State Diplomacy Research Articles

Europeanisation at Work in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea Region: Is There an All-European Way of Voting in the United Nations General Assembly?

Is there an all-European way of voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that transcends the borders of the European Union (EU) and affects, though differentially, the foreign policy of non-EU European states? To answer this question, this paper inquires into the voting behaviour in the UNGA of 12 non-EU states from the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region between 1993 and 2010. It assesses the voting distance of these non-EU states vis-à-vis EU positions, which it models either by proxy (using Luxembourg) or by unanimity. The paper finds that the multilateral diplomacy of most non-EU states has become distinctively convergent with EU preferences. It nevertheless observes notable cross-national variations, which it cannot trace back to differences in the non-EU states' institutional distance to the EU. While acknowledging the role of compliance mechanisms, the paper suggests that other mechanisms (e.g. simple and social learning) may be at work.

Mimicking state diplomacy: The legitimizing strategies of unofficial diplomacies

Diplomacy and recognition play central roles in the conventional conferral of state legitimacy and functioning of the inter-state system. In broadening the diplomatic frame by stepping outside the conventional state-system, this paper brings a poststructuralist and performative toolkit to mimetic diplomatic practices. Adapting Bhabha’s notion of mimicry to diplomatic discourse, it demonstrates how non-state diplomacies draw on, mimic and intervene in the realm of formal political action in ways which both promote ‘official’ state diplomacy as an ideal and dilute its distinction from other, ‘unofficial’ diplomacies. In thereby examining the enactment of international diplomacy in unexpected spaces, this paper brings together three empirical studies: a Government-in-Exile, a religious community and micropatrias (self-declared parodic nations). In each of these cases, attention focuses on: discourses of recognition; sovereignty and legitimacy; the diplomatic relationships fostered and institutions of diplomacy constructed; and the strategic position of such diplomacy vis-à-vis the conventional state-system. Unpacking the relationship between legitimacy, recognition and diplomacy and exploring the tension between state-centric and non-state diplomatic practices, this paper foregrounds the points of connection between the official and the unofficial. As a result, this paper expands the analytical gaze of diplomacy studies while incorporating lessons from the margins into our understandings of legitimacy, recognition, statecraft and sovereignty.

Emerging trends and concerns in the economic diplomacy of African states

Increased globalisation has played a key role in shaping recent trends and concerns in the economic diplomacy of African states. African states are increasingly interested in becoming more relevant actors in the global economy. The economic diplomacy of African states is primarily a diplomacy of development aimed at improving the quality of life of African citizens. Economic diplomacy at both bilateral and multilateral levels is helping to articulate the key concerns of African states. This diplomacy in recent years has been defined by the engagement of African states with non-traditional partners such as China, India and Brazil and also a strong impetus towards greater economic integration within Africa. The renewed economic growth of African states spurred a much bigger middle class and the discovery of new natural resources has helped to create a great economic interest in Africa by both Western and non-Western states that have sought to engage African governments so as to further their own interests in economic diplomacy. In order to enhance the articulation of their economic interests, African states need to overcome key trade and investment barriers that still exist.

Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy

It is increasingly obvious that Qatar is playing above its weight in the international role. There is no one script that defines Qatar's diplomatic role. It is best seen as a maverick, willing to work with the US as well as Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. It operates a complex form of public diplomacy via Al-Jazeera and other high profile initiatives at the same time as it mediates behind the scenes with Israel and Lebanon. Qatar's role as a unique hybrid diplomatic actor is reinforced by the enthusiastic support it displayed towards the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, including operational support for the UN Security Resolution to place a no-fly zone with respect to the Qaddafi's regime, while being more circumspect on the uprising in Bahrain. Such an extensive, unconventional and differentiated approach creates risks as well as opportunities. Yet, through a combination of resources and vision, it is skilled resilience not vulnerability that defines Qatar.

How and when the Gyeongguk daejeon System Dismantled?: A Study on Political Meaning of the Daehan Empire’s Birth

