude into the every-day government of the Ottoman Empire was its extraterritorial judiciature. It served British subjects interspersed in a mosaic of peoples of different religions, social conditions and geographic origins stretching from the Balkans in Europe to the region comprising the Eastern Mediterranean parts of Asia and North Africa, then called the Levant and now included in the Middle East. The Foreign Office found it necessary to concern itself with the life and customs of this distinctive pluralistic empire from early in the nineteenth century, not only because of the increasing number of British

Les loisirs de Philothée (review)

REVIEWS 81 desire. Dubost has unearthed a later text, L'Histoire du Prince Apprius (1729), which he places within this tradition because its codification of sexuality can be read as anagrams of desire (Apprius = Priapus). Moving on to such eighteenth-century texts as Les Egarements du coeur et de l'esprit (1738), Antl-Pamela (1742), and Vénus en rut (1771), Dubost characterizes libertine writing as unstable mimesis, exhausting itself in objectifying desire. On the other hand, libertinism exposes economic exchange as cunning, and individual freedom as a relentless process of appropriation: against his will, the immoral libertine turns into a moralist. A short section of the book considers works by Mirabeau, Nerciat, and Rétif de la Bretonne. Mirabeau's texts especially are seen as unique combinations of realism and libertine idealism. Bourgeois and libertine will converge, producing revolutionary energy. The final chapter discusses Sade, whose "cruel philosophy" Dubost regards as the quintessential and yet most alien form of libertine writing. Sade's libertine voice is the paradoxical negation of God and doubling of his omnipotence. Distinguishing between discourse and textuality, Dubost defines Sade's works as expositions of evil within and by the text. In these evil discourses, the reader does not encounter bodies but ideas. They are not perversions of morality but the flip side of the ethical coin: they expose the problematic nature of an essentially "empty" moral law (i.e., Kant's categorical imperative). Sade's works develop the imagery of evil itself, resulting in a never-ending anamnesis of inhuman man. In addition to a bibliography and an index, the appendix to Dubost's book contains a very useful anthology of key passages from the texts discussed in this study. Dubost has also provided excellent translations of these passages into German. Less helpful are the definitions of narratological terms given in the "methodological appendix," since they are, in most cases, too brief and will be obscure for those readers not familiar with Genette's works. Although the book occasionally suffers from an excessive use of jargon—especially in the introductory remarks—it is a fascinating study of the rhetoric of eroticism within the libertine tradition. Credit is also due to the author for the careful and detailed analysis of several texts that have been ignored so far by scholarship. Ulrich Scheck Queen's University Nicolas Mavrocordatos. Les loisirs de Philothée. Texte établi, traduit et comment é par Jacques Bouchard. Athènes et Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1989. 249pp. $35.00. The Phanariotes, aristocratie and educated Greeks who held high office in the Ottoman empire, do not fit very well either with the populist and nationalist ideology of the modem Greek state or with the Habsburg view of Turkey as a state of anti-Christian barbarians. Figures like Nicolas Mavrocordatos (1670-1730) thus receive far less attention than they deserve. Mavrocordatos was the quintessential Phanariote. His father, Alexandres, was Turkish plenipotentiary at the peace treaty at Karlowitz in 1699. Nicolas was a semi-independent prince in Moldavia (1704-1715) and Wallachia (1715-1730), but it was as an intellectual that he was admired in his own time. Alexandras obtained the finest Greek and Western teachers for his son, and used his diplomatic influence with the Venetian senate to find him the latest books. The court of Nicolas Mavrocordatos at Bucharest attempted, like many others, to realize the Platonic ideal of the philosopher king. 82 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FICTION 3:1 Nicolas, like his father a remarkable polyglot, chose to write in classical Greek, attempting to give it the same status that Latin still enjoyed in the West. The linguistic skills and intellectual stature of figures like Mavrocordatos help explain why the classicizing katharevousa form of Greek has given way only in the last few decades to the vernacular dhimotiki. Although the language was archaic, the ideas were not. In Les loisirs and On Duties (Leipzig, 1722), Mavrocordatos combined elements of classical culture (both Greek and Latin) with the best of the "tulip era" of Sultan Achmed ?? (1703-30) in Turkey and such Western figures as Bacon, Hobbes, and La Rochefoucauld. Jacques Bouchard faced a considerable challenge in presenting the work of...

