ABSTRACT The rise of illiberal powers, notably China and Russia, has stoked heated debates on their impact on democratic backsliding. However, the actual extent to which they undermine democratic governance in foreign countries remains contested. What roles do China and Russia play in contemporary backsliding? Under what conditions do they succeed or fail in spreading illiberal practices? China and Russia promote discrete illiberal practices in different places, but their efforts do not always succeed. While certain foreign policy strategies have effectively attracted and empowered like-minded foreign actors, others have obstructed political diffusion instead. We argue that the Chinese governance model of digital authoritarianism has increasingly spread to the periphery of the dominant international order after 2014. On the other hand, the Russian model of super-presidentialism, once prevalent in the former Soviet bloc, has experienced significant setbacks after 2014, when Russia increasingly came to be perceived as a security threat. We present corroborating evidence through difference-in-differences analyses and additional validation using placebo tests. This research sheds light on the international dimensions of democratic backsliding and reconciles conflicting findings in the literature by identifying distinct Chinese and Russian models, as well as the conditions under which their diffusion succeeded or faltered.
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