The Joseon dynasty, based on its approximate 500 year-long Gyeongguk daejeon system, maintained its two governmental features: internationally “respecting the senior state”(sadae) with China and “keeping friendship with neighboring countries”(kyorin)(Jurchin and Japan) on the one hand, while it domestically pursued respect for Confucian proprieties and conceded only relative sovereignty to the Joseon king on the other hand. This political system, however, was dismantled in 1897 following the birth of the Daehan Empire, which proclaimed itself as a self-reliant independent nation in the international community and in which unlimited sovereign authority was granted to the emperor. How is the Daehan Empire different from the Joseon Dynasty? For this, I compared the provisions of the Daehanguk gukje(hereafter, Gukje), which was established with the birth of the Daehan Empire in 1897, with those of the Gyeongguk daejeon as follows. First, Gukje states that the Daehan Empire is an independent empire that can make its own decisions regarding important matters of the Empire, such as the dispatch of diplomats, declarations of war, and conclusion of peace treaties. In comparison, Gyeongguk daejeon accepted a junior status to China and scrupulously observed the ritual practices of a tributary state, based on the tradition of “the respect for the senior state(sadae) diplomacy”. Second, another point to be noted is the stipulation that grants unlimited military power to the emperor. According to the Gukje, the emperor has the command of the military and naval forces, the right of enacting and enforcing laws, and even the power to pardon (Article 6). Compared with this, the royal authority prescribed in the Gyeongguk daejeon is relative. Unlike the Gukje, according to which the emperor is supposed to assume all responsibilities from the enactment of laws to the appointment of government officials, the Gyeongguk daejeon system makes it a principle to entrust all those responsibilities to ministers. The third difference is found in the upgrading of state rituals. Whereas the Gukjo oryeui established the norms for the state rituals at the kingdom level, the Daehan Empire raised all its state rituals to the level of those of an empire and stipulated the norms in the Daerye uigwe (Ceremony Manual for the Grand Rites). For example, the Daerye uigwe assigns to the country a different status from that specified in the Gukjo oryeui, which is a counterpart to the Gyeongguk daejeon.

Soft Power and State-Firm Diplomacy: Congress and IT Corporate Activity in China

In today’s globalized political economy, diplomacy between nation-states (state–state diplomacy) now exists alongside state–firm diplomacy, the negotiations between multinational corporations (MNCs) and the countries in which they do business. While the state must be committed to the interests of its MNCs in the interest of domestic state–firm diplomacy (maintaining a supportive business environment), it still has recourse to address failures in corporate diplomacy and to maintain the appearance of dominance on the world stage. This paper examined these strategies through a critical analysis of prepared testimony at the February 2006 congressional hearing regarding the controversial actions of four U.S. IT MNCs (Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Cisco) operating in China. I conclude that when the government is constrained from using its hard power on its MNCs, soft power becomes its most effective tool. Image, suggestion, and appearance—soft power—can be considered more important than legislation itself—hard power—and perhaps even the currency of current state–firm relations.

Conflict Management and Communicative Action: Second-Track Diplomacy from a Habermasian Perspective

Many critics have called Jurgen Habermas’s concepts of communicative action theoretically interesting but not practically viable. Traditional conflict management in the form of negotiation and state diplomacy leaves little room for Habermasian communication theory and could count as another example of the inapplicability of his ideas. However, with the advent of new conflict resolution practices in the form of second-track diplomacy, Habermasian communication theories seem to be applied in new ways, which this article will analyze.

One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War, and: The Blessed Place of Freedom: Europeans in Civil War America (review)

Reviewed by: One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War, and: The Blessed Place of Freedom: Europeans in Civil War America Hugh Dubrulle One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War. By Dean B. Mahin. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, Inc., 1999. Pp. 342. Cloth, $27.95; paper $21.95.) The Blessed Place of Freedom: Europeans in Civil War America. By Dean B. Mahin. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, Inc., 2002. Pp. 298. Cloth, $27.95.) By writing One War at a Time and The Blessed Place of Freedom, Dean Mahin has undertaken two very large and complex tasks. In the former work, he seeks to capture the international impact of the Civil War while stressing the role of Abraham Lincoln in guiding Federal foreign policy. With the latter, he attempts to examine the part Europeans played in the conflict and dwells on their Civil War experiences. The war's global impact, particularly the British public's opinions about the conflict, has already inspired much strong scholarship. D. P. Crook's The North, the South and the Powers, 1861–1865 (1974) remains an excellent overall survey of the international diplomacy associated with the war while R. J. M. Blackett's Divided Hearts (2001) is perhaps the best study of British attitudes. Mahin's ambitions, however, are surely justified when dealing with Europeans' participation in the Civil War. Not since Ella Lonn's Foreigners in the Confederacy (1940) and Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (1951) has anyone attempted a comprehensive survey of this enormous field. In One War at a Time, the author is at his best when explaining the complex diplomatic maneuvering revolving around events like the Trent affair, the crisis associated with the escape of the Alabama from Liverpool, and the difficulties stemming with the Laird rams. Mahin's clear narrative serves as a good introduction to these events. Mahin also displays a good eye for telling quotations that provide his narrative with color. Unfortunately, this narrative, particularly in One War at a Time, is often disrupted by staccato-like chapters that focus on one small bit of the picture at a time. [End Page 325] This approach makes it difficult to comprehend the important connections between all the bits so important to understanding international diplomacy. Mahin tackles British and French policy toward America in different chapters, an awkward approach when each state's diplomacy depended on the other. For instance, the story of John Roebuck's 1863 parliamentary motion to recognize the Confederacy is difficult to understand without extensive reference to Napoleon III. Mahin's judgments, however, are quite astute, especially with regard to Lincoln and William Seward. Mahin also performs a great service by providing a highly critical reassessment of Lord Lyons, the British minister to Washington, D.C., from 1859 to 1864. Long praised by historians for his discretion, Lyons repeatedly provided poor intelligence to his government. If Mahin is critical of Lyons, he is perhaps not critical enough in his approach to both primary and secondary sources. Mahin seems unfamiliar with the findings of recent historiography, especially in One War at a Time. He still employs a traditional social interpretation of British public opinion during the war, asserting the upper classes championed the South while the working classes supported the North—a notion long discarded by historians in the field. Mahin also relies extremely heavily on published English-speaking sources (along with a smattering of German works). This reliance not only proves something of a handicap in covering the foreign policy of France and events in Mexico, both of which assumed much importance in Civil War diplomacy, but also in examining the immigrant experience during the conflict. Particularly in The Blessed Place of Freedom, Mahin displays an unwillingness to analyze his primary sources, writing, "I have preferred to let Europeans speak for themselves rather than to attempt to generalize about their reactions" (x). Although this stance makes for intriguing reading, it also leads him to take an uncritical attitude toward the sources. Mahin uses Northern diplomats, like Charles Francis Adams, to assess British public opinion or strongly pro-Confederate British observers, such as...