The Decline of U.S. Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

THE DECLINE OF U.S. DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Gareth Porter O1 "ne ofthe first tasks ofthe new administration in foreign policy must be the reconstruction of U.S. diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Since 1977, the most striking feature of the politics of the region, apart from the violent character ofthe conflicts among Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cambodian communists, has been the sharp decline ofAmerican diplomatic influence. Despite the dominance of American military and economic power, the close political relationships between the United States and the states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the obvious interest of both Beijing and Hanoi in closer ties to the United States, Washington has become a passive and subordinate actor in the central issues in Southeast Asia. It has yielded the initiative to a coalition of states whose ability to define a common interest is doubtful , at best. Washington's low profile in the region reflects in part the fundamental readjustment in the relationships between the United States and the noncommunist states of Southeast Asia that followed the Vietnam war. The ASEAN states, no longer expecting—or desiring—U.S. military intervention in any local conflict in the region, have charted more independent paths in foreign policy than during the Vietnam war when ASEAN was established. The influence of ASEAN relative to all outside powers has been further enhanced by its greater unity since 1974 in the face of Hanoi's emergence as a new regional power. But the Carter administration's diplomatic passivity in an area where the United States still has security commitments and military presence does not simply mirror ASEAN's response to the Indochina Gareth Porter is associated with the Indochina Project ofthe Center for International Policy. He has long been involved in research, teaching, and writing on Southeast Asia, and formerly served as Saigon Bureau ChiefforDispatch News Service International. His most recent book is The Third Indochina War. 149 150 SAIS REVIEW war. The primary factors in the decline ofthe U.S. diplomatic-political role in the region have been subjective, rather than objective, in character : first, an overriding preoccupation with establishing a new strategic relationship with China, which has been given priority over regional concerns, and second, a lingering feeling that the United States should minimize its involvement in Indochina, from which it had been forced to leave in humiliation only a few years earlier. Because of these two constraints, American policy has not conformed to any long-term strategy. No policy in the region can be coherent unless it takes fully into account Vietnam's pivotal role both in relation to outside powers and to the rest of the region. By 1978, Vietnam had once again become the center of a major conflict involving the Soviet Union and China which would inevitably affect noncommunist Southeast Asia. The evolution of the conflict could hold the key to the balance of power in the region for years to come, and the United States had to decide how its own policy might influence that outcome. A crucial turning point in U.S. policy, relatively unnoticed at the time, occurred when the Carter administration rejected, in effect, any effort to exert such influence. Instead it substituted the new strategic alignment with China and automatic support for ASEAN initiatives to formulate an independent regional policy. As a result, the United States acquiesced and ultimately had to publicly support a rather pathetic effort by China, seconded by the ASEAN states, to use the remnants of the army of Cambodia's murderous Pol Pot regime as an instrument of leverage against Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. Lacking an independent diplomacy with Southeast Asia, the Carter administration not only reduced its own influence in the area to negligible proportions, but gave both China and the Soviet Union greater influence than either communist power would otherwise have had. The challenge to the Reagan administration, therefore, is to arrest and reverse the trends toward polarization, violence, and greater prominence for the Soviets and Chinese in the region by again playing a conscious role in maintaining the balance of power there. The situation in postwar Southeast Asia offered the United States an opportunity to play a...

Canada and Arms Control: Perspectives and Trends

The relationship between the military power of a state and its diplomatic influence in arms control negotiations is not always clear cut. While beyond any doubt the major powers remain the primary actors in this field, the voices of lesser states have been heard and, at times, even heeded. This has been particularly true in the multilateral debates over nuclear arms, the weapons which have most clearly distinguished the great powers from all the rest. On a number of occasions Canada has exercised an influence

The United States and the Andean Republics: Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador

1. Perspectives of Cultural Contrasts Individualism and Rising Expectations Patronalism-Clientelism, Corporativism, and Andean Cultural Patterns Patronalist-Clientelist Corporativism and the Image of the Limited Good The Nature of Government 2. The Social Matrix of the Andean Past Indians, the Hacienda, and the Frontier Experience in the Colonial Era Race Relations and Corporativism Education, Letters, and the Patronalist-Clientelist, Corporative Society Merchants and Landowners The Ideological Background to the Andean Independence Movement 3. Prelude to Chaos: The Implications of Independence Religion and the Implications of Independence Liberalism, Conservativism, and the Corporativism Issue Economic Collapse and the Blow to Liberalism Andean Krausists as Early Critics of Liberal Modernization Andean Regionalism The Racial Issue and the Implications of Independence 4. The Nineteenth-Century Quest for Stability and Progress Peru: Independence and the Age of Caudillos The Age of Castilla and of Guano Herrera versus Vigil Economic and Political Disintegration, 1868-1879 Bolivia: The Attainment of Independence The Rule of Sucre, Santa Cruz, and Ballivian, 1826-1847 Tata Belzu, the Precursor of Andean Populism, 1848-1855 Civilian and Military Rule, 1857-1879 Ecuador: Independence from Spain and Gran Colombia The Age of Flores, Rocafuerte, and Urbina, 1830-1860 The Age of Garcia Moreno and the Aftermath, 1861-1883 5. Rivalry, Diplomacy, War, and Reconstruction in the Nineteenth Century Intervention and Balance-of-Power Politics to the 1870s The War of the Pacific Reconstruction in Bolivia and Peru Ecuador, 1883-1895 6. The Apogee of Liberalism and the Rise of U.S. Influence, 1900-1920 Liberalism and the Indians Liberalism and the Church Progress and the Rise of a New Plutocracy The Penetration of U.S. Capital: Peru Bolivia Ecuador The Social Problem Surfaces Disillusionment with Liberalism 7. Andean Political Establishments and Transition, the 1920s Andean Political Establishments Respond to New Challenges: Leguia and the Political Establishment in Peru Saavedra and Siles and the Political Establishment in Bolivia Civilians, the Military, and the Political Establishment in Ecuador Intensification of U.S. Economic Penetration The Rise of U.S. Diplomatic Influence 8. Aspiring Elites and Transition Catholicism and Transition Marxism-Leninism and Transition Marxian Indianism and Revolutionary Transition The APRA and Its Formulas for Transition Prophets of Transition and U.S. Relations 9. Experiments with Reformism: The Depression and Wartime Years Populism in Peru and Ecuador, 1930-1934 The Chaco War and the Aftermath in Bolivia, 1930-1946 Weathering the Storm in Peru and Ecuador, 1934-1945 10. Revolution in Bolivia, Muddling Through in Peru and Ecuador, 1945-1960 Respectable Indianism in Andean America The Bolivian Social Revolution: The Revolution and the Indian or Campesino The Revolution and the Urban and Mining Sectors The Revolution and the United States The Old Order in Peru The Established Order and the Political Kaleidoscope in Ecuador 11. The Alliance for Progress and Andean Transitions, 1961-1968 Bolivia and the Attempt to Impose Order, 1960-1968 The Political Scene in Ecuador The Political Scene in Peru Breakdown of the Old Order: The Agrarian Sector Breakdown of the Old Order: The Urban Sector The United States and the Breakdown of the Old Order External Dependency Theories The Military and Its Perceived Role of Nation-Building 12. A New Era Emerges, 1968-1976 The View from Andean America Peru's New Corporativism and the Quest for Controlled Development Ecuador and the Transition to Military Corporativism Bolivia: Shifting Patterns of Military Rule The Catholic Church and the New Corporativism The Uncertain Prospects of Andean Corporativism 13. Epilogue: On Life and Culture in Postmodern Times Notes Index

Christian-Democratic Parties and Politics

Christian-democratic parties sprang to prominence only after the second world war, but their ancestry goes back to the Catholic movements of the nineteenth century, when industrialization and constitutional government were becoming the characteristic features of modern Europe. Against this background, new forces began to emerge, partly as champions of the new labouring masses; and Christianity was obliged to adapt itself to a new social and political situation. The adaptation began in the social field. Christian social reform movements, particularly successful in rural areas, were slow to develop parallel political action. In general, the church hierarchy was wary of political participation in governments that had some of their roots in anti-clerical liberalism although the church's attitude varied with the history of each government's relations with the Vatican. Once a working relationship had been established with Rome, the church came to tolerate, if not to encourage, the rise of Catholic parties. Throughout the nineteenth century, however, when the Vatican was fighting its long rearguard action to retain diplomatic influence in international affairs, Catholic parties were suspected of being pawns in the power game or even agents of foreign interests: they lost popularity at home as nationalism gained ground. Only gradually did the church manage to establish a new relationship with the nation-states that was no longer dependent on support from political parties. Paradoxically, however, the conflict between church and state was one factor in the rise of Christian-democracy. The phrase itself has meant different things since it was first used over a century ago; but it is not found in either Great Britain or the United States precisely those countries where, in contrast to continental Europe, no long-standing church-state conflict now exists. Elsewhere, after the clash between the claims of the temporal