Reconciliation, Assimilation, and the Indigenous Peoples of Australia

Reconciliation as a peacemaking paradigm emerged as an innovative response to some of the mass atrocities and human rights violations that marked the 20th century. It provided an alternative to traditional state diplomacy and realpolitik that focused on restoring and rebuilding relationships. To that end, those creating reconciliation processes have set themselves the difficult task of laying the foundations for forgiveness through the establishment of truth, acknowledgment of harm, and the provision of appropriate forms of justice. In 1991, the Australian government instigated a process of reconciliation between the indigenous peoples and wider society in order to “address progressively” colonial injustice and its legacy (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991: Preamble). This article seeks to demonstrate, however, that restrictive policy framing and a lack of political will have severely hindered the progress of the Australian reconciliation process. An alternative conceptual approach to settler state and indigenous reconciliation is suggested.

Australian 'Aboriginal' Reconciliation: The Latest Phase in the Colonial Project 1

In the 1990s several countries that had been divided by episodes of mass violence or gross human rights violations instigated projects of national ‘reconciliation’. Reconciliation initiatives sought to provide an alternative to traditional state diplomacy and realpolitik by focusing on restoring and rebuilding relationships in novel and context sensitive ways that promoted state legitimacy, forgiveness and social stability. In 1991 the Australian parliament unanimously passed the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act, which heralded the start of a process of reconciliation between the indigenous peoples and wider society. The Preamble to the Act founded the need for a reconciliation process on the injustice of colonial dispossession and on the continuing dispersal of indigenous people from their traditional lands. Yet, as this paper will show, the notion of ‘justice’ was deemed inappropriate from the start, and the resulting process was framed in a nation building discourse that placed a definite ceil...

Australian ‘Aboriginal’ Reconciliation: The Latest Phase in the Colonial Project

In the 1990s several countries that had been divided by episodes of mass violence or gross human rights violations instigated projects of national ‘reconciliation’. Reconciliation initiatives sought to provide an alternative to traditional state diplomacy and realpolitik by focusing on restoring and rebuilding relationships in novel and context sensitive ways that promoted state legitimacy, forgiveness and social stability. In 1991 the Australian parliament unanimously passed the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act, which heralded the start of a process of reconciliation between the indigenous peoples and wider society. The Preamble to the Act founded the need for a reconciliation process on the injustice of colonial dispossession and on the continuing dispersal of indigenous people from their traditional lands. Yet, as this paper will show, the notion of ‘justice’ was deemed inappropriate from the start, and the resulting process was framed in a nation building discourse that placed a definite ceiling on indigenous aspirations. This paper seeks to demonstrate that, far from being a genuine attempt at atonement that is responsive to indigenous aspirations, Official Reconciliation exhibits a subtle, yet pervasive, assimilationist agenda, and consequently the process should be understood as but the latest phase in the colonial project. The paper will conclude by suggesting a de-colonising approach to reconciliation that addresses the problem of internal colonisation and which more closely reflects indigenous aspirations.

Burgeoning Transnationalism of Taiwan's Social Movement NGOs

So far as Taiwan's foreign relations are concerned, in parallel to the state's diplomacy and state-blessed Track-II maneuvering, there has emerged a more natural and meaningful phenomenon: i.e. grassroots solidarity between Taiwanese activist NGOs and their foreign counterparts, as a result of the joint pursuit of common social justice goals. It is high time that voluntary transnational activism was studied for a more comprehensive understanding of Taiwan's foreign relations in the era of democratization and surging activism of transnational social movement campaigns. This paper discusses the internationalization of Taiwan's social movement NGOs: their background, motivations, activities, and roles in transnational politics. Special attention is paid to the fact that while Taiwanese NGO activities in the transnational NGO community by nature ignore and disregard the state's diplomatic interests, both the quality and quantity of such activities have been severely restricted by Taiwan's poor diplomatic status in the inter-state community. This is a unique paradox not studied in the mainstream discourse on transnational civil society.

How the United States Sold its Soul to Win the Cold War

Distinguished Research Professor of History at Montana State University. This is a slightly amended version of an address delivered to women historians at the annual meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), Toronto, June 2000.AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, the United States had an opportunity to take stock and shoulder responsibility not just for the future but also for some of the less savoury aspects of the last fifty years of American foreign policy. Unfortunately, this honest and systematic re-evaluation has yet to take place - in part because American diplomacy for most of the last century was characterized by a mercurial assortment of unilateral and collective actions that I first described in the 1970s as 'independent internationalism.'Independent internationalism does not, however, refer to the ideology that imbued United States diplomacy by 1900, but rather to the modus operandi of the country's foreign affairs. Most simply, it means that when the United States cannot, or does not want to, solve a particular diplomatic problem through unilateral action, it seeks co-operative methods to pursue its goals. In these short-lived and usually opportunistic times of co-operation, the shibboleths of self-determination or self-government, wrapped in the rhetoric of democracy, prevail in American foreign policy discourse. But the country's first inclination for most of the last century was to act unilaterally whenever possible and to co-operate with other nations only when absolutely necessary.(1)With the cold war over, it should be possible for American foreign affairs experts and scholars to reassess traditional strategies for controlling nation-state anarchy between (and sometimes inside the poorest) nation-states and to devise a less erratic and arbitrary way of implementing them, other than independent internationalism, to serve the best interests of the United States and the world. (Of course, to do so realistically, they must now factor in the 'irreversible effects' of modern information technology, not only on capitalism but also on the nation-state system.)The trend towards independent internationalism can be seen as early as 1933 when a presidential commission reported to Herbert Hoover that the postwar diplomacy of the United States in the 1920s had alternated 'between isolation and independence, between sharply marked economic nationalism and notable international initiatives in cooperation moving in a highly unstable zigzag course.'(2) The United States continued to follow this 'highly unstable zigzag course' in the 1930s, again after the Second World War when its power was unprecedented, and yet again in the post-cold war era. The latest, largest, and nominally co-operative effort took place during the 1990-1 GulfWar. Its most recent unilateral action, taken much to the consternation of Russia and the European allies of the United States, was the decision to construct an anti-missile defence system in violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. (An earlier unilateral action that had disconcerted the same countries was the insistence of the administration of President Bill Clinton on expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.) The foreign policy of George Bush junior in the first six months of his presidency has been almost completely along unilateral lines.Prior to 1933, the stage had been set for the independent internationalist course that the United States would follow for most of the twentieth century. By the time of the 'splendid little' Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino war (1900), the United States not only acquired an overseas empire and tried to assert itself unilaterally into the affairs of the world for economic gain with 'dollar diplomacy' under Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, but also had developed a foreign policy ideology - all the while refusing to use the word ideology because of its leftist taint. …

The United Nations and low politics: Environmental & human security in East Asia*

In a world order characterized by ideological conflicts, low politics’ usually goes by the wayside. Policymakers focus on ‘high politics’ such as issues on state security, diplomacy and warfare. The September 11th attack was an epitome of terrorism that calls for not only the protection of territorial and political security of the state but also the safeguarding of the individual or group from all threats to human survival. This paper raises the issues on ‘environmental security’ and ‘human security,’ particularly in the context of East Asia and reviews the efforts of the United Nations to safeguard the global environment and human rights. Finally, this paper reflects on the future role of the United Nations in non‐traditional security arenas with special emphasis on its role in East Asia.

Environmental Diplomacy of States, Corporations and Non-Governmental Organizations: the Worldwide Web of Influence

Environmental Diplomacy of States, Corporations and Non-Governmental Organizations: the Worldwide Web of Influence

John L. Offner. <italic>An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895–1898</italic>. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1992. Pp. xii, 306. Cloth $39.95, paper $14.95

John L. Offner. <italic>An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895–1898</italic>. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1992. Pp. xii, 306. Cloth $39.95, paper $14.95

Book reviews

V. Kubalkova and A. A. Cruickshank, Marxism‐Leninism and Theory of International Relations. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980, pp. 411. £UK14.75 Carsten Holbraad, Superpowers and International Conflict. Macmillan, London, 1979. 178pp. $A39.95. P. J. Boyce, Foreign Affairs for New States: Some Questions of Credentials. University of Queensland Press, 1977, pp. xii 289. $17.95. Ralph Pettman, Small Power Politics and International Relations in South‐East Asia. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976, pp. 160. $6.75. Stewart Harris, "Its Coming Yet . . .”: An Aboriginal Treaty within Australia, Between Australians. The Aboriginal Treaty Committee, Canberra, distributed by Angus and Robertson (Australia), Sydney, 1979, pp. 87. $6.95. Alexander Mamak and Grant McCall (eds.), Paradise Postponed: Essays on Research and Development in the South Pacific. Perfamon Press, Rushcutters Bay, 1978, pp. 217. $9.95. Alexander Mamak, Colour, Culture and Conflict: A Study of Pluralism in Fiji. Pergamon Press, Rushcutters Bay, 1978, pp. 203. $9.95. John Connell, Taint Bilong Mani: The Evoluation of Agriculture in a Solomon Island Society. Development Studies Centre Monograph No. 12, Australian National University, 1978, pp. xii., 274. $A9.00. Samuel S. Kim, China, The United Nations and World Order. Princeton University Press, Princeton N. J., 1979, pp. 551. $US41.00. Harry G. Gelber, Technology, Defence, and External Relations in China, 1975–78. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1979, pp. 235. $US18.50. Stuart E. Johnson with Joseph A. Yager, The Military Equation in North‐East Asia. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1979, pp. 87. $US35.35. Anthony Reid and David Marr (eds.), Perceptions of the Past in South‐East Asia. ience Heinemann Asia, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, for ASAA South‐East Asia Publications Series, 1979, pp. 436. $21.50 (cloth), $9.50 (paper). Matsumoto (ed.), South‐East Asia in a Changing World. Institute of Developing Economics, Tokyo, 1980, pp. 242. $US15.00. Bill Nicol, Timor. The Stillborn Nation. Visa Books, Melbourne, 1978, pp. x 328. $8.95. R. J. May (ed.), The Indonesian‐Papua New Guinea Border: Irianese Nationalism and Small State Diplomacy. Department of Political and Social Change Working Paper No. 2, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, August 1979, pp. ii 142. $3.00. James C. Jackson and Martin Rudner (eds.), Issues in Malaysian Development. Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd, Singapore, for the Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1979, pp. 418. $19.50 (cloth), $9.80 (paper). Michael Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia. The Indian Case. University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1980, pp. 234. $15.95. Peter Gordon Gowing, Muslim Filipinos—Heritage and Horizon. New Day Publishers, Quezon City, 1979, pp. 286. No price given. Andrew Beveridge and Anthony Oberschall, African Businessmen and Development in Zambia. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1979, pp. 382. $US28.50. Sven Lindqvist, Land and Power in South America. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1979, pp. 333. $6.95. SIPRI, Warfare in a Fragile World: Military Impact on the Human Environment. Taylor and Francis, London, 1980, 249 pages. £9 or $US27.50. SIPRI, Chemical Weapons: Destruction and Conversion. Taylor and Francis, London, 1980, 201 pages £6.50. Justus D. Doenecke, Not to the Swift: the Old Isolation in the Cold War Era. Associated University Press, N. J., 1979. pp. 289. $US8.95.

New State Diplomacy - Peter J. Boyce: Foreign Affairs for New States: Some Questions of Credentials. (New York: St.Martin's, 1978. Pp. xi, 289. $19.95.)

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Turkish Foreign Policy 1943–1945. Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics

Turkish Foreign Policy 1943–1945. Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics Get access Turkish Foreign Policy 1943–1945. Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics. By Edward Weisband. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press under the auspices of the Center for International Studies, New York University. 1973. 377 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Studies in Peaceful Change.) £6⋅70. $14.50. William Hale William Hale Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 50, Issue 2, April 1974, Pages 308–309, https://doi.org/10.2307/2616724 Published: 01 April 1974

Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics

Